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 ABSTRACT 
 
Nella tesi si dimostra come il tema dell’universale si sia manifestato principalmente nelle 
controversie ariane del quarto secolo e nei lavori dei padri cappadoci, come anche nella filosofia 
antica e nella tradizione orientale cristiana filosofica e teologica. Parlando dell’“universale”, 
intendo realtà universali di ogni tipo (incluse le proprietà comuni a molti individui come i 
principi trascendentali applicati ai tipi di essere ad essi partecipanti, i legami della gerarchia 
dell’essere tra cui la moltitudine degli individui ecc.) e non solo i termini di κοινόν e καθόλου o 
la nozione di un universale inteso nel senso tecnico normativo dal punto di vista dell’uso del 
termine nel discorso storico e filosofico.  
Nella tesi possono essere individuati tre temi principali. In primo luogo, il tema della 
partecipazione. Distinguo tre paradigmi della partecipazione rispetto al problema dell’universale 
caratteristici della filosofia antica: il paradigma platonico, aristotelico e neoplatonico. Dimostro 
che il paradigma platonico trova espressione in Origene, Ario e Gregorio di Nissa, quello 
aristotelico in Origene e Gregorio di Nissa e quello neoplatonico, come propongo, in Ario. In 
secondo luogo si tratta il tema dell’applicazione della divisione genera-species all’essere 
intelligente. Ricostruisco la storia intellettuale della seconda tappa delle controversie ariane per 
cui, in risposta alla dottrina di Vasilio di Cesarea sul fatto che la comunanza dell’identità della 
Trinità sarebbe analoga alla comunanza dell’aspetto rispetto agli individui, Eunomio, al fine dei 
confutare questa dottrina, avrebbe insistito che la divisione genera-species non sia applicabile 
all’essere immateriale. Ricerco le origini di questo concetto nel platonismo antico e cristiano. In 
terzo luogo, si affronta il tema della gerarchia dell’essere. Secondo la mia visione nella dottrina 
di Gregorio di Nissa questo tema ha un ruolo fondamentale. Dimostro che Gregorio di Nissa 
prese in prestito l’ordine dei componenti della gerarchia dell’essere dal cosiddetto albero di 
Porfirio, nello sviluppare questo argomento vi introdusse elementi platonici, aristotelici e stoici e 
cambiò l’ordine dei componenti in relazione all’ordine biblico della creazione. Inoltre analizzo lo 
sviluppo del tema della gerarchia dell’essere nel conseguente pensiero orientale cristiano e 
l’influenza di Gregorio di Nissa in questo senso. Mi soffermo inoltre sul tema 
dell’individuazione attraverso la convergenza delle proprietà nel pensiero di Vasilio di Cesarea e 
studio lo stato delle proprietà comuni nell’ambito del concetto di individuazione. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
This dissertation has demonstrated how the topic of the universal was manifested mainly in 
the Arian controversy of the fourth century and the works of the Cappadocian Fathers, as well as 
in the Ancient philosophy and the previous and late Eastern Christian philosophical and 
theological tradition.  By speaking of the “universal,” I mean the universal realities of any type 
(including the properties common to many individuals such as transcendental principles applied 
to the types of beings participating in them, the links in the hierarchy of beings encompassing the 
multitude of individuals, etc.), and not only the terms of κοινόν and καθόλου or the notion of a 
universal understood in the normative technical sense from the viewpoint of the use of the term 
in the historical and philosophical discourse. The dissertation focuses on three main topics. 
Firstly, it is the topic of participation. In a wider context of analyzing the role of universals, I 
distinguish three paradigms of participation, typically used in classical philosophy: the Platonic, 
the Aristotelian, and the Neoplatonic paradigms. It is demonstrated how the Platonic paradigm 
found its expression in Origen, Arius, and Gregory of Nyssa; the Aristotelian paradigm – in 
Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, and the Neoplatonic paradigm, as I am suggesting, in Arius. 
Secondly, the dissertation addresses the topic of applicability of individuals / species division to 
rational beings. From that perspective, I reconstruct the intellectual history of the second phase 
of the Arian controversy. In response to the doctrine of Basil of Caesarea that commonness in the 
Persons of the Holy Trinity was similar to the commonness of the species in respect to their 
constituent individuals, and attempting to refute this doctrine, Eunomius insisted that individuals 
/ species division was inapplicable to immaterial beings. I trace the origins of this concept in the 
Platonism of Antiquity and in Christian Platonism. Thirdly, the dissertation analyzes the topic of 
the hierarchy of beings. In my opinion, this topic played a paramount role in the teaching of 
Gregory of Nyssa. I demonstrate that Gregory of Nyssa adopted the order of the levels in his 
hierarchy of beings from the so-called Tree of Porphyry, in the process introducing some 
Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic elements, and changing the order of the levels in accordance 
with the Scriptural order of creation. I also trace how the topic of the hierarchy of beings evolved 
in the subsequent Eastern Christian thought, and what was the impact of Gregory of Nyssa in this 
regard. In addition, I address the topic of individuation through the convergence of properties in 
Basil of Caesarea, and discuss the status of general properties in his concept of individuation. 
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Introduction 
 
 
In the first centuries after its emergence, the Eastern Christian civilization developed a 
rich intellectual tradition which made a significant impact on the subsequent periods. On the one 
hand, the Eastern Christian philosophical thought of the first centuries A.D. addressed problems 
common for the history of philosophy (the problem of universals, the psychophysical problem, 
the topic of the ontological hierarchy of beings, etc.), while, on the other hand, it dealt with fairly 
narrow issues specific for the Early Christian thought (Trinitarian doctrine, Christology, 
Pneumatology, etc.). 
The presence of circle of specific subjects playing a particularly important role in 
Christian thought resulted in the emergence of the phenomenon of dogmatic (in a technical sense 
of the word) thinking within the Christian civilization. From the viewpoint of that paradigm, 
religious and philosophical doctrines which developed over the course of numerous and intense 
debates, received their authorized formulations in the conciliar decrees and became largely 
“dogmatized” in the process. In the course of this dogmatization, certain trends and traditions 
which had existed in the Eastern Christian philosophical tradition, went out of sight or entirely 
disappeared; other traditions remained on the surface and were actively elaborated. 
At the same time, Eastern Christian philosophical thought was in close contact with the 
non-Christian classical philosophical tradition, often rhetorically denying it and arguing with it, 
yet, at the same time, taking the most important concepts from it, which the representatives of 
the Christian philosophical thought in different ways reshaped for their own purposes. Thus, 
many Christian thinkers and intellectual movements (including the ecclesiastical parties) 
borrowed certain provisions both from the previous Christian intellectual tradition and from the 
philosophical doctrines of Antiquity. The struggle and interaction of these movements in Early 
Christianity resulted in the formation of intellectual discourse which would become fundamental 
for the further development of Christian civilization. 
Keeping this in mind, it should be pointed out that the relevance of the present study is 
tied with the need to clarify the diversity of intellectual trends which were followed in the early 
period of the Eastern Christian philosophical tradition, particularly in the fourth century, in their 
relation to various trends of the classical non-Christian philosophical tradition and regardless of 
their belonging to the dogmatically established trend. 
For doing this, I chose the topic of the universal which, on the one hand, could reveal the 
continuity of Eastern Christian thought in its relation to the classical philosophical tradition and 
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which therefore could be considered one of the paradigmatic themes for understanding the 
specific nature of the Eastern Christian intellectual discourse in the history of philosophy. On the 
other hand, this topic as applied to the Eastern Christian intellectual tradition has remained 
largely unexplored in the academic literature, at least under the angle with which it is addressed 
in this study, namely, the subject of the universal in the Cappadocian Fathers and in the Arian 
controversy of the fourth century. 
By speaking of the “universal,” I mean the universal realities of any type (including the 
properties common to many individuals such as transcendental principles applied to the types of 
beings participating in them, the links in the hierarchy of beings encompassing the multitude of 
individuals, etc.), and not only the terms of κοινόν and καθόλου or the notion of a universal 
understood in the normative technical sense from the viewpoint of the use of the term in the 
historical and philosophical discourse. 
It seems that the philosophical language of the Eastern Christian tradition was 
significantly influenced by the paradigms of understanding the concept of participation in its 
relationship with the notion of the universal – the Platonic and Aristotelian paradigms as well as 
the Neoplatonic paradigm, which was formed on their basis. These paradigms surfaced in the 
Eastern Christian philosophical tradition in various ways and were used differently in respect to 
the same subjects by the classical authors as well as by Early and Late Byzantine Christian 
authors. This consideration leads to the fact that even within the Orthodox Eastern Christian 
intellectual tradition we may find inconsistencies between the Early Christian authors and the 
authors of the later periods due to their use of different philosophical paradigms of participation 
for describing the connection of the man with the transcendental principle, which almost entirely 
escaped the attention of scholars. In this study, these paradigms of participation will be identified 
in their relation to the problems of the universal in the Early Christian thought. In the final 
chapter a brief overview of how these paradigms were reshaped in respect to the subject of the 
hierarchy of beings in the subsequent Eastern Christian tradition, will be provided. 
In addition to the topic of the hierarchy of beings, other key topics addressed in this 
dissertation are associated with the applicability of the Aristotelian categories (first of all, the 
second category of substance), and with the topic of individuation. Each of these topics is 
essential for understanding the specific nature of the Eastern Christian philosophical tradition, 
both of the fourth century and in general.   
The sources for this study include the writings of authors from Early Antiquity to the Late 
Byzantine period, generally written in the Old Greek language. During the work on the 
dissertation, the critical editions of primary sources were used. In the absence of critical editions, 
the Database Thesaurus linguae graecae, Digital Library of Greek Literature, and for the 
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Eastern Christian writers, the texts collected in J. P. Migne, Patrologiae Cursus Completus. 
Series Graeca were employed. 
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Chapter 1, “Paradigms of Participation in the context of the Topic of Universals 
 in the Classical Philosophical Tradition” 
 
  
For the first time in philosophy the concept of “participation” as a term seems to have 
appeared in Plato. The present author will not touch upon all the meanings which the concept of 
participation entails in Plato, and will only mention several points, important for the following 
analysis. 
For expressing the idea of connection between things and Platonic ideas, Plato used the 
notions of μέθεξις, μετοχή, μετάληψις, the terms κοινωνία и κοινωνέω with similar meaning, the 
verb μεταλαμβάνειν,1 and their derivatives.2 In his later dialogues Plato used the notions of 
“image”, “likeness,” and “imitation” (εικών, ὁμοίωμα, μίμησις) for describing the relations 
between things and ideas. The Platonic concept was possibly influenced by Anaxagoras3 who 
said that everything had a part in everything (πάντα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει), while the Mind 
remained unmixed.4 In Phaedo in particular, but also in some other dialogues, Plato spoke about 
participation of the individual in ideas. According to this understanding of participation, 
paradigmatic for philosophical and theological thought of the later periods, “something 
according to participation” meant the opposite to “something according to being;” for instance, a 
being different from the One participated in it, otherwise it would have been the One itself.5 This 
opposition of the participating and the participated is expressed in Sophist, where “something 
according to participation” was opposed to “something according to its nature” (κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ 
φύσιν).6 In a very general sense, in this paradigm, participation pointed to the fact that some 
being had a certain quality (in this case the unity) to a lesser degree, than the being personifying 
                                                 
1 In Greek the notion μετέχειν (the verb is derived from the noun μέθεξις) describes the state of 
participation, while the notion μεταλαμβάνειν describes the process of achieving that state; κοινωνεῖν also has 
connotations of transitivity and described the common possession of something, while μετέχειν has connotations 
of single directedness in relation to participation and describes the participation of something in something else 
rather than the common possession of something by several beings. 
2 There are too many relevant fragments in Plato’s works to be listed here. Cf. the corresponding 
meanings of the notions in the index of platonic terms: E. DES PLACES, Lexique de la langue philosophique et 
religieuse de Platon, Paris 1964, s. v. μετέχειν (pp. 340–341), μετοχή (p. 342), μεταλαμβάνειν (p. 338), κοινωνία 
(pp. 292–294), κοινωνός (p. 294). In general about the concept of participation in Plato see in particular: A. 
HENAMAS, Participation and Predication in Plato’s later Thought, “Review of Metaphysics”, 36 (1982); N. 
FUJISAWA, Ἔχειν, μετέχειν, and Idioms of Paradeigmadsm in Plato's Theory of Forms, “Phronesis”, 19 (1974); 
F.-G. HERRMAN, Μετέχειν, μεταλαμβάνειν and the Problem of Participation in Plato's Ontology, “Philosophical 
Inquiry”, 15 (2003), fasc. 3-4; Ch. BIGGER, Participation: A Platonic Inquiry, Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State 
University Press 1968. 
3 Cf.: F.-G. HERRMAN, Μετέχειν, μεταλαμβάνειν, pp. 42–48. 
4 SIMPL. In Phys. 164, 24 and 25 = DK 59B6, 12.  
5 PLATO. Parm. 158а. 
6 PLATO. Soph. 250a-c, cf.: F. ADEMOLLO, Plato’s Conception of the Forms: Some Remarks, in R. 
Chiaradonna, G. Galluzzo (eds.) Universals in Ancient Philosophy, Pisa 2013, pp. 73–74. 
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this quality, or the quality as such (in this case – the One), and the participated quality acted as 
the transcendental cause for the participating entity. In this relation the concept of participation 
had a double function in the texts of Plato: causal and explanatory (since the participated entity 
was also the object of knowledge).7 This understanding may be called a normative Platonic 
understanding of causality; it was subsequently used by Plotinus,8 Proclus, and others. In his 
dialogues, Plato used the concept of “the participating one” (μετέχοντα),9 in particular, for 
pointing at the being which participated in ideas (qualities per se). In this respect this concept 
would play an important role in the future, and in Christian thought in particular. 
 Nevertheless, in the first part of Parmenides, Plato expressed something which might have 
been considered a critical attitude toward the concept of participation of individual beings in 
ideas (130e–131c). From the viewpoint of this critique, the notion of participation possessed the 
material connotations typical for the teaching of Anaxagoras.10 Here the participation was 
understood in the sense of material presence of the participated in the participating. In the 
critique in Parmenides 131a–e, participation was described as possession of a part of the 
participated. In this respect Plato formulated (131b7–9) his famous likening of participation to 
canvas as having different parts. This understanding would also be manifested in later periods, in 
particular, in Christian thought. 
Aristotle’s criticism of Plato included the Platonic concept of participation of things in 
ideas,11 following the critique of this concept presented in Parmenides by Plato himself. 
However, Aristotle slightly changed the meaning of that concept. Elaborating on the notions of 
genus, species, difference of species, etc., in his logical writings, Aristotle spoke about 
participation (μετέχος), implying the logical relations between genus’ and species’ predicables of 
different grades of commonality: less general participated in more general, while the latter did 
not participate in the former. Thus, according to Aristotle, individuals participated in their 
species and genus. Thus, “according to causality” meant to Aristotle the same as “according to 
being,” or “nature.” From the viewpoint of this paradigm, the participation of A in B meant that 
B was a being, immanent in relation to A, and not transcendental, as we see in the Platonic 
paradigm of participation. Unlike Plato, who could speak of greater and lesser degrees of 
participation, Aristotle’s view did not imply any measurement of participation.  
                                                 
7 S. STRANGE, Plotinus’ Account of Participation in Ennead VI.4-5, “Journal of the History of Philosopy” 
30 (1992), fasc. 4, p. 486. 
8 See for example: PLOT. Enn. 5, 5, 13. 
9 See the index of passages in: L. BRANDWOOD, Word Index to Plato, Leeds 1976, s. v. μετέχοντα (р. 
575). 
10 Cf.: F.-G. HERRMAN, Μετέχειν, μεταλαμβάνειν, pp. 46–48. 
11 ARIST. Met. A 6, 987b10–14; A 9, 990b27–991a8, 991a22ff, ср. 1079a25ff. On the subject of 
participation in Aristotle see.: M. PHILIPPE, La partipation dans la philosophie d'Aristote, “Revue Thomiste” 49 
(1949), pp. 254-277. 
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In Topica Aristotle wrote: 
 
You must see whether it is necessary or possible for the genus to participate 
(μετέχειν) in that which has been placed in the genus. (The definition (ὅρος) of  
‘participation’ is ‘admitting the logos of that which is participated.') (τὸ ἐπιδέχεσθαι 
τὸν τοῦ μετεχομένου λόγον). It is obvious, therefore, that the species participate in 
the genera, whereas the genera do not participate in the species ; for the species 
admits the logos of the genus, whereas the genus does not admit the logos of the 
species.12 
 
 Nor is the differentia generally held to participate in the genus; for 
everything which participates in the genus is either a species or an individual 
(ἄτομον), but the differentia is neither a species nor an individual.13 
 
Aristotle used the concept of participation to illustrate one of the theses of classical logic 
(founded by himself), according to which everything which belonged to a genus, also belonged 
to the species and the individual, but not the other way around.14 Therefore, participation of the 
individual in its genus and species in this conceptual framework meant that it participated in its 
“logos of substance” (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας), or “secondary substance.”15 
Thus, if the Platonic paradigm of participation assumed that the participated element acted 
as a universal-before-things (if this element is participated in by many things in the same respect, 
and not by a single thing), the Aristotelian paradigm of participation assumed that the 
participated was a universal-in-things. Such a universal was not a transcendental idea, but the 
substance of the thing (or the second substance in the terms of the Categories), embedded into 
the thing itself, and not an idea transcendental to it. 
In addition to the Platonic and the Aristotelian paradigms of participation mentioned 
above, the texts of Antiquity employed this concept in a “neutral” sense, which did not imply the 
                                                 
12 ARIST. Top. 121a10-15.  
13 Ibid. 122b20-22. Сf. 133а1ff, 134b17ff; Met. 1030а13–14, 1037b18–22; Eth. Eud. 1217а27-29. 
14 The same idea expressed in Categories in the language of predication: «Whenever one thing is 
predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also. For 
example, man - is predicated of the individual man, and animal of man; so animal will be predicated of the 
individual man also - for the individual man is both a man and an animal… man is said of a subject, the 
individual man, and the name is of course predicated (since you will be predicating man of the individual man), 
and also the definition of man will be predicated of the individual man (since the individual man is also a man)» 
(IDEM. Cat. 1b10-14, 2а23-25). 
15 See: IDEM. Cat. 1a1-12, 2a14ff. 
  
8
connotations distinctive for the two above paradigms. We may see such a usage for example in 
Galen16 and the Stoics.17 18 
The Middle Platonic writings commonly show the understanding of the concept of 
participation in the Platonic sense. It is found, for instance, in Alcinous, who mentioned 
participation of forms and matter in ideas.19 
  Plotinus in general follows what the present author calls the normative Platonic 
understanding of causality. He speaks of participation (μετάληψις, μέθεξις), pointing to the fact 
that something has some nature or quality due to a reality, distinct from itself, which is a 
transcendental cause for this nature or quality.20 For instance: 
 
And Socrates did not in his own person give being human to the non-human 
but humanity gave being human to Socrates: the particular human is so by 
participation (μεταλήψει) in humanity.21 
 
In the 4th Ennead, VI Plotinus says that something is extensive in the material world, 
because it participates in something in the immaterial world, which is not extensive.  In this 
respect Plotinus elaborates the concept of participation in the following way: 
 
If then anything is going to participate in anything, it is clear that it will not 
be participating in  itself:  otherwise  it will  not be  a  participant,  but  [just]  
itself (Εἰ οὖν τι μεταλήψεταί τινος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ αὑτοῦ μεταλήψεται· ἢ οὐ 
μετειληφὸς ἔσται, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἔσται).22     
 
Here the understanding of participation which I call Platonic is employed. It assumes that 
the participation of a being in something points to the connection of this being to that, in which it 
participates as a transcendental cause of its quality or nature.   
Plotinus went on to elaborate this understanding in greater detail, giving an example of 
how the extensive (and hence, divisible) participates in the non-extensive. He says that the 
participated (non-extensive) is completely different in relation to the participating (extensive), 
                                                 
16 GALEN. De meth. med. 10, 28. 
17 See: HIEROC. Eth. 4, 6-8. 
18 Cf.: J. BARNES (transl., comm.), Porphyry. Introductio, Oxford 2003, р. 138.  
19 ALBINUS. Epit. 10, 7, 11-13 (Louis). 
20 See: PLOT. Enn. 1, 6, 1, 12-14; 5, 9, 2, 15; 5, 9, 5, 36-38; 6, 4, 13; 6, 3, 9, 27-30. Cf.: S. STRANGE, 
Plotinus’ Account of Participation in Ennead VI.4-5, “Journal of the History of Philosophy” 30 (1992), fasc. 4, 
pp. 484-486. 
21 PLOT. Enn. 6, 3, 9, 27-30. 
22 PLOT. Enn. 6, 4, 13, 6-8. 
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and this participated is in some sense present (πάρειμι) in the participating as a whole without 
parts.23 The understanding of this presence by Plotinus is certainly far away from the material 
connotations which would assume some kind of division of the participated in the participating.24 
This presence is such that the participated does not belong to that in which it participates: 
 
But it belongs to  no  thing which wishes to  belong  to  it, but,  as  far  as  it  
can, approaches  whatever  it  itself  wishes,  not  by  its coming to belong to that, 
nor again to anything else, but  by  the  desire  of that  for  it.  There  is  nothing, 
therefore, surprising in its being in all things (ἐν πᾶσιν εἶναι) in this way, because 
it is also in none of them in such a way as to belong to them.25.  
 
Yet, Plotinus speaks about this “transcendental participated” in that it is present in the 
participating by its own power.26  
Besides the “transcendental participated” which corresponded to universal-before-things, 
Plotinus mentioned the forms in matter, which were immanent to things and corresponded to 
universal-in-things. These forms in matter were different from the “transcendental participated” 
ideas and had a relation of correspondence to them.27  
The Aristotelian attitude to the concept of participation was further developed in the 
commentaries to Aristotle belonging to the Peripatetic and Neoplatonic traditions, such as 
Alexander of Aphrodisias,28 Aspasius,29 Porphyry, etc.30 Porphyry developed this paradigm in 
his work Isagoge, which was very important and widely popular in Late Antiquity, including the 
Christian philosophical tradition. 
Porphyry wrote Isagoge as a manual of Aristotelian logic for the students of the Platonic 
school. Porphyry described the different and the common among the five predicables, which he 
                                                 
23 PLOT. Enn. 6, 4, 13, 18-19. Cf. 6, 6, 14, which talks about the participation of things in numbers in 
terms of presence (παρουσία) of numbers in things. Using the language of presence Plotinus makes an evident 
allusion to Plato’s Parmenides. 
24 See: PLOT. Enn. 6, 4, 7, 3ff. 
25 PLOT. Enn. 6, 4, 3, 15-19. Cf. 6, 4, 16, 7-13. 
26 PLOT. Enn. 6, 4, 3.  
27 See PLOT. Enn. 6, 5, 6, cf. 6, 5, 11, 31-34. See S. STRANGE, Plotinus’ Account of Participation, pp. 
493-494. The interpretation of Adamson (P. ADAMSON, One of a Kind: Plotinus and Porphyry on Unique 
Instantiation, in R. Chiaradonna, G. Galluzo (ed.), Universals in Ancient Philosophy, p. 333) assumes that it is 
impossible to speak about the existence of universals immanent to things in the proper sense because of the 
divisive nature of matter. I prefer the interpretation of Stephen Strange which assumes that speaking about 
universal-forms immanent to things, is permissible. 
28 ALEX. APHR. In Top., in Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria, 
ed. M. Wallies (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 2.2), Berlin 1891, pp. 301, 9-10; 393, 25-394, 7. 
29 ASP. Eth Nic., in Aspasii in ethica Nicomachea quae supersunt commentaria, ed. G. Heylbut 
(Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 19.1), Berlin 1889, p. 16, 21. 
30 See also for example: APOL. DYSC., in APOLLONIUS DYSCOLUS. De pronominibu, ed. R. Schneider, 
Grammatici Graeci, vol. 2.1, Leipzig 1878, p. 6, 24-25.  
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called “sounds”, φωναί (genus, species, difference of species, its own attribute and the accident) 
– these problems were touched upon by Aristotle in his Topics. Describing the difference of the 
genus and the accident Porphyry wrote: 
  
A genus differs from an accident (συμβεβηκότος) in that a genus is prior to 
its species whereas accidents are posterior to the species—for even if an 
inseparable (ἀχώριστον) accident is taken, nevertheless that of which it is an 
accident is prior to the accident. What participates (τὰ μετέχοντα) in a genus 
participates equally, what participates in an accident does not—for participation in 
accidents admits augmentation and diminution (ἐπίτασιν καὶ ἄνεσιν), whereas 
participation in a genus does not. Accidents subsist (ὑφίσταται) principally on 
individuals (τῶν ἀτόμων), whereas genera and species are prior by nature to 
individual substances (τῶν ἀτόμων οὐσιῶν). Genera are predicated of the items 
under them in answer to ‘What is it?’ (τῷ τί ἐστι), accidents in answer to ‘What 
sort of so-and-so is it?’ (τῷ ποῖόν τι) or to ‘What is it like?’ (ἢ πῶς ἔχον).31 For, 
asked what sort of item an Ethiopian is, you will say black; asked what Socrates is 
like, you will say that he is sitting down or walking about.32 
 
Describing the difference of species and accidents, Porphyry notes: 
 
Participating in species occurs equally, in accidents—even inseparable 
ones—not equally. For one Ethiopian compared to another may have a skin-
colour either diminished or augmented in blackness.33 
 
Porphyry followed the Aristotelian logical discourse, where participation of the individual 
in the universal, or the participation of less general in more general, that is, participation of 
individuals in species and species in genera was described. He also used a “neutral” discourse of 
participation when he spoke about participation of the individual in the accident. Porphyry noted 
that everything participating in species and genus, that is, in that which answered the question 
“what is it?” (it was substance in the Aristotelian discourse)34 participated in them in equal 
measure; whereas as far as participation in the accident was concerned, it answered the 
                                                 
31 Cf. ARIST. Cat. 1b25-2a10. 
32 PORPH. Isag. 10, 17, 3-13.  
33 IDEM., XXI: 14-17. 
34 See for example: ARIST. Met. Z 1. 
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questions: “what is it like?” or “in which state?” (it was quality in the Aristotelian discourse)35; 
notably, that might have taken place in different measure. Porphyry built upon the thesis of 
Categories, according to which the category of substance did not allow for a greater or a lesser 
degree, while a quality might be present in a thing to a greater or lesser degree.36 However in his 
works Aristotle seems not to use the language of participation, whereas in Isagoge Porphyry 
used exactly that language. Some ambiguity of Porphyry’s discussion of participation in Isagoge 
becomes clear: on the one hand, it was the Aristotelian philosophical language that was used in 
Porphyry when he spoke about participation of the individual in its substance; but on the other 
hand, when Porphyry discussed participation of the individual in the accident, he did not use the 
discourse of Aristotle but something resembling the Platonic discourse which assumed the 
opposition of participation and nature. 
Discussing participation of individuals in species and genus, Porphyry used language, 
according to which the hierarchy of species and genera which constituted the human nature, 
united all people who belonged to this hierarchy by virtue of their human nature and made them 
all a single human being. In this case Porphyry proceeded from the assumption that an individual 
represented the principle of division and general represented the principle of unity; therefore, the 
higher the position in the hierarchy of genera and species was, the more clearly the unity was 
expressed and the less clearly the division was manifested. This was described by Porphyry in 
the second chapter of Isagoge devoted to species: 
  
So, when we are descending to the most special items, it is necessary to 
divide and to proceed through a plurality (διὰ πλήθους), and when we are ascending 
to the most general items, it is necessary to bring the plurality together into One 
(συναιρεῖν εἰς ἕν). For species—and still more, genera—are that which gather 
(συναγωγὸν) the many items into a single nature (εἰς μίαν φύσιν); whereas the 
particulars or singulars, in contrary fashion, always divide (διαιρεῖ) the one into a 
plurality. For by participaing in the species (τοῦ εἴδους μετουσίᾳ) the many men are 
one man, and by the particulars the one and common (ὁ εἷς καὶ κοινὸς) man is 
several — for the singular is always divisive whereas the common is collective and 
unificatory.37 
 
                                                 
35 See: Ibid. 
36 IDEM. Cat. 2b26-27; 3b33-4а9; 10b25-28. 
37 PORPH. Isag. 6, 16-23 (Busse). Cf. also: DEXIPP. In Cat. 3.3: 67, 17–30 (Busse). 
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This important fragment was analyzed by Jonathan Barnes in his extensive commentary on 
Isagoge. Barnes showed38 that various concepts of the preceding philosophical heritage were 
reflected in the text, primarily, the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions. The present author may 
add that the latter tradition seems to be of the greatest importance. 
Thus, the connection of the division into genera and species with the notions of plurality 
(moving along the hierarchy of genera and species in the direction of more universality) can be 
found in Alexander of Aphrodisias;39 in the latter aspect it may be traced to Platonic Phaedrus.40 
The notions of συλληπτικός,41 συναίρειν,42 and συναγωγός43 are also reminiscent of the Platonic 
context. 
The Aristotelian line of argumentation finds its expression in this fragment when it speaks 
about participation of individuals in the species, constituting the nature of these individuals. This 
corresponds to the Aristotelian paradigm of participation identified above.44 Although Jonathan 
Barnes,45 Alain de Libera,46 and Bruno Maioli47 considered the Platonic line to be more 
conspicuous in this fragment, the present author thinks that it corresponds to the general 
Aristotelian attitude of Porphyry’s Isagoge by virtue of the Aristotelian paradigm of participation 
in the fragment, while the Platonic terminology is rather of rhetorical nature. That is why it 
seems that the Aristotelian line of understanding participation is pursued in the above fragment, 
while the Platonic terminology is used without its specific Platonic content.48 
                                                 
38 J. BARNES, Porphyry. Introduction, pр. 137-141. 
39 ALEX. APHR. In Top. 1, 15-18.  
40 See: “For a human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity by 
means of reason the many perceptions of the senses  (δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ 
πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον)” (249b6-c1). 
41 See: NICOMACH. Introd.  2, 19, 1, in Nicomachi Geraseni Pythagorei introductionis arithmeticae libri 
ii, ed. R. Hoche, Leipzig 1866; IAMBL.(?). Arithm. 9, 14-15. 
42 Cf.: PLATO. Phaed. 249b; PLOT. Enn 6, 7, 7, 20-21.  
43 Cf.: PLATO. Tim. 31bc; ALBINUS. Epit. 27: 167, 32-33 (Louis); PLOT. Enn. 6, 4, 40, 12. 
44 Pace Bruno Maioli thinks that the notion of participation has Platonic connotations here, see: PORFIRIO. 
Isagoge, trans. B. Maioli, Padua 1969 (Studium Sapientiae 9), p. 38.  
45 J. BARNES, Porphyry. Introduction, pp. 136-137. 
46 PORPHYRE, Isagoge, texte grec et latin, traduction par A. de Libera et A.-P. Segonds, Introduction et 
notes par A. de Libera, Paris 1998, p. 52; A. De Libera, L’Art des généralités—théories de l’abstraction, Paris 
1999, p. 142, n. 126. 
47 PORFIRIO. Isagoge, trans. B. Maioli, Ibid. 
48 Jonathan Barnes states that we see here “a brief burst” of Plotinus’ metaphysics in Isagoge. In this 
respect Barnes refers to par. 36 and 11 of Porphyry’s Sententia, where Porphyry followed Plotinus while 
speaking about the principles of unification and multiplication/division. Barnes thus wrote, “The Sentences are 
paraphrases of, or ruminations upon, Plotinus. In the present paragraph of the Introduction we have a brief burst 
of Plotinian metaphysics» (J. BARNES, Porphyry. Introduction, p. 137). It is probably appropriate to quote these 
fragments, “The incorporeal substances, when they descend, are partitioned and pluralized into the individuals 
by a deficiency of power; when they ascend, they are unified and return to togetherness by an abundance of 
power” (Sent. 11, transl. by Barnes in: J. Barnes, Porphyry. Introduction, p. 136). “What is really existent is said 
to be many not by having different places or different measures of mass, nor by being a heap, nor by 
circumscriptions and distinctions which divide it into parts, but rather by being divided as to plurality by an 
otherness (ἑτερότης) which is immaterial and massless and non-plural; that is why it is also one — and not like 
one body or something one by place or by mass, but one plurality of items (καθ' ὃ ἓν ἕτερον)” (Sent. 36, transl. 
by Barnes in: J. Barnes, Porphyry. Introduction, pp. 136-137). In these fragments of Sententia, 
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As Jonathan Barnes showed,49 the notion of the “general human being,” used by Porphyry 
in the discussed fragment and appearing two more times in Isagoge,50 also has a certain history. 
Barnes was right to indicate that this notion was identical to the expression “human being, 
speaking in general” from the Porphyry’s Commentary to Categories.51 The notion of the general 
human being belongs to the Peripatetic tradition. It can be found in Alexander of Aphrodisias, 
where this notion denoted a human being as such: 
 
If you take the form (εἶδος) of man without the material circumstances you have 
the common man (τὸν κοινὸν ἄνθρωπον) — for the mutual differences among singular 
men depend on their matter, since their forms, in virtue of which they are men, show no 
differences.52  
 
However it seems, that the distinctive features of Porphyry’s thought in relation to the 
concept of human being in general consisted in his idea that the general human being, that is the 
species of a human being, in some sense acquired the wholeness through the participation of 
individuals in it, while the Alexander’s teaching of the “general human being” did not imply that. 
Another point which should be mentioned concerning Porphyry and his Isagoge is the 
concept of Porphyry’s so-called Tree. In his Isagoge Porphyry constructed his famous Tree of 
divisions according to genus and species with “substance” at its summit, while the lowest limit 
of the Tree was a human individual: 
 
Most general (γενικώτατον) is that above which there will be no other 
superordinate genus; most special (εἰδικώτατον), that after which there will be 
no other subordinate species; and between the most general and the most 
special are other items which are at the same time both genera and species (but 
                                                                                                                                                             
multiplication/division and unification are discussed in the context of descending of the incorporeal into the 
corporeal world, and the opposition of incorporeal and corporeal. In the discussed fragment of Isagoge, as well 
as in the whole treatise, the relation between incorporeal and corporeal is not discussed (in the beginning of the 
book Porphyry explicitly stated that in his treatise he would avoid discussing incorporeal beings, see: Isagoge, in 
Porphyrii isagoge et in Aristotelis categorias commentarium, ed. A. Busse, p. 1, 9–11). Therefore, in my opinion 
Barnes is incorrect in establishing a correlation between this fragment of Isagoge and par. 11 and 36 of Sententia 
and making conclusion about its Neoplatonic background.   
49 J. BARNES, Porphyry. Introduction, pp. 137-141. 
50 See: «…Such items are called individuals because each is constituted of proper features the assemblage 
of which will never be found the same in anything else—the proper features of Socrates will never be found in 
any other of the particulars. On the other hand, the proper features of man (I mean, of the common (τοῦ κοινοῦ) 
man) will be found the same in several items—or rather, in all particular men in so far as they are men.» 
(Isagoge 2: 7, 21-27 (Busse)), а также: Isagoge 3: 11, 14-16 (Busse). 
51 Ibid. 90, 32-33 («…ὁ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενος ἄνθρωπος…»); 122, 34 (Busse). 
52 Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter commentaria scripta minora, ed. I. Bruns (Commentaria in 
Aristotelem Graeca, suppl. 2.1), Berlin 1887, p. 85, 15-18. 
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taken in relation now to one thing and now to another). What I mean should 
become clear in the case of a single type of predication. Substance (ἡ οὐσία) is 
itself a genus. Under it is body, and under body animate body, under which is 
animal; under animal is rational animal, under which is man; and under man 
are Socrates and Plato and particular men. Of these items, substance is the most 
general (τὸ γενικώτατον) and is only a genus, while man is the most special 
and is only a species. Body is a species of substance and a genus of animate 
body.53 
 
This tree in Isagoge does not claim any ontological status. This is testified to by the 
general approach of Porphyry in the treatise: the philosopher refused to pose and answer the 
question concerning the status of the predicabilia under consideration, whether they exist only in 
the mind or independently.54 Keeping in mind Porphyry’s Tree and the paradigm of participation 
employed by Porphyry in Isagoge, we can say that the discourse of Isagoge implied that an 
individual participated in the hierarchy of genus and species and in the “substance,” understood 
as the highest genus of this hierarchy. 
Later Neoplatonists to some extent transformed the Platonic doctrine of participation by 
introducing the notion of the unparticipable (ἀμέθεκτος), which resulted in the emergence of the 
Neoplatonic triad of participation: participating – participated – unparticipable. This triad was 
extensively used by Proclus,55 although it seems that the concept of unparticipable was 
introduced into the active vocabulary of Late Antique philosophy due to Iamblichus. At least in 
the commentary on Timaeus, Proclus quoted Iamblichus’ discourse on the universal super-
cosmic soul, which was higher than all souls existing inside the cosmos and which was the 
unparticipable monad for them. According to Iamblichus, this universal Soul was different from 
the individual souls in which individual bodies participated.56 The participated intelligible, 
immanent for individual souls, was different from the intelligible which was unparticipable. As 
Richard Wallis stated,57 the distinction of Iamblichus between the unparticipable universal Soul 
and the participated individual souls was related to Iamblichus’ polemics with the teaching of 
Plotinus, according to which the universal soul was the cause of all individual souls and of the 
World Soul.58 If we compare the views of Iamblichus and Plato, it becomes evident that 
Iamblichus disagreed with the assumption of Plato’s teaching that the universal Soul and the 
                                                 
53 PORPH. Isagoge: 4, 15-27 (Busse).  
54 See: PORPH. Isagoge 1: 1, 8-12 (Busse). 
55 See esp.: PROCLUS. Inst. theol. 23-24.  
56 PROCLUS. In Tim. 2: 105, 16–28 (Diehl); cf. 313, 19-24. 
57 R. WALLIS,  Neoplatonism, London 1972, pp. 126-127. 
58 PLOT. Enn. 4, 3, 2, 5ff, cf. 6, 8, 3, 6-21; 6, 2, 20. 
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intelligible reality were in a certain sense immanent to the material world. Therefore, as Wallis 
thinks, Iamblichus began to teach that the universal Soul was unparticipable, meaning that it was 
transcendental for individual souls. Then the concept of the unparticipable was adopted and 
developed by Proclus.59 Dodds60 discussed the necessity for solving a problem already described 
in Plato’s Parmenides, namely, the possibility of understanding the participation of things in 
ideas in a material sense. According to such an understanding, ideas were immanent to things 
and they were divided into parts by the things participating in them. Therefore, to be indivisible 
an idea had to be understood as transcendental and unparticipable. In the situation of 
participation of things in ideas, the participated was the universal, immanent to things.61 The 
transcendental idea,62 different from the immanent universal in things, secured the inner unity of 
this universal and the things united by it, and was related to it as a monad to the members of the 
series.   
 
 
 
                                                 
59 In general in the system of Proclus the unparticipable is the One, and then downward: Being as it is, 
Life as it is, Mind as it is and Soul as it is. Each of them is a progenitor of the series of participated beings (the 
One is the beginning of the series of henads; unparticipable Being – series of participated being etc.) We can say 
that in the framework of the doctrine of Proclus this teaching of the unparticipable, especially his teaching about 
the hierarchy of the unparticipable, secures the stability and the ontological static character of being in his 
system; this static character manifests itself in the fact that the participating entity does not change its ontological 
status through participation, but accomplishes the wholeness of its nature and the awareness of a greater 
proximity to the One. See: A. LLOYD, Possession and division in Proclus, H. J. Blumenthal & A. C. Lloyd 
(eds.), Soul and the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism: Syrianus, Proclus, and Simplicius: Papers and 
Discussions of a Colloquium Held at Liverpool, 15-16 April 1982, Liverpool University Press 1982, esp. p. 25ff. 
See also: L. SIORVANES, Proclus on Transcendence, “Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medieval”, 9 
(1998). 
60 E. DODDS, Commentary, in PROCLUS, The Elements of Theology, A revised text with transl., introd. and 
comm. by E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1963, pp. 210-211. 
61 See: PROCLUS. In Parm. 1069, 23ff. (Cousin). 
62 Discussing this unparticipable element, Dodds called it a universal (E. DODDS, Commentary, р. 211; 
Riccardo Chiaradonna used the same term: R. CHIARADONNA, Porphyry and Iamblichus on Universals and 
Synonymous Predication, “Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medieval”, 18 (2007), p. 230; R. 
CHIARADONNA, Alexander, Boethus and the Other Peripatetics: The Theory of Universals in the Aristotelian 
Commentators,”, in R. Chiaradonna, G. Galluzzo (eds.), Universals in Ancient Philosophy, p. 302). Christof 
Helmig insists that these unparticipable elements, being simple and indefinable are rather the causes of 
universals and not universals themselves (Ch. HELMIG, Forms and Concepts – Concept Formation in the 
Platonic Tradition. A study on Proclus and his Predecessors, De Gruyter 2012, p. 210; cf. the position of 
P.Adamson (P. ADAMSON, One of a Kind: Plotinus and Porphyry on Unique Instantiation”, R. Chiaradonna, G. 
Galluzzo (eds.), Universals in Ancient Philosophy, p. 331), who notes that the teaching of Neoplatonists about 
the transcendental ideas, existing “before many” means that it is correct to apply the notion of “general” (κοινόν) 
to them, but it is not quite correct to apply the notion of “universal” (καθόλου) which is applicable to “general,” 
existing in the human mind as a result of comprehending the forms in things by it, as well as to those forms 
which are immanent to things. Therefore, Helmig suggests to speak not about the three kinds of universals in 
Neoplatonist writers – corresponding to transcendental ideas, ideas in matter, and abstract universals in soul – as 
it is usually done – but about the three levels of manifestation of the Platonic ideas: in their transcendental, 
psychic, and intra-material aspects (Ibid.; see also my review of the book: D. BIRIUKOV, Review on: Christof 
Helmig. Forms and Concepts – Concept Formation in the Platonic Tradition. A study on Proclus and his 
Predecessors. De Gruyter, 2012, “Universa. Recensioni di filosofia”. Anno 3, Vol. 1 (2014)).  
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Chapter 2 “The Scientific knowledge and universals in Clement of Alexandria” 
 
In his epistemology Clement of Alexandria combines the Middle Platonist and the 
Aristotelian elements. The subject of universals in Clement’s epistemology emerges in the 
context of his doctrine of scientific knowledge (ἐπιστημονικὴ θεορία), which Clement elaborates 
in detail in the eighth book of Stromateis1.  
According to Clement, scientific knowledge is achieved through demonstration 
(ἀπόδειξις),2 which is the speech bringing the problem under discussion to unprovable principles 
(ἀρχαὶ), usually taken for granted. Demonstration is based on real, observable, conventional, and 
exactly known premises.3 Through demonstration it is shown whether the thing exists, what it is 
(what is its substance), and by virtue of what it is.4 In the sixth chapter of the eighth book of 
Stromateis Clement uses Aristotelian and scholastic Middle Platonist conceptual framework 
speaking about induction (ἐπᾰγωγή), definition (ὅρος), division (διαίρεσις), and demonstration as 
a path to acquiring knowledge.5-6 Induction indicates whether something exists or not; this 
procedure also ensures the ascension from a singular sensible experience to universals (ἀρχὴ τῆς 
ἐπαγωγῆς ἡ αἴσθησις, πέρας δὲ τὸ καθόλου) whereby the single perceived by the senses, is 
                                                 
1 Strom. 8, I. 1, 3ff. Generally speaking, according to Clement, the arguments and analysis should be 
based on the unprovable principles taken by faith (Strom. 7, XVI, 95, 5-6; 8, VI, 18, 4-5; cf. ARIST. Anal. pr. 
64b32-36; Anal. post. 71b20-23 etc.). These universal unprovable principles include, in addition to the tenets of 
the Christian faith, the sensible reality and the self-evident rational positions (Strom. 8, III, 7, 3-4; IV, 14, 3). 
Accordingly, Clement admits two principles which in their combination may give us knowledge: the senses and 
the reason (Strom. 2, IV, 13, 2). However, Clement argues that the sensible data also give us only hypotheses; 
faith may overcome the hypothetical knowledge and reach the truth (Strom. 2, IV, 13, 3). According to Clement, 
scientific evidence seeks to proof what is doubtful on the basis of the obvious and indisputable (Strom. 2, XI, 48, 
1). Following the distinction between two kinds of faith – one based on knowledge and another based on 
opinion, Clement distinguishes two corresponding kinds of evidence: ἐπιστημονικῆς and δοξαστικῆς, and the 
according gnosis (γνῶσις) and prognosis (πρόγνωσις) (Strom. 2, XI, 48, 2; cf. 2, XI, 49, 2; 8, III, 5, 2-3; 8, III, 7, 
8). S. Lilla (S. LILLA, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism, Oxford 1971, pp. 
133-134) associates this distinction of Clement with the Aristotelian distinction between the scientific and the 
dialectical (rhetorical or epicheirema) syllogisms (ARIST. Top. 100a27-30, cf. Anal. pr. 27a1, 46a9-10; Top. 
162a15-16; Rhet. 1355a8-9)). Clement thinks that scientific knowledge (ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητική) assumes a 
condition in which the acquired knowledge cannot be rejected and cannot be changed, as opposed to ignorance 
which implies illusory and fluid visions (Strom. 2, XVII, 76, 1). In addition to scientific knowledge, Clement 
identifies the following types of knowledge which are close to it: knowledge from experience (ἐμπειρία), aimed 
at studying sensible things; knowledge of the whole through distinguishing eidoses (Clement calls it εἴδησις); 
mental reasoning (νόησις), aimed at what is known is only by the mind; juxaposition (σύνεσίς), aimed at 
studying mutial correspondence of parts, correspondence between things, bringing things to the same definition, 
and, finally, gnosis (γνῶσις) which is the knowledge of the essence (Strom. 2, XVII, 76, 2-3). 
2 Strom. 8, III, 5, 1ff. 
3 Cf M. HAVRDA. Galenus Christianus? The Doctrine of Demonstration in Stromata VIII and the 
Question of its Source, “Vigiliae Christianae” 65 (2011), pp. 343-375. 
4 Strom. 8, VI, 17, 8, 2-4. 
5 Cf. ALBINUS. Epit. 5, 1, 1ff.: 156, 25-34 (Louis). 
6 See A. ZHYRKOVA, Reconstructing Clement of Alexandria’s Doctrine of Categories, in J. Finamore, R. 
Berchman (eds.), Conversations Platonic and Neoplatonic: Intellect, Soul, and Nature, Sankt Augustin 2010, pp. 
145-148; R. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism, Amsterdam 1971, pp. 37-38. 
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brought to the universal.7 Witt8 draws a parallel between this notion in Clement and the 
epistemology and the theory of the formation of universals in Ascalon of Antioch.9 Definition 
and division reveal the substance of things, that is, they show what the thing is (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι)10 
and what the individual is.11 Clement distinguishes between definition as description of 
particular features and definition as indication of the cause (αἰτία) of the thing. According to 
Clement there are four kinds of causes: matter (ὕλη), mover (κινοῦν), eidos (εἶδος), and purpose 
(τέλος).12 At the same time, Clement recognizes the status of definition provided by means of 
particular features to be lower than the status of definition through causes. 
Clement of Alexandria pays special attention to the procedure of dividing into species 
(diairesis) for the purpose of acquiring knowledge. Step by step division leads to the simple and 
indivisible which clarifies what is being examined. In this context, Clement addresses the subject 
of categories and states that species are characterized by identity and difference,13 and each of 
them in the process of division falls under some of the following ten categories (which, however, 
are not the genera for these species): substance, quantity, quality, relation, position, possession, 
“where,” “when,” action, and enduring.14 Next, explaining the principle of demonstration, 
Clement develops the theory which classifies things and thoughts according to categories. He 
distinguishes between things (τὰ ὑποκείμενα πράγματα), thoughts (ὰ νοήματα), and names (τὰ 
ὀνόματα). Thoughts are the imprints and likenesses of things, while names are the symbols of 
thoughts, and as such relate to things.15 The commonness of human thinking about the same 
things and the capacity of people to understand each other are caused by the fact that things 
impose identical imprints on human souls. However, names of things (that is, words) may vary 
depending on the language.16 
Sharing the Aristotelian premise that science is inapplicable to the individual, but may only 
be about the general,17 Clement states that an indefinitely large number of individual things and 
names can be arranged according to some general elements (τὰ καθολικὰ στοιχεῖα). 
Consequently, according to Clement, the names are reduced to twenty-four letters of the 
                                                 
7 Strom. 8, VI, 17, 7, 1. 
8 R. WITT, Albinus, p. 38. 
9 See SEXT. EMP. Adv. math. 11, 250; CICERO. Luc. 30; Top. 30. 
10 Cf. Met. 1007a; 1016ab; 1117b; 1022a; 1029b-1030a, etc. 
11 Strom. 8, VI, 17, 4, 1-4. 
12 Strom. 8, VI, 18, 1, 1-2, 1. 
13 Cf. PLATO. Soph. 254d14-e1. 
14 Strom. 8, VI, 20-21; 8, VIII, 23-24. 
15 M. Havrda (M. HAVRDA, Categories in Stromata VIII, pp. 202–203, 222) finds parallels between the 
terminology employed by Clement and Boethus of Sidon (in DEXIPPUS: In Cat. 4, 4, 7, 1-2: 9, 22-10, 2) and 
Aspasius (in BOETHUIS: In De Int. 41, 16-19); сf. ARIST. De Int. 1.16а3-15. 
16 Strom. 8, VIΙΙ, 23. 
17 Cf. ARIST. Met. Β4 999а26-29. 
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alphabet,18 while things, if we want to study them, can be made subjects to the universals (εἰς τὰ 
καθόλου).19 Clement correlates these universals with the ten Aristotelian categories which he 
understands as ways of saying (τὰ λεγόμενα).20 Clement calls these categories the elements of 
things in matter following the principles (στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων φαμὲν τῶν ἐν ὕλῃ καὶ μετὰ τὰς 
ἀρχάς); the elements can be comprehended by the reason (λόγῳ) as opposed to immaterial beings 
(τὰ ἄυλα) which can be captured by the mind (νῷ).21 According to M. Havrda,22 Clement speaks 
about categories as elements (στοιχεῖον) of things, implying that categories are the most 
elementary general species for subsuming the material things. As far as the “principles” which 
Clement mentions here are concerned, A. Zhirkova believes that these are the universal 
principles of demonstration, referred to or implied in Stromateis23, which should be understood 
in the epistemological sense as allowing us to build up the notion of material things,24 while M. 
Havrda points to Galen’s distinction between the “elements” as the final point of genera-species 
division25 and the “principles” which clarify them as qualityless substrate and pure qualities.26 
Keeping in mind the Clement’s opposition of immaterial beings (τὰ ἄυλα) comprehended 
by mind, and categories understood as elements of things in the matter, as well as Clement’s 
words that definitions are not the definitions of ideas,27 M. Havrda, although, in our opinion, 
without sufficient grounds, sees here the traces of the theory of universals28 typical for the 
scholastic Platonism of Clement’s time, which are formulated in the eighth book of Stromateis, 
where Clement makes a distinction between the forms in things and the rationally comprehended 
forms as the basis for knowing them.29 According to the hypothesis of M. Havrda, Clement 
adopted this doctrine through Galen’s tradition.30 In contrast to this position, in the eighth book 
of Stromateis A. Zhirkova sees the theory of universals (universal categories), building on the 
principle of generalizing sensible experience, which goes back to Antiochus of Ascalon.31 
We should also note that, as it was pointed to by A. Zhirkova,32 the description of the 
categories proposed by Clement as elements of things “in matter,” is close to the interpretation of 
                                                 
18 Cf. PLATO. Phil. 18b3-d2. 
19 Strom. 8, VIΙΙ, 23, 2-3. 
20 Strom. 8, VIII, 23. 
21 Strom. 8, VIII, 23, 6. 
22 M. HAVRDA, Categories, p. 206. 
23 Strom. 2, ΙΧ, 5, 1-6, 1; 2, IV, 13, 4, 1-3; 8, II-IV. 
24 A. ZHYRKOVA, Reconstructing Clement of Alexandria’s Doctrine of Categories, p. 151. 
25 GALEN. In Nat. hom 15, 30, 7ff. 
26 M. HAVRDA, Categories in Stromata VIII, pp. 206-207. 
27 Strom. 8, VI, 19, 2. 
28 M. HAVRDA, Categories, p. 208, cf. 220, 222. 
29 ALBINUS. Epit. 4, 7. 
30 M. HAVRDA, Categories, pp. 222-225. 
31 A. ZHYRKOVA, Reconstructing Clement of Alexandria’s Doctrine of Categories, p. 152. 
32 A. ZHYRKOVA, Reconstructing Clement of Alexandria’s Doctrine of Categories, p. 150; ср. A. 
ZHYRKOVA, The Doctrine of Categories in Neoplatonism, in A. Kijewska, Being or Good? Metamorphoses of 
Neoplatonism, Lublin 2004, p. 85 and n. 2 
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the Aristotelian categories, widespread in the Middle Platonism33 (and subsequently in the 
Neoplatonic tradition) and, in particular, in Philo of Alexandria.34 According to that 
interpretation, the Aristotelian categories were understood as assertions which may be related 
only to the material world, but not to the intelligible reality (since the human speech itself is 
capable of expressing only the realities of the sensible world). It may be also pointed out that this 
understanding of Clement’s doctrine of categories corresponds with his words that ideas in the 
intelligible world are the models for genera and species in the sensible world,35 which implies 
that genera and species belong to the sensible reality (that is, the genus and species are the 
equivalents of the category of the (second) nature within the Aristotelian categories), as well as 
with Clement’s position that definitions are not applicable to ideas36 (the definition is an 
essential feature of the Aristotlelian understanding of the category of the second nature) and with 
Clement’s words from Stromateis 5, XII, 81, 5 that God is inexpressible in words not being a 
genus, species, an indivisible (an individual), a distinction, or property (πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη ῥητὸν ὃ 
μήτε γένος ἐστὶ μήτε διαφορὰ μήτε εἶδος μήτε ἄτομον μήτε ἀριθμός, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ συμβεβηκός). 
With reference to Alcinous (Albinus),37 Jaap Mansfeld rightly correlates the doctrine of Clement 
that God is not the subject of genera-species division with the Middle Platonist teaching.38 This 
understanding of the status of the Aristotelian categories and, accordingly, the scope of the 
genera-species discourse diverges from the later Orthodox theology (that is, from the Nicean 
theology), according to which the Aristotelian individual-and-species discourse may be applied 
to the Holy Trinity.39 
Further we should turn to another aspect of universals in Clement – the question of how 
Clement understands the status of the Logos-Son-Monad in relation to the subject of archetypes 
in the intelligible world for the things of the sensible world, and his interpretation of Plato’s 
Parmenides. 
 
Status of the Logos and the Archetypes for the Things of the Sensible World 
 
Clement addresses the topic of the archetypes of things belonging to the sensible world, in 
the intelligible world in the context of his exegesis of the Book of Genesis. According to 
                                                 
33 Cf. ALBINUS. Epit. 4, 8: 156, 21ff.; 10, 4: 165, 5ff. (Louis). 
34 De dec. 30-31, esp. 30: “categories are in the nature (ἐν τῇ φύσει).” 
35 Strom. 5, XIV, 93, 4 - 94, 2. 
36 Strom. 8, V, 19, 2. 
37 ALBINUS. Epit. 10: 165, 12 (Louis). 
38 J. MANSFELD, Substance, Being and Division in Middle Platonist and Later Aristotelian Contexts 
(Excurs), in Idem., Heresiography in context: Hippolytus' Elenchos as a source for Greek philosophy, Brill 
1992, p. 84, cf. 80. 
39 It seems that the understanding of applicability of genera-species discourse similar to that shared by 
Clement would later be developped by Eunomius, the leader of the Neoarian (anti-Nicean) party. 
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Clement, first verses of the Book of Genesis about the creation of heaven, formless earth, and 
light40 are in fact about the intelligible world contained in the Monad. This world is the 
archetype (ἀρχέτῠπος) or paradigm (παράδειγμα) for the sensible world. According to Clement, 
ideas in the intelligible world are models for the species in the material world; in this respect 
Clement recognizes the rightness of Plato’s teaching. God created the sensible sky, the earth, and 
the light when He created the firmament41 which signified the entire sensible world.42 As C. 
Lilla has shown,43 Clement follows Philo of Alexandria in his exegesis of the Book of Genesis,44 
as well as in the doctrine, according to which the intelligible world is the archetype for sensible 
world,45 shared by Philo and by the Middle Platonists.46 However, it seems more likely that in 
his doctrine of the intelligible and the sensible worlds Clement relied directly on Plato47 to whom 
he also referred.48 
The dependence of Clement on Plato’s Parmenides, noted by a number of scholars49 is 
important in the context of our discussion. Clement’s reasoning is based on the first hypothesis 
of Parmenides (137cd), when he describes God as One, nameless, and limitless in Stromateis 5, 
                                                 
40 Gen. 1:1-5. 
41 Cf. Gen. 1:6. 
42 Strom. 5, XIV, 93, 4 - 94, 2; cf. Protr. 1, VI, 4 which says that Christians had been born in God (that is, 
in the divine plan) before the creation of the world (πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου καταβολῆς) (сf. Eph. 1: 4). 
43 S. LILLA, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 191-192. 
44 PHILO. De opif. 29; 36. 
45 Ibid., 16; 36; 129; Her. 280; De ebriel. 133; De confus. ling. 172. 
46 Cf. PLUTARCH. Is. et Os., 373А; De an. procr. in Tim. 113С; ALBINUS. Epit. 12, 1. 
47 Cf. PLATO. Timaeus 28ас, 29аb, 30cd, 31a, 48e. 
48 Strom. 5, XIV, 94, 2. 
49 Indeed, Plato seems to be a great authority for Clement. Unlike other ancient philosophers and 
philosophical schools, Clement almost never criticises Plato. Quotations and paraphrases of Plato as well as 
allusions to Plato can be often found in Clemen’s writings. Clement pays particular attention to the dialogues 
Theaetetus (especially, to 176b which speaks about likening to God, ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ), The Republic, Laws, 
Phaedo, Phaedrus, Timaeus, Statesman, Gorgias, Symposium, and Sophist; less frequent are Clement’s 
references to Protagoras, Philebus, Parmenides, and the so-called Seventh Letter. It should also be noted that 
scholars view Clement as a representative of the Christian trend of Middle Platonism. This is justified in the 
sense that the principles of reading Plato and using certain passages from Plato’s dialogues among the 
representatives of this trend (in addition to Clement including Justin Martyr, Tatian, and Origen) are close to the 
principles current in the classic Middle Platonism, as it was shown by J. Danielou and G. Andersen (J. 
DANIELOU, Message évangélique et culture hellénistique aux IIe et IIIe siècles, Paris 1961, pp. 103–122; G. 
ANDERSEN, Justin und mittlere Platonismus, “Zeitschrift fur die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft” 44 (1952)). 
Clement typically uses key passages from Plato (for his time) to confirm the truth of the Christian doctrine, since 
he believes that Moses was one of the sources of Plato. Thus, Timaeus 28c and the Seventh Letter 341c were 
popular texts applied for the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God both in the Middle Platonism and in 
Clement; Timaeus 28c was used in the context of the doctrine of God the Creator; the Second Letter 312e was 
used in the discussion of the supremacy of God and the doctrine of the Trinity; Laws 715e–716a were applied in 
the ethical context; Timaeus 51a – in the context of the doctrine of creation; Theaetetus 176ab – in the context of 
the doctrine of striving to God, etc. On Clement’s Platonism see: G. BUTTERWORTH, Clement of Alexandria’s 
Protreptikos and the Phaedrus of Plato,” Classical Quarterly” 10 (1916); R. CASEY, Clement of Alexandria and 
the Beginnings of Christian Platonism, “Harvard Theological Review” 18 (1925); A. OUTLER, The 'Platonism' of 
Clement of Alexandria, “The Journal of Religion” 20 (1940), fasc. 3; J. WYTZES, The Twofold Way I. Platonic 
Influences in the Works of Clement of Alexandria, “Vigiliae Christianae”, 11 (1957), fasc. 4; J. WYTZES, The 
Twofold Way I. Platonic Influences in the Works of Clement of Alexandria, “Vigiliae Christianae”, 14 (1960), 
fasc. 3; D. WYRWA, Die christliche Platonaneignung in den Stromateis des Clemens von Alexandrien, Berlin 1983. 
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XII, 81, 6 in the sense that God has no beginning nor end,50 and similarly to Plato states that the 
One is not the whole; It is formless, and we cannot say that It has parts.51 This passage is 
probably the earliest evidence of the theological interpretation of the Parmenides’ first 
hypothesis, which was based on the application of the notion of limitlessness (ἄπειρον) to God.52 
From the historical and philosophical perspective, by calling the One limitless Clement 
anticipates the intuition of Neoplatonism and can be considered to be a precursor of Plotinus in 
his interpretation of the One.53 
J. Whittaker points to the similarity between Stromateis 5, XII, 81, 6 and a passage from 
the Handbook of Platonism 10, 4 (165, 5-17) of Alcinous, and proposes that both passages were 
inspired by the first hypothesis of Parmenides (despite the fact that Alcinous does not discuss the 
subject of the One and the Limitless). Whittaker suggests that both authors rely on some Middle 
Platonist commentary on the Parmenides, which was of theological kind.54 
In turn, A. Choufrine55 argues that Clement’s logic (as well as his possible Middle 
Platonist source) in the interpretation of the One is not quite the same as Plato’s, since on the 
basis of the first hypothesis Clement departs from the logic of Plato, deriving the limitlessness of 
the One from the notion that It has no parts and is indivisible. Clement also does not use Plato’s 
premise that limits are parts of that whose limits they are (Parmenides 137c), and therefore says 
that the One is limitless not in the sense that it is impossible to reach its end, but as indivisible 
(οὐ κατὰ τὸ ἀδιεξίτητον νοούμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀδιάστατον), that is, in a stronger sense. 
In his doctrine of the Monad and the Son56 Clement continues to use the philosophical 
language which goes back to Plato’s Parmenides. According to Clement, “The [Son] does not 
simply become one as one, nor many as a part, but [becomes] one like all ... (οὐ γίνεται ἀτεχνῶς 
ἓν ὡς ἕν, οὐδὲ πολλὰ ὡς μέρη ὁ υἱός, ἀλλ 'ὡς πάντα ἕν. ἕνθεν καὶ πάντα). ... Thus, to believe in 
Him and through Him is to become monadic, being unshakably unified in Him; but to not 
believe is... to be divided into parts....”57 This statement corresponds to the three hypotheses of 
Plato’s Parmenides, namely, to the first hypothesis (the One as one), the second hypothesis (the 
One as many) (Parmenides 143c), and the fourth and eighth hypotheses (Many as many) (Ibid., 
                                                 
50 E. OSBORN, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria, Cambridge 1957, pp. 27–29. 
51 J. WHITTAKER, Philological Comments on the Neoplatonic Notion of Infinity, in R. Harris (ed.), The 
Significance of Neoplatonism, Norfolk VA 1976, p. 157; Idem., Ἄρρητος καὶ ἀκατονόμστος, in Platonismus und 
Christentum. Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie, Münster 1983. 
52 See: E. MÜHLENBERG, Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von Nyssa, Göttingen 1966, Ss. 75-76; J. 
WHITTAKER, Philological Comments on the Neoplatonic Notion of Infinity. 
53 A. CHOUFRINE, Gnosis, Theophany, Theosis: Studies in Clement of Alexandria's Appropriation of His 
Background (Patristic Studies 5), New York 2002, pp. 163-165. 
54 J. WHITTAKER, Philological Comments, p. 158. 
55  A. CHOUFRINE, Gnosis, Theophany, Theosis, pp. 174-177. 
56 Cf. R. MORTLEY, Connaissance religieuse et herméneutique chez Clément d’Alexandrie, Leiden 1973, pp. 
70–73; H. HÄGG, Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Apophaticism: knowing the unknowable, 
Oxford 2006, pp. 214-216. 
57 Strom. 4, XXV, 156, 2; 157, 2. 
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158c, 165bc). As noted by A. Choufrine, “Clement thus seems to assume that the audience he 
addresses knows the Parmenides well enough to understand his belief that the infinity of the 
monad is to be construed in terms not of the First, Fourth or Eighth, but of the Second 
Hypothesis”.58  Having analyzed a number of passages from Stromateis,59 A. Choufrine comes to 
the conclusion that, “for Clement there are two grades of infinity in God (corresponding to the 
monad and “the One”), the difference between which is technical enough for him to inscribe 
them without reservations into Plato’s scheme”.60 Limitlessness corresponding to the Monad is 
limitlessness which Clement denies in respect to the One – limitlessness in the sense of inability 
to reach its end (Strom. 5 XII 81.6). 
The notion that Clement shared the so-called theory of the two stages in the existence of 
the Logos has received certain popularity among the scholars. There are two versions of this 
theory. According to the first, moderate, version, the position of Clement is similar to the earlier 
doctrine of the Apologists: the Logos was first in the Father, and then the same Logos was born 
for creating the world on the basis of the ideas-paradigms.61 Supporters of the other, more 
radical, understanding of the theory of two stages in the existence of the Logos in Clement rely 
on the testimony of Photius of Constantinople who accused Clement of upholding the doctrine 
that Father had two Logoi and only one of them appeared to the people, citing the following 
passage from the Hypotipos, “The Son is also called the Logos homonymously with the paternal 
Logos, but it was not Him who became flesh, nor the Logos of the Father, but some power of 
God which was the outflow of the Logos Himself, who became the mind and visited the hearts of 
men (Λέγεται μὲν καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς λόγος, ὁμωνύμως τῷ πατρικῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ 'οὔ νυν οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ 
σὰρξ γενόμενος · οὐδὲ μὴν ὁ πατρῷος λόγος, ἀλλὰ δύναμίς τις τοῦ Θεοῦ οἷον ἀπόρροια τοῦ 
λόγου αὐτοῦ, νοῦς γενόμενος τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καρδίας διαπεφοίτηκε).”62 Placing this 
testimony against the passages of Stromateis where Clement correlates the world of ideas to the 
Son-Monad, such scholars as G. Wolfson and S. Lilla suggest that according to Clement, the 
Logos in the Father (identical with the “thought” of the Father) and Logos who was generated by 
the Father and who created the world are two different Logoi. In Clement G. Wolfson 
distinguishes, on the one hand, the Logos as the thought of the Father and, on the other hand, the 
Logos who was generated by the Father and received individual being; it is this Logos who 
became incarnated and enlightens the minds of the faithful.63 In fact, S. Lilla also identifies the 
                                                 
58 A. CHOUFRINE, Gnosis, Theophany, Theosis, p. 176. 
59 Strom. 4, XXV, 156, 2; 157, 2; 5, XII, 71, 2 - 82, 1. 
60 A. CHOUFRINE, Gnosis, Theophany, Theosis, p. 176. 
61 R. CASEY, Clement of Alexandria, p. 47. 
62 PHOTIUS, Biblioth. 109, 89А. 
63 H. WOLFSON, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers: Faith, Trinity, Incarnation, Cambridge 1976, p. 
211. 
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third stage of the existence of the Logos, understanding the Logos in Clement similarly to the 
World Soul in Platonism as the principle governing the whole in the world and ensuring the 
harmony between the constituent parts of the world.64 In the recent studies, the theory based on 
the testimony of Photius and distinguishing the Logos in the Father and the Logos produced the 
Father in Clement, has been criticized. Thus, M. Edwards rightly points out that the quote cited 
by Photius and its interpretation in terms of two different Logoi is contrary to the passages of 
Stromateis where the Son is identified with the divine power which governs the world (such as 7, 
II, 9, 1), or with the power of the Father (such as 7, II, 7, 7). The testimony of Photius also 
contradicts the passage where Clement speaks of the Son as Father’s Logos who rules the world 
and has taken upon Himself the economy of salvation (7, II, 5, 5-6). M. Edwards juxtaposes the 
quote from Photius with the passage of Stromateis, which says that the Word of the Father (the 
Son) is not “the word uttered” (λόγος προφορικός), but the Divine Wisdom (5, I, 6, 3), and 
suggests that the text of Clement speaks not about the Son of God, but about the λόγος 
προφορικός. Accordingly, Photius must have accredited Clement with the erroneous teaching, 
being guided by the theological language of the Apologists and understanding the expression as 
applied to the Son, while in fact in this passage Clement just as in Stromateis 5, I, 6, 3 wanted to 
warn his readers against identifying a rational word uttered by man, which abides in the human 
heart, with the Logos of the Father who gives Christians this rational word.65 Thus, the question 
of whether the Son is understood in the teaching of Clement as being transcendent in relation to 
the created world, or merely as immanent, containing the logoi-archetypes of the sensible world 
is actively discussed in the literature and seems to be a very important problem. The more so that 
we can often come across the notion that God the Father in the doctrine of Clement is 
transcendent to the world, while the Son, the Logos, is immanent to the world.66 
The question on the status of the Son according to Clement, also rises in connection with 
the Platonic discourse according to which the Son is discussed in the context of multiplicity, that 
is, when it said of the Son that He “is [becomes] One like all.”67 Some scholars understand this 
multiplicity literally in the sense of the second hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides as multiplicity 
in general,68 while other scholars correlate it either with the Son in His relation to the world He 
                                                 
64 S. LILLA, Clement of Alexandria, p. 200. 
65 Challenging the position of G. Wolfson and C. Lilla, H. Hägg offers a less convincing explanation of 
the quote from Photius compared to M. Edwards’. According to H. Hägg, on the one hand, Clement 
distinguished between the Own Mind of the Father and the Logos (of the Son) Who became incarnated (Hägg 
understands that in the quotation from Photius, Clement knew that the word λόγος could be used in different 
meanings); on the other hand, Clement also claims that when the Son gives rationality to the man, His own 
rationality is not becoming reduced in the process (H. HÄGG, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 189-194). 
66 Ibid., 215. 
67 Strom. 4, XXV, 156, 2, see above. 
68 R. MORTLY, From Word to Silence. T. 2. The Way of Negation, Christian and Greek, Bonn 1986, p. 43; 
H. HÄGG, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 216-217, 227-228. 
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created,69 or argue (and this solution seems to be the most correct) that Clement speaks about a 
monad-like quality as something which is acquired by the faithful who have believed in the 
Son.70 This phrase may be interpreted in the sense of the existence of the faithful in their unity 
with the Son, and of the Son’s unity with the faithful.71 This understanding is confirmed by the 
passage from the Exhortation to the Gentiles 88 which discusses the Monad (the Son) in the 
context of Son’s unity with the faithful, “Being many, let us hasten to unite in one love in 
accordance with the union of the Monad’s substance (κατὰ τὴν τῆς μοναδικῆς οὐσίας ἕνωσιν). 
Therefore, acting in a good manner, let us strive for the unity, exploring the good Monad. Unity-
out-of-many becomes one, forming divine harmony and harmonious sounding in polyphony, 
following one chorist and mentor – the Word, resting in the truth itself.” 
This being said, Clement also pursues another way of treating monadology, namely, that 
the Monad (the Son) is discussed as the principle of all things, containing intelligible archetypes 
of everything created.72 We should keep in mind that duality in naming divinity is typical for  
Clement, when he calls the divinity by a certain name, and at the same time says that the divinity 
supercedes that name. Thus, although Clement often attributes the Son to the realm of the 
intelligible,73 he also says that the Son is beyond the intelligible world.74 The same can be found 
in respect to God the Father; according to Clement, the Father is “both the One and beyond the 
One, and above the very Monad (ἓν δὲ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν μονάδα).”75 
However, Clement speaks about the Son as being one with the Father.76 
Thus, in the writings of Clement we should distinguish three kinds of statements 
concerning the Son-Logos, and only in one of them the intelligible archetypes-logoi of the 
material world correspond to the Son. Thus, the first type of statements discuss the Son without 
referring to the created world, in the way He is in the bosom of the Father (Son as the One); in 
this context, there is no question about the Son as containing logoi-archetypes of the sensible 
world. The second type of statements refers to the Son in his relation to the created world; in this 
case the Son is described as containing intelligible archetypes of beings. The third type of 
statements refer to the Son in the Incarnation, when He forms a unity with the faithful (the Son 
(= Monad) in the context of the second hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides). At the same time, we 
                                                 
69 B. BUCUR, Angelomorphic Pneumatology. Clement of Alexandria and Other Early Christian Witnesses, 
Brill 2009, p. 29. 
70 Strom. 4, 157, 2, see above. 
71 A. CHOUFRINE, Gnosis, Theophany, Theosis, p. 195. 
72 Strom. 5, XIV, 93, 4–94, 2. 
73 Strom. 5, III, 16, 3; 5. XI, 73, 3; 7, I, 2, 2; 7, VII, 40, 1; ср. 4, XXV, 162, 5. 
74 Strom. 5, VI, 38, 6. 
75 Paed. 1, 71, 2. 
76 Paed. 1, 8, 62, 3–4; Exc. 8.1: “Nothing [from the existing beings] is hated by God [the Father], as well 
as by the Logos; for both are One, the God (οὐδὲν ἄρα μισεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου· ἓν γὰρ 
ἄμφω, ὁ θεός).” 
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cannot say that the presence of different discourses applied to the Son-Logos in Clement entails a 
doctrine of different logoi, it is simply different discourses applied to one and the same Logos. 
The understanding that the Son corresponds to plurality as He is, without distinguishing between 
these discourses in Clement, I believe, should be considered unfounded. 
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Chapter 3, “Paradigms of Participation in the context of the Topic of Universals in 
Origen” 
 
 
Now we should turn to the paradigms of participation associated with the topic of 
universals in Christian authors. 
The Platonic topic of participation appears in passing in the context of discussion of the 
ontological status and the fate of the soul after death in the Dialogue with Trypho the Jew by 
Justin the Philosopher who writes: 
 
The soul assuredly is or has life. If, then, it is life, it would cause something else, and 
not itself, to live, even as motion would move something else than itself. Now, that the 
soul lives, no one would deny. But if it lives, it lives not as being life, but as 
participating in life; but that which participates in anything, is different from that in 
which it does participate (ἕτερον δέ τι τὸ μετέχον τινὸς ἐκείνου οὗ μετέχει). Now the 
soul participates in life, since God wills it to live.1 
 
Justin says that the human soul lives not because it is life as such, but because it 
participates in life given to human being by God. This life, according to the Platonic paradigm of 
participation, is understood as a transcendental universal cause of existence for all living things. 
Here Justin formulated virtually the same understanding of the concept of participation, which 
was proclaimed by Plotinus in Enneads VI, 4, 13, 6-82: the participating entity is different from 
the participated entity; otherwise the situation of participation would not have taken place.    
Paradoxically, the development of the Platonic concept of participation in Christian 
literature was influenced by the Holy Scripture. Generally speaking, when Scripture speaks of 
participation and community, it usually uses the term κοινωνός, and less often – the verbs 
μετέχω and μετοχή as well as their derivatives. The Apostles Paul and Peter discuss the 
participation of Christians in Christ – in his Passion and his glory – in their Epistles.3 The Epistle 
to the Hebrews mentions the Christians as participants in the Holy Spirit (…μετόχους 
                                                 
1 JUST. Tryph. 6.1.3-9, in GOODSPEED E.J. (ed.), Die ältesten Apologeten, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht 1915. 
2 See above. 
3 See: 2 Cor. 1:7; Fil. 3:10; Heb. 4:14; 1 Pet. 4:13; 1 Pet. 5:1, and also the study: D. POWERS, Salvation 
through Participation. An Examination of the Notion of the Believers’ Corporate Unity with Christ in Early 
Christian Soteriology, Leuven–Paris–Sterling 2001. 
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γενηθέντας πνεύματος ἁγίου)4. However the key text for the later re-elaboration of the subject of 
participation in philosophy is the following fragment from the Second Epistle of Apostle Peter: 
 
Ὡς πάντα ἡμῖν τῆς θείας δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ τὰ πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν δεδωρημένης 
διὰ τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως τοῦ καλέσαντος ἡμᾶς ἰδίᾳ δόξῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ, δι’ ὧν τὰ τίμια καὶ 
μέγιστα ἡμῖν ἐπαγγέλματα δεδώρηται, ἵνα διὰ τούτων γένησθε θείας κοινωνοὶ 
φύσεως. 
 
His divine power has given us everything we need for a godly life through our 
knowledge of him who called us by his own glory and goodness. Through these he 
has given us his very great and precious promises, so that through them you may 
participate in the divine nature, having escaped the corruption in the world caused by 
evil desires.5  
 
In his book on 2 Pet. 1:3-4 and its historical context,6 James Starr showed that the 
expression “participation in the divine nature” in the Epistle of Peter meant the same as 
participation in the nature of Christ. The essence of this participation was the acquisition of, or 
participation in, the qualities of God, which were listed in 2 Pet. 1:1-3: divine glory, virtue, and 
power. Norman Russel7 assumed the influence of the Platonic doctrine in this fragment of 2 
Peter, but I doubt such an influence. Exploring the meaning of the passage from 2 Peter 
mentioned above, John Kaufman made an interesting suggestion that a human being participated 
in the divine perfection by expressing its virtues, and implying a philosophical concept of 
participation of the individual in the universal. 
                                                 
4 Heb. 6:4; cf.: 2 Cor. 13:13. 
5 2 Peter 1:3–4. The historical and philosophical context of 2 Peter 1:4 is discussed in: J. STARR, Sharers 
in Divine Nature: 2 Peter 1:4 in its Hellenistic Context, Stockholm 2000; S. FINLAN, Second Peters Notion of 
Divine Participation, in S. Finlan, V. Kharlamov (eds.), Theosis. Deification in Christian Theology, Eugene, 
Oregon 2006, pp. 32-50; see also: J. KAUFMAN, Becoming Divine, Becoming Human. Deification Themes in 
Irenaeus of Lyons, Oslo 2009 (PhD thesis), pp. 215-224; D. KEATING, The Appropriation of Divine Life in Cyril 
of Alexandria, Oxford 2004, pp. 148-150. Too superficial and in many respects inaccurate article by N. Russel is 
devoted to the exegesis of this fragment in the Byzantine literature: N. RUSSEL, "Partakers of the Divine Nature" 
(2 Peter 1:4) in the Byzantine Tradition, in ΚΑΘΗΓΗΤΡΙΑ: Essays presented to Joan Hussey on her 80-th 
Birthday, Camberley 1988, рp. 51-67; he demonstrates a more suspended view in his book: N. RUSSEL, The 
Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, Oxford 2004, pp. 151-152, 181-184, 200-203 etc. 
Jeffrey Finch, in his dissertation named Sanctity as participation in the divine nature  according to the ante-
Nicene eastern fathers, considered in the light of Palamism (Diss., the Caspersen School of Graduate Studies at 
Drew University 2002) leaves the history of 2 Peter 1:3-4 in the early Christian literature almost untouched.. 
6 J. STARR, Sharers in Divine Nature, p. 45. 
7 N. RUSSEL, Partakers of the Divine Nature,  
http://www.myriobiblos.gr/texts/english/Russell_partakers.html, between notes 3 and 4.  
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It seems that Origen,8 who used this fragment for his description of theosis, was the first 
Patristic author who incorporated the words from 2 Pet. 1: 3–4 about participation in the divine 
nature into the theological and philosophical context. In Origen this theme is built into a 
consistent, so to speak, philosophy of participation.9 In general the Platonic paradigm of 
participation was constitutive for Origen’s teaching, being one of cornerstones of Origen’s 
theological doctrine. However, as we shall see, the employment of the theme of participation by 
Origen allowed for the deviations from the Platonic paradigm and included the Aristotelian and 
the “neutral” trends. The Platonic paradigm of participation was reworked in Origen in the 
context of two major discourses inside which several subdivisions can be identified. 
First of all, this is manifested in Origen’s concept of participation by nature when Origen 
discussed participation of beings of the created world in God due to their natural qualities, or the 
participation of beings of the material world in principles and logoi, contained in the world of the 
Mind due to their natural qualities (we have already seen such a version of the theme of natural 
participation in Christian literature before Origen in Justin the Philosopher). Generally speaking, 
this trend, appearing in Origen, and more fully elaborated in the later Patristic authors, entailed 
that beings of the same nature participated in the transcendental participated principle(s), which 
granted them their natural abilities acting as a universal-before-things. The method of 
participation was different for beings of different natures, and depended upon the place of the 
natural perfections owned by the beings of each particular nature in the order and hierarchy of 
perfections. 
In the first case Origen said that the Son was divine due to the participation (μετοχῇ) in the 
divinity of the Father.10 Origen described not only the relation of the Son to the Father but also 
the relation of the Spirit to the Son using the language of participation. The Spirit needs the 
cooperation of the Son in respect to being, wisdom, understanding, justice, and all of the 
perfections; He has all these according to participation (κατὰ μετοχὴν), understood here in the 
Platonic sense, in that which belongs to Christ11. According to Origen, although the Son 
accepted the divinity and the divine attributes from the Father, they belonged to Him in the 
                                                 
8 Cf. N. RUSSEL, The Doctrine of Deification, p. 151; KAUFMAN J. Becoming Divine, Becoming Human, 
p. 215. 
9 Concerning the concept of participation in the doctrine of Origen see esp.: D. BALAS, The Idea of 
Participation in the Structure of Origen’s Thought. Christian Transposition of a Theme of the Platonic tradition, 
in Origeniana. Premier colloque international des études origéniennes (Montserrat, 18-21 Septembre 1973), 
Bari 1975 (Quaderni di Vetera Christianorum, 12), pp. 257-275 (I was mostly influenced by this article in my 
interpretation of the doctrine of Origen presented below). See also: A. BUENO, «Plenitud» y «Participación». 
Nociones estructurantes de la doctrina teológica de Orígenes de Alejandría, “Augustinianum” 50 (2010), pp. 
27-60; N. RUSSEL, The Doctrine of Deification, pp. 147-152; J. RIUS-CAMPS, Comunicabilidad de la naturaleza 
de Dios segun Origenes, “Orientalia Christianae Periodica”, 34 (1968), pp. 5-37; 36 (1972), pp. 201-247; 38 
(1972), pp. 430-453; IDEM., El dinamismo trinitario en la divinizacion de los seres racionales segun Origenes, 
Rome 1970.  
10 ORIGEN. In Joan. II, 2, 17, 4-6 (Blanc).  
11 ORIGEN. In Joan. II, 10, 76, 1-7 (Blanc). 
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essential and not in the accidental way. It is testified to by Origen’s application of divine names 
with the prefix αὐτο- to the Son,12 as well as Origen’s statement that it was wrong to say that the 
Son participated in the righteousness, but rather that He was righteousness Himself, in which 
righteous people participated,13 or if human beings became God according to participation (κατὰ 
μετουσίαν), Christ was God according to substance (κατ̕ οὐσίαν).14 This opposition, formulated 
in the latter case as “according to substance/according to participation” will be adopted by the 
later Patristic authors. Keeping all this in mind, we may agree with David Balas15 that in the case 
of the discourse of participation being used in the Trinitarian context, the measure of 
participation, which would depend on the will of the participating beings, that is, the Son and the 
Holy Spirit, was not discussed. The participation of the Son in the Father and the Spirit in the 
Son is constant and unchangeable.   
In the second case, when the concept of participation was used for describing the 
individual, dynamic unity of human beings with God, it was supposed that participation 
depended on the disposition of the will of the participating beings.16 In this context, Origen and 
the subsequent Christian authors used 2 Pet. 1: 3-4 in their discussion of individual participation. 
The allusion to this fragment could be skillfully inserted into the general Platonic discourse of 
participation. We can see it in Origen’s De principiis IV, 4, 9, where both the “individual” and 
the “natural” discourses take place. 
This fragment has survived in the Latin translation, but the initial terminology of 
participation is quite evident: 
 
Every one who participates in anything, is unquestionably of one essence 
and nature with him who participates in the same thing. For example, as all 
eyes participate in the light, so accordingly all eyes which participate in the 
light are of one nature; but although every eye participates in the light, yet, 
inasmuch as one sees more clearly, and another more obscurely, every eye does 
not equally share in the light. And again, all hearing receives voice or sound, 
                                                 
12 См.: D. BALAS. The idea of participation, p. 263.  
13 ORIGEN. Contra Celcus VI, 64. Cf.: De Princ. II, 6, 6. 
14 ORIGEN. In Ps. in catenae, Ps. 135: PG 12, 1656A. 
15 D. BALAS. The idea of participation, p. 271. 
16 In opposition to the “natural” participation David Balas calls this participation “supernatural”, see: D. 
BALAS. The idea of participation, p. 266-270. N. Russel follows Balas in this respect (N. RUSSEL, The Doctrine 
of Deification, p. 147; he calls this kind of participation dynamical). In general, my distinction between the 
natural and the individual discourses of participation in Origen is close to the distinction made by David Balas, 
who spoke of natural and supernatural levels of participation in Origen. The difference in my understanding of 
this distinction, is that I distinguish the individual level instead of the supernatural. This difference seems more 
adequate because it is more universal. The discourse of individual participation encompasses the participation in 
the context of relations between the Persons of the Holy Trinity as well as participation of deified people in God, 
described as supernatural by Balas.  
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and therefore all hearing is of one nature; but each one hears more rapidly or 
more slowly, according as the quality of his hearing is clear and sound. Let us 
pass now from these sensuous illustrations to the consideration of intellectual 
things. Every mind which participates in intellectual light ought undoubtedly to 
be of one nature with every mind which participates in a similar manner in 
intellectual light. If the heavenly virtues, then, participate in intellectual light, 
i.e., in divine nature, because they participate in wisdom and holiness, and if 
human souls, have participated in the same light and wisdom, and thus are 
mutually of one nature and of one essence—then, since the heavenly virtues 
are incorruptible and immortal, the essence of the human soul will also be 
immortal and incorruptible. And not only so, but because the nature of Father, 
and Son, and Holy Spirit, in whose intellectual light alone all created things 
participate, is incorruptible and eternal, it is altogether consistent and necessary 
that every substance which participates in that eternal nature should last for 
ever, and be incorruptible and eternal, so that the eternity of divine goodness 
may be understood also in this respect, that they who obtain its benefits are 
also eternal.17 
 
First, Origen used the examples of participation of the eye in light and the hearing in 
sound. He said that the same way of participating in something, if it could be applied to different 
beings, presupposed that those beings were of the same nature. And individuals of the same 
nature might have their typical method of participation either naturally, that is, in the good way, 
or unnaturally, that is, in the bad way. The discourse of participation, used in these examples, 
was neither Platonic, nor Aristotelian – it was neutral. 
                                                 
17 ORIGEN. De Princ. IV, 4, 9 (36): 422-424: 337-368 (Crouzel, Simonetti). The Latin text: “Omnis, qui 
participat alicuius, cum eo, qui eiusdem rei particeps est, sine dubio unius substantiae est uniusgue naturae. Vt 
puta omnes oculi lucis participant, et ideo omnes oculi, qui de luce participant, unius naturae sunt ; sed licet 
omnis oculus de luce participet, tamen quoniam alius acutius, alius obtunsius uidet, non omnis oculus aequaliter 
de luce participat. Et rursum omnis auditus uocem uel sonum recipit, et ideo omnis auditus unius naturae est; 
uerum pro qualitate puri et sinceri auditus unusquisque uel uelocius audit uel tardius. Transeamus ergo ab his 
sensibilibus exemplis ad intellectualium contemplationem. Omnis mens, quae de intellectuali luce participat, 
cum omni mente, quae simili modo de intellectuali luce participat, unius sine dubio debet esse naturae. Si ergo 
caelestes uirtutes intellectualis lucis, id est diuinae naturae, per hoc quod sapientiae et sanctificationis participant, 
participium sumunt, et humana anima eiusdem lucis et sapientiae participium sumit, erunt et ista unius naturae 
secum inuicem uniusque substantiae; incorruptae autem sunt et inmortales caelestes uirtutes : incorrupta sine 
dubio et inmortalis erit etiam animae humanae substantia. Non solum autem, sed quoniam ipsa patris et filii et 
spiritus sancti natura, cuius solius intellectualis lucis uniuersa creatura participium trahit, incorrupta est et 
aeterna, ualde et consequens et necessarium est etiam omnem substantiam, quae aeternae illius naturae 
participium trahit, perdurare etiam ipsam semper et incorruptibilem et aeternam, ut diuinae bonitatis aeternitas 
etiam in eo intellegatur, dum aeterni sunt et hi, qui eius beneficia consequuntur.”  
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Then Origen turned to formulating his specific teaching, and spoke of human minds and 
heavenly powers, participating (in the Platonic sense) in the light of the Mind, thus participating 
in the divine nature. The allusion to 2 Pet.1:3-4 is evident here.18 Thus, according to Origen, the 
human minds and the heavenly powers were of the same nature and substance.19-20 This means 
that the human soul is incorruptible and eternal, able to participate in the divine nature which is 
understood by Origen as the nature of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, that is, the nature 
of the Holy Trinity. When Origen spoke about “divine nature” here, or the nature of the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Spirit, he clearly understood the notion of nature in the context of 
causality. For Origen if beings participated in the divine nature, that nature was the cause of the 
acquisition of qualities, typical for it, by the beings participating in it. This brings the concept of 
participation in the divine nature in the way it was used by Origen, closer to the understanding 
probably implied in 2 Pet. 1:4 (see above). 
Now I will turn to Origen’s teaching of the natural participation in more detail. In this 
respect the following fragments of De principiis should be cited: 
   
God the Father bestows upon all, existence; and participation in Christ, in 
respect of His being the word of reason, renders them rational beings. From 
which it follows that they are deserving either of praise or blame, because 
capable of virtue and vice. On this account, therefore, is the grace of the Holy 
Ghost present, that those beings which are not holy in their essence may be 
rendered holy by participating in it. Seeing, then, that firstly, they derive their 
existence from God the Father; secondly, their rational nature from the Word; 
thirdly, their holiness from the Holy Spirit. 21 
 
That the working of the Father and the Son operates both in saints and in 
sinners, is manifest from this, that all who are rational beings are partakers of 
the word, i.e., of reason, and by this means bear certain seeds, implanted within 
them, of wisdom and justice, which is Christ. Now, in Him who truly exists, 
and who said by Moses, "I Am Who I Am" (Ex. 3:14), all things, whatever 
                                                 
18 Norman Russel (N. RUSSEL, The Doctrine of Deification, p. 151, n. 62) listed the fragments where 
Origen quoted 2 Pet. 1:4 in his discussion of participation in the divine nature: De princ. IV, 4, 4 and in In Rom. 
4, 9, PG 14, 997С; Contra Celsus 3, 37; In Lev. 4, 4, GCS, Т. 6, p. 319, 16-17. The fragment of De Princ. IV, 4, 
9 quoted above was omitted from this list, but it is evident that when Origen spoke about participation in the 
divine nature, he was alluding to 2 Pet. 1:4. In his book, N. Russel (p.148) mentioned this passage and its 
discussion of the participation in the divine nature, but did not connect it to the interpretation of 2 Pet. 1:4.  
19 In respect to such discourse of participation, Norman Russel spoke about the “horizontal” dimension of 
participation in the doctrine of Origen (N. RUSSEL, The Doctrine of Deification, p. 148).   
20 Here I will not go into the details of the “Origenist myth” about the fallen minds. 
21 ORIGEN. De princ. I, 3, 8: 272-283, in ORIGÈNE. Traité des principles, p. 162. 
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they are, participate; which participation in God the Father is shared both by 
just men and sinners, by rational and irrational beings, and by all things 
universally which exist. The Apostle Paul also shows truly that all have a share 
in Christ, when he says, "Say not in your heart, Who shall ascend into heaven? 
(i.e., to bring Christ down from above); or who shall descend into the deep? 
(that is, to bring up Christ again from the dead.) But what says the Scripture? 
The word is near you, even in your mouth, and in your heart" (Rom. 10:6-8). 
By which he means that Christ is in the heart of all, in respect of His being the 
word or reason, by participating in which they are rational beings.22 
 
According to Origen, created beings participated in God with their substantial qualities 
because of their very existence (the Platonic connotations are evident here). And there was some 
definite order of participation of beings in God: all created beings participated in God the Father 
– the source of all beings – according to their existence; rational beings, in addition to 
participating in God the Father according to existence, also participated in the Sun as the Logos – 
the source of all reason. This theological and philosophical discourse presumed that the 
Hypostases of the Holy Trinity acted as universal participated causes23 for beings. This 
participation of everything in God the Father and of the rational beings in the Son-Logos did not 
depend on the state of the participating individuals: both people worthy of praise and worthy of 
punishment participated in the Son due to their rational capacities. Therefore this doctrine 
implied (but was not expressed quite explicitly), that natural participation of all beings in God 
the Father according to existence and participation of rational beings in the Logos according to 
rational capacities could be “more” or “less.” The theological language used by Origen in the 
fragment also contained the instrument to describe participation in God in dynamic terms. 
Typical for the saints, it presupposed that participation in God could be “more” or “less” for the 
participating individual.24 Such participation of saints in God was described by Origen as 
participation in the third Person of the Holy Trinity, the Holy Spirit. 
If we compare the discourses of participation from the fragments of De principiis I, 3, 6 
and I, 3, 8 on the one hand, and from the fragment of De principiis IV, 4, 9, on the other hand, 
we can see the static character of the natural participation of created beings in God (participation 
according to existence and rational capacity) was presumed in the first case, while in the second 
case we can see a different discourse of natural participation with some deviation from 
                                                 
22 ORIGEN. De Princ. I, 3, 6: 155–171, in ORIGÈNE. Traité des principles, p. 154.  
23 They are universal precisely as causes, viewed in relation to the plurality of the caused, for which this 
causality is common. 
24 See also: De princ. II, 6, 3. Cf. D. BALAS, The Idea of Participation, p. 271. 
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understanding natural participation in a static sense. According to that discourse, although the 
individuals of the same nature participated in the participated entity in the same way, in reality 
such natural participation in the divine nature, acting as a universal principle, was possible in 
different measure; the measure of participation depended on whether the mode of participation 
was actualized in each particular instance naturally or not. 
This divergence of discourses of participation can be explained by the fact that in De 
principiis IV, 4, 9 Origen was discussing individual participation in God in terms of natural 
causation. Origen meant that it was inherent in nature of all human beings to participate in God 
in the sense of personal unification with God in theosis (I call this individual participation in 
God). However, this natural capacity might or might not be actualized in a natural way. If natural 
actualization of this capacity did not occur, the human being would still have existence and 
intellect, yet outside of personal unification with God. 
Thus, we may say that in the context of the discourse of participation, present in the 
fragments of De principiis I, 3, 6 and I, 3, 8, it is assumed that natural participation in God was 
present in the same measure for all beings according to existence, and for rational beings 
according to their intellectual capacity, while individual participation in God in theosis could be 
actualized for the rational beings in varying degrees. The discourse of participation from De 
principiis IV, 4, 9 suggests that the concept of the same measure of participation referred to the 
capacity of every being belonging to the human nature – individual participation in God in 
theosis – and not the natural participation in God. 
From these examples we may realize that Origen used different language for describing 
individual participation of rational beings in God in theosis. In De principiis I, 3, 6 and 3, 8, 
where Origen discussed the order of the ways of participation, individual participation was 
described in accordance with the logic of this order in the language of participation in the Holy 
Spirit, while in De principiis IV, 4, 9, where Origen did not elaborate on the theme of the order 
of participation, he used the language of participation in the divine substance, alluding to 2 Pet. 
1:3-4. 
Speaking about Origen’s doctrine of participation, it is necessary to touch upon the theme 
of participation of all beings in the Son-Logos-Wisdom. Just as Clement of Alexandria, Origen 
described God the Father in terms of unity and simplicity, while the Son was characterized by 
plurality,25 since He was the Beginning of the plurality of created things.26 
                                                 
25 Here the line which can be traced to Plato’s Parmenides, possibly through Clement. Concerning the 
teaching of Clement in this respect see especially: A. CHOUFRINE, Gnosis, Theophany, Theosis, pp. 167-179.  
26 See: ”Now God is altogether one and simple (ἕν καὶ ἁπλοῦν); but our Saviour, for many reasons, since 
God set Him forth a propitiation (Rom. 3:25) and a first fruits of the whole creation, is made many things, or 
perhaps all these things; the whole creation, so far as capable of redemption, stands in need of Him (cf. Rom. 
8:21)” (In Joan. I, 22). 
  
35
Following Philo27 and Clement of Alexandria,28 Origen developed a doctrine on the 
Logos-Wisdom Who contained in Himself the intelligible principles and logoi of beings, in 
which the beings of the created world participate.29 According to these logoi, God created beings 
of the created world with the help of the Logos-Wisdom.30 Creation always has its prototype in 
the Divine Wisdom.31 According to Origen, there were logoi for species and genera of beings32 – 
we may say that such logoi correlate with universals-before-things as well as the individual 
things.33 The relation between the logoi of beings and the Logos-Word was that of parts to the 
whole and of the species to the genus.34 
Thus, Logos-Wisdom is participated in differently, first of all, by all created beings,35 
second of all, by beings with rational capacity (even if they do not live in accordance with 
reason),36 and third of all, by truly rational righteous and holy people.37 
In the first case Origen’s discussion assumed that Logos-Wisdom in some way contained 
universals-before-things, and in the second case – that Logos was a universal participated 
principle for rational beings. 
Speaking about human beings as having rational capacity, Origen emphasized two 
meanings of logos entailing two meanings of participation: in one sense all people participate in 
logos (with lowercase l) since they all have a natural capacity to think due to their participation 
in Logos-Wisdom; in the other sense those people who reached spiritual perfection, participate in 
Logos (with capital L): 
 
But the logos in man, in which we have said that our whole race 
participated in, is spoken of in two senses; first, in that of the filling up of ideas 
                                                 
27 Cf. for ex. PHILO. De opif. 16; 36; 129; Her. 280; De Plant. 50; De ebriel. 133; De confus. ling. 172. In 
general about the teaching of Philo on logoi in the historical-philosophical context see: R. RADICE, Logos tra 
stoicismo e platonismo. II problema di Filone, in R. Radice, A. Valvo (ed.), Dal logos dei greci e dei romani al 
Logos di Dio Ricordando Marta Sordi. (Temi metafisici e problemi del pensiero antico. Studi e testi 122), 
Milano 2011, p. 131-145. 
28  See: CLEM. Strom. 5, XIV, 93-94; 4, XXV, 155-157. 
29 On this subject in Origen in relation to the previous tradition see esp.: I. RAMELLI, Cristo-Logos in 
Origene Ascendenze medioplatoniche e filoniane, passaggi in Clemente e Bardesane, e anti-subordinazionismo, 
in R. Radice, A. Valvo (ed.), Dal logos dei greci, pp. 295-318. Cf.: A. BUENO, «Plenitud» y «Participación», pp. 
54-55. 
30 ORIGEN. De Princ. I, 3, 6; I, 4, 4-5; In Joan. XIX, 22, 147; I, 19, 109-115; I, 34, 243-246; Contra Cesus 
V, 39. Cf. also the words of Origen that all living beings are such because the participate in Life as it is (In Joan. 
Fr. 2, GCS, T. 4, p. 485, 24-26). Here Origen practically repeats the similar statement by Justin the Philosopher 
(Tryph. 6, 1, 3-9, see above). 
31 ORIGEN. De Princ. I, 4, 4-5. 
32 In Joan.  I, 19, 114, cf. De Princ. I, 2, 2; I, 4, 5; I, 7, 1; III, 6, 4. 
33 ORIGEN. De Princ. I, 2, 2. 
34 ORIGEN. Contra Cesus V, 19, cf. In Joan. I, 34, 244. 
35 ORIGEN. In Joan. I, 34.244; XIX.22.147 
36 ORIGEN. In Joan. I, 37.269–270, ср. I, 34, 246. 
37 ORIGEN. Contra Cesus VI, 64; In Joan. I, 37, 268 (Blanc). 
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which takes place, prodigies38 excepted, in every one who passes beyond the 
age of boyhood, but secondly, in that of the consummation, which takes place 
only in the perfect.39  
 
Although it was mentioned only in passing, here we may see the Aristotelian paradigm of 
participation, rare for Origen: it is assumed that all people participate in the capacity of 
reasoning, constitutive for the human nature. It is apparently understood in this fragment not as a 
transcendental capacity for human individuals, but as something inherent in every participating 
human. Therefore we can affirm that the Aristotelian paradigm is used here, since logos is 
understood in the sense of a universal-in-things.  
In sum, two major discourses of participation can be discerned in Origen: natural 
participation and individual participation.  
Natural participation can be subdivided into four types: 
N1: the order of natural participation of species uniting created beings in the Persons of the 
Holy Trinity; according to this order all beings participate in God the Father according to 
existence, and rational beings participate in the Son according to their rational capacity; God the 
Father and God the Son act as universal participated causes for the plurality of beings. 
 N2: all created beings naturally participate in the logoi contained in the Logos-Wisdom, 
although the way the rational beings participate in the Logos differ from the way other beings 
participate in the Logos; this discourse assumes that Logos-Wisdom in some way contains 
universals-before-things. 
N3: all rational beings have a natural capacity to unite with God; this discourse presumes 
that the divine nature, common for the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, acts as a universal 
participated principle in relation to the natural ability of rational beings to unite with God. 
N4: all people naturally participate in the capacity of reasoning, constitutive for the human 
nature. The Aristotelian paradigm is used here, which assumes the presence of universal-in-
things (logos) in rational beings. 
  Individual participation can be subdivided into two types in Origen; 
I1, associated with the subject of relations between the Persons of the Holy Trinity: the Son 
participates in the divinity of the Father, and the Holy Spirit participates in the qualities of the 
Son. 
I2, associated with the subject of unification of righteous people to God. This type may be 
subdivided into two: 
                                                 
38 In the sense of mentally retarded.  
39 ORIGEN. In Joan. I, 37, 273, 1-5 (Blanc). 
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I2а: individual unification of a rational being with God is described using the language of 
participation in the Holy Spirit. In respect to natural participation this correlates with N1. 
I2b: individual unification of a rational being with God is described using the language of 
the divine substance with the allusion to 2 Pet. 1:3–4. In respect to natural participation this 
correlates with N3. 
These observations may help us to clarify the concept of David Balas concerning the 
doctrine of participation in Origen. According to Balas, in general terms Origen’s concept of 
participation presumes that the lower level of being has a certain kind of perfection, being 
dependant in this relation on the higher level of being, which fully possesses this perfection and 
is its source.40 It seems that such an understanding is commonplace in the study of Origen.41. 
Such an understanding of participation corresponds to the Platonic paradigm of participation 
mentioned above. However, as we have seen, although the Platonic paradigm is dominant in 
Origen, there are also manifestations of a paradigm which can be called Aristotelian as well as an 
understanding of participation in the neutral sense. 
A new trend in the development of the theme of participation in Christian theology 
emerged during the Arian controversy and was associated with the use of the concept of 
“unparticipable” by the representatives of the Arian party. I will discuss it in the next part of my 
work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 D. BALAS. The idea of participation, p. 270.  
41 See for example: N. RUSSEL, The Doctrine of Deification, pp. 147-148. This does not contradict the 
horizontal dimension of participation, emphasized by N. Russel (р. 148, see note 19 above), since it points not to 
the relation between the participating and the participated, but to the relation between the participants 
themselves: it is connected to the idea, that the same way of participation of different beings in the participated 
indicates that they have the same nature. 
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Chapter 4, “Participation and universals in the doctrine of Arius” 
 
 
4.1. The doctrine of Arius
 
 
The Arian controversy was triggered by Arius’1 interpretation of the passage from the 
Book of Proverbs, “The Lord created me the beginning of his ways” (Prov. 8, 23 according to 
the Septuagint), when Arius started to preach the doctrine of the created nature of the Son-Logos 
that “there was when the Son did not exist.” This doctrine became a stumbling block for many 
Christians. When the controversy around the teaching of Arius began to spread among the 
population of Alexandria, Bishop Alexander received a complaint about Arius. At first, 
Alexander did not take the allegation seriously and took a neutral position, considering this issue 
to be one of the topics which could be discussed in the Church and which might be a subject of 
public debate.2 However, when Arius accused Alexander of Sabellianism because of his words, 
“Holy Trinity is the One in the Trinity,” arguing in opposition to Alexander that “there was when 
the Son did not exist,” Alexander decidedly sided with those who condemned the teachings of 
Arius and forbade him to preach his doctrine.3 Arius, who was very popular in Alexandria, did 
not comply with the prohibitions of Alexander, forcing Alexander to convene a council of 
bishops under his jurisdiction from Egypt and Libya (318) and excommunicate Arius and the 
bishops who followed him, subsequently announcing his decision to all Churches in the 
Encyclical Letter.4 Probably at that same time5 Arius composed a treatise named Thalia 
(“Feast”)6 which is a crucial source on his doctrine. The disciplinary action against Arius on the 
                                                 
1 Arius was born ca. 256; by his origin he was a Libyan. Arias attended the theological school of Lucian 
in Antioch, but since the beginning of the fourth century lived in Alexandria. He became a presbyteros there and 
was once even a candidate for the episcopal see of Alexandria, but declined the offer in favor of his future enemy 
and opponent Alexander of Alexandria (PHILOSTORGIUS 1.3; EPIPH. Panar. 69, 1-6; SOZOM. Hist. 1, 15; THEOD. 
Hist. 1, 2). 
2 SOZOM. Hist. 1, 15. 
3 SOCR. Hist. 1, 5. 
4 IBID., 1, 6. 
5  See: W. LÖHR, Arius Reconsidered (Part 2), “Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum”, 10 (2006), pp. 556-
557. 
6 Arias composed Thalia in order to popularize his views and this is why the work is written in verse (for 
the analysis of the poetic meter, see M. WEST, The Metre of Arius’ “Thalia”, “The Journal of Theological 
Studies”, 33 (1982), pp. 98-105). The most important primary sources for the doctrine of Arius are the following 
passages from the treatises by Athanasius of Alexandria, which preserved the fragments of Thalia: De syn. 12 
and Contra Arianos 1, 5 - 6, 9. The fragments of Thalia are published in G. BARDY, Recherches sur Saint Lucien 
d'Antioche et son école, Paris 1936, pp. 217-295 as well as in the above article by Martin West; the fragments 
from the edition of Martin West (with English translation) can also be found in W. LÖHR, Arius Reconsidered 
(Part 2), pp. 134-146. On the sources of Arius’ doctrine, see the Letter of Arius to Bishop Eusebius of 
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part of Alexander of Alexandria became the reason for spreading the debate over the entire 
Christian East and led to the Church-wide scale of the Arian controversy. Arius and his 
associates went to the East; Arius settled in Caesarea of Palestine where he met a positive 
attitude on the part of a famous church historian and intellectual Eusebius, the Bishop of 
Caesarea. Arius wrote a letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia, asking him as a “co-Lucianist,” that is, 
as his classmate in the school of Lucian, to join the fight. In the letter Arius argued with 
Alexander and explained his doctrine. Arius accused Alexander of proclaiming that “The Son 
coexists with God in an ungenerated way; He is always generated and is ungeneratedly generated 
(ἀγεννητογενής).” Arius set out his own doctrine in the following way: 
 
The Son is not unbegotten and in no sense He is a part of the Unbegotten, 
and He did not originate from anything pre-existent, but by the will and the 
counsel [of God] before the times and before the ages He was perfect God, the 
Only-begotten, immutable. However, He was not in existence before He was 
begotten, or created, or defined, or established, since He did not exist before 
the birth.7  
 
In the passage Arius rejects the (incorrectly understood) doctrine of Alexander of 
Alexandria8 that “being unbegotten” refers not only to God the Father, but also to the Son, and 
insists that “being unbegotten” refers only to the Father, while the Son was either begotten or 
created. However, as can be seen from this quotation, according to Arius the Son is “the perfect 
God.” However, He is God not in the ontological sense, but according to honor, that is, in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Nicomedia: THEOD. Hist. 1, 5, as well as the Letter of Arius to Alexander of Alexandria: De syn. 15; Ad ep. Aeg. 
et Lib. 16 = EPIPH. Panar. 69, 7.  
7 THEOD. Hist. 1, 5. 
8 Alexander of Alexandria denied that taught about non-generation of the Son (see his Epistle to Bishop 
Alexander of Constantinople, “That is why we believe that the Son is always from the Father; for He is the 
brightness of His glory, and the image of His hypostasis (Heb. 1: 3). But let no one take the word ‘always’ in the 
sense of being unbegotten as people with damaged senses of the soul think: ‘He was not,’ ‘not always,’ ‘not 
before the ages’ is not the same as being unbegotten. Human mind is incapable of inventing any words for 
designating unbegottenness” (THEOD. Hist. 1, 4). Alexander’s own doctrine was that the Father always generates 
the Son: “The Only Begotten Son of the Father has the immutable sonship... We believe that the Son is always 
from the Father” (Ibid.). The doctrine of the eternal timeless generation of the Son by the God the Father was 
probably adopted by Alexander from Origen; cf. “And who that is capable of entertaining reverential thoughts or 
feelings regarding God, can suppose or believe that God the Father ever existed, even for a moment of time, 
without having generated this Wisdom? For in that case he must say either that God was unable to generate 
Wisdom before He produced her, so that He afterwards called into being her who formerly did not exist, or that 
He possessed the power indeed, but – what cannot be said of God without impiety – was unwilling to use it; both 
of which suppositions, it is patent to all, are alike absurd and impious” (De princ. I, 2, 2). However, as opposed 
to Bishop Alexander, Origen believed that God always produced not only the Son, but also the cosmos. 
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comparison with other created beings.9 Arius defended the voluntaristic understanding of the 
origin of the Son: the Son was not “begotten” by God, but was created by His volition; even 
more so, created as well as all created beings “from nothing.” There is no contradiction in the 
words of Arius that on the one hand the Son originated “from before the time,” and on the other 
hand that “He was not before he was begotten,” since Arius must have followed the views 
expressed in Timaeus 38b that physical time depended on the motion of the celestial bodies,10 
which as Christopher Stead noted11 were easily reconcilable with the Scripture (Gen. 1:14). The 
words, “...He was begotten or created” manifest an important point in the entire history of the 
Arian controversy. Two Greek words, γεννητός (from γεννάω, “originate,” “give birth”) and 
γενητός (from γίγνομαι, “emerge,” “become”) can be understood both synonymously and not 
synonymously. The general Arian trend when it came to the Son was to identify γεννητός and 
γενητός, implying the createdness of the Son and His generation in time (that is, if the Son “is 
begotten,” He is “created”).12 The representatives of the anti-Arian party as a rule distinguished 
between these notions, using γεννητός to refer to timeless generation of the Son by God the 
Father and not allowing for the application of this notion to the created world, while γενητός was 
used to indicate the created nature of the world created by God, but not applying it to God the 
Son. 
 
 
4.2. Language of Participation and Universal Realities in God and in the Created Realm in 
Arius and the Arians 
 
Arius and his followers formulated several aspects of their doctrine using the language of 
participation. We can identify several trends in applying the concept of participation by Arius 
and the Arians. 
1) In order to emphasize the created nature of the Son, the Son was described as 
participating in the divinity of the Father which was understood in the sense that the Son did not 
possess divinity according to His nature. There are the following testimonies on the subject 
                                                 
9 Probably the Arian doctrine preconditioned the ban on calling Christ “the true God” (see ATHAN. 
Contra Arianos 1, 9), since that expression could be applied only to the Father. Yet, sometimes, for political 
reasons the Arians could leave this principle aside, see: ATHAN. Ad ep. Aeg. et Lib. 5. 
10 It should be noted that R. Gregg and D. Groh followed another point of view regarding the statement of 
Arius that the Son originated before the time. They believed that it referred to the doctrine of Arius that the Son 
was chosen by the Father as the Only Begotten before the time according to the foreknowledge of the Father 
about the immutable good will of Christ (R. GREGG, D. GROH, The Centrality of Soteriology in Early Arianism, 
“Studia Patristica”, 15 (1984), p. 313, n. 45). However, the interpretation of C. Stead seems to be more 
appropriate, taking into account the emphasis on the cosmological function of the Son in the doctrine of Arius. 
11 C. STEAD, The Platonism of Arius, “The Journal of Theological Studies”, 15 (1964), pp. 26-27. 
12 See the old but still relevant article L. PRESTIGE, ἀγέν[ν]ητος and γεν[ν]ητός and kindred words, in 
Eusebius and the Early Arians, “The Journal of Theological Studies” 24 (1923), pp. 486-496. 
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(however, it is not often clear whether Athanasius paraphrased the words of Arius or quoted 
them): 1a) the words of Arius that although the Son was called God, He was not the true God, 
but according to the participation in grace (λέγεται θεός, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀληθινός ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ μετοχῇ 
χάριτος)13; 1b) the words of Arius that the Son-Christ was not the true God, but was made God 
by participation (οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθινὸς θεὸς ὁ Χριστός, ἀλλὰ μετοχῇ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐθεοποιήθη)14; 1c) 
the Letter to the Bishops of Egypt and Libya where Athanasius quoted the following words of 
Arius: οὐδὲ θεὸς ἀληθινός ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός, ἀλλὰ μετοχῇ καὶ αὐτὸς ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες 
λέγεται θεός.15 These words seem to make sense only if we understand them in a way that Christ 
was not the true God, but was called God due to participation (in God), in respect to which He 
was similar to all the other people.16 
2) The arguments associated with the concept of non-participation. Arius claimed that the 
Son existed by Himself separately from the Father and did not participate in any way in the 
Father (καὶ διῃρημένον ἐστιν πατρὸς υἱὸς καθ ̉ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀμέτοχος κατὰ πάντα)17. A similar 
thought was expressed by the Arian Bishop Eusebius of Nicomedia in his Letter to Paulinus of 
Tyre, where Eusebius said that the Son was not from the substance of the Unbegotten (the 
Father), and did not participate in the nature of the Unbegotten (καθόλου τῆς φύσεως τῆς 
ἀγεννήτου μὴ μετἑχον)18. According to Arius, the substances of the Father, the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit did not participate in each other (ἀλλότριαι καὶ ἀμέτοχοί εἰσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ οὐσίαι τοῦ 
πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος)19. 
3) The arguments involving the description of the Son as participating in the divine 
attributes. The doctrine of Arius included a concept that Christ was not the Wisdom, the Logos 
(Word), and the power of God in the proper sense, and that God had His own inherent Wisdom, 
Logos, and Power, while the Son was produced by the Divine Wisdom and Logos in order to 
create the world through Himself, and participated (μετέχει) in the divine Wisdom, Logos, and 
Power according to grace. In virtue of that participation, the Son was called by the names of 
Wisdom, Logos (Word), and Power, in fact, being Wisdom, Word, and Power only in name, and 
                                                 
13 ATHAN. Contra Arianos 1, 6, 1: 115 (Metzler, Savvidis, Lieferung), cf.: Contra Arianos 3, 15. 
14 ATHAN. Contra Arianos 1, 9, 5: 118 (Metzler, Savvidis, Lieferung). 
15 ATHAN. Ad ep. Aeg. et Lib. 12, 4: 52 (Hansen, Metzler, Savvidis). 
16 I understand this statement as implying the principle that all people participate in God (taking the form 
of “μετοχῇ” as dativus finalis). I find meaningless another possible understanding of this statement, according to 
which all people are called God. 
17 Fr. 3, in M. WEST, The Metre of Arius’ “Thalia”, p. 102 (cf.: W. LÖHR, Arius Reconsidered (Part 2), 
pp. 135-136). 
18 ATHANASIUS, Werke. Herausgegeben im Auftrag der Kirchenväter-Kommission der preussischen 
akademie der wissenschaften. Dritter Band. Erster Teil. Urkunden zur Geschichte des Arianischen Streites 318–
328, ed. von H.-G. Opitz. Berlin/Leipzig 1934, Urkunde 8, S. 16. 
19 ATHAN. Contra Arianos 1, 6, 4: 115 (Metzler, Savvidis, Lieferung). 
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not in substance. 20 Thus, according to Arius, despite the fact that Godhead remained non-
participated (in the sense of the words of Arius and Eusebius of Nicomedia concerning non-
participatedness of the Father), there were certain participated realities, at least, the Divine 
Wisdom, Word, and Power. 
4) In the extant fragments of Arius we can find some words about the Christians who were 
“the partakers of wisdom” (τῶν σοφίας μετεχόντων). According to Arius, he took his doctrine 
from those Christians. 21 In my opinion, the words of Arius concerning “the partakers of 
wisdom” are not accidental. Indeed, we may see the correlation between this statement of Arius 
on the advanced Christians as partakers of Wisdom and the position of his doctrine, according to 
which the Divine Wisdom was a participated principle in God. This as well as some other 
elements of Arius’ teaching (I will discuss them later) make it possible to claim with a certain 
degree of certainty that the doctrine of Arius implied that people just like Christ participate in the 
Godhead according to their capacity of reason, and some even according to their possession of 
wisdom. Moreover, according to their rational capacities, people participate in the Logos proper 
to God and inherent in Him, but according to the capacity to possess wisdom, the people who 
have it participate in the Wisdom proper to God and inherent in Him.  
Thus, the following reasons make it possible to conclude that the doctrine of Arius 
contained the concept of participation. Firstly, it seems that Arius claimed that all people 
participated in God. Secondly, it is the doctrine of Arius that Christ participated in the Logos and 
Wisdom inherent in the Divinity. And thirdly, the statement of Arius, cited by Athanasius, “The 
Lord [= Christ] is called Logos [= Mind; λόγος] according to Providence because of those who 
are endowed with reason, and [is called] Wisdom also according to Providence because of those 
                                                 
20 See: ATHAN. Contra Arianos 1, 5, 5–6: 114 (Metzler, Savvidis, Lieferung) (δύο γοῦν σοφίας φησὶν 
εἶναι, μίαν μὲν «τὴν ἰδίαν καὶ συνυπάρχουσαν τῷ θεῷ», τὸν δὲ υἱὸν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ σοφίᾳ γεγενῆσθαι ταύτης τε 
μετέχοντα ὠνομάσθαι μόνον σοφίαν καὶ λόγον. «ἡ σοφία γάρ», φησί, «τῇ σοφίᾳ ὑπῆρξε σοφοῦ θεοῦ θελήσει». 
οὕτω καὶ λόγον ἕτερον εἶναι λέγει παρὰ τὸν υἱὸν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, καὶ τούτου μετέχοντα τὸν υἱὸν ὠνομάσθαι πάλιν 
κατὰ χάριν λόγον καὶ υἱὸν αὐτόν …  ἡ μὲν μία τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστιν ἰδία φύσει καὶ ἀίδιος· ὁ δὲ Χριστὸς πάλιν οὐκ 
ἔστιν ἀληθινὴ δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ μία τῶν λεγομένων δυνάμεών ἐστι); Contra Arianos 2, 37, 1: 213-214 
(Metzler, Savvidis, Lieferung) (ἄλλον μὲν εἶναι τὸν ἴδιον καὶ φύσει λόγον τοῦ πατρὸς λέγουσιν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸν 
υἱὸν πεποίηκε, τὸν δὲ ἀληθῶς υἱὸν κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν μόνον λέγεσθαι λόγον ὡς «ἄμπελον» καὶ «ὁδὸν» καὶ «θύραν» 
καὶ «ξύλον ζωῆς». σοφίαν τε ὀνόματι λέγεσθαι αὐτόν φασιν, ἄλλην μέντοι εἶναι σοφίαν τὴν ἰδίαν καὶ ἀληθινὴν 
τοῦ πατρὸς τὴν ἀγεννήτως συνυπάρχουσαν αὐτῷ, ἐν ᾗ καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ποιήσας ὠνόμασε κατὰ μετουσίαν ἐκείνης 
σοφίαν αὐτόν); Ad ep. Aeg. et Lib. 12, 5: 52 (Hansen, Metzler, Savvidis) (οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸς ὁ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ φύσει 
καὶ ἴδιος τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἰδία σοφία, ἐν ᾗ καὶ τοῦτον πεποίηκε τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλ’ ἄλλος μὲν ἔστιν ὁ 
ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἴδιος αὐτοῦ λόγος καὶ ἄλλη ἡ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἰδία αὐτοῦ σοφία, ἐν ᾗ σοφίᾳ καὶ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον 
πεποίηκεν) etc. 
21 See Fr. 1 в: M. WEST, The Metre of Arius’ “Thalia”, pp. 101-102 (W. LÖHR, Arius Reconsidered (Part 
2), pp. 134-135); Contra Arianos 1, 5, 1. 
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who have the gift of wisdom,” 22 emphasized that the capacities of reason and wisdom were the 
same in Christ and regular people. 
As we have seen, according to Arius all people in some way participate in God23 while the 
Father in Himself remains non-participated,24 and that which is participated in God is His own 
Wisdom and Logos. Thus, the words of Arius about the people who were partakers in wisdom 
and about Christ who was called the Wisdom and Logos on the one hand due to His participation 
in the Wisdom and Logos inherent in Godhead, and on the other hand due to the people endowed 
with reason and wisdom, indicate that the doctrine of Arius implied that not only Christ, but 
regular people participate in the Logos inherent in the Godhead (this should apply to all people 
as possessing reason) and in the Wisdom inherent in the Godhead (this should apply only to 
some people, not simply rational but “wise”).  
We should recall that Arius also taught about the Power of Godhead, which is participated 
in by the Son,25 and that according to the testimony of Athanasius Arius spoke about the Son as 
one of the powers of the created world mutable in nature, including beetles and caterpillars.26 
This highlights the third type of the created reality along with rational and wise beings, and we 
may conclude that the doctrine of Arius presupposed the presence of three universal realities in 
the Godhead: Power, Logos (= Mind, Word), and Wisdom, and accordingly, three realms of the 
created world, the realms of powers, the realm of the rational, and the realm of the wise. 
Following the logic of the preceding discussion, according to the Arius three realms were present 
in the created world, participating in the corresponding realities in the Godhead: the divine 
Power inherent in God was participated in by all created beings (or living, but not rational 
beings27); the divine Logos inherent in God was participated in by the bearers of reason, while 
the divine Wisdom inherent in God was participated in by the wise bearers of reason.  
                                                 
22 ἄλλος μὲν ἔστιν ὁ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἴδιος αὐτοῦ λόγος καὶ ἄλλη ἡ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἰδία αὐτοῦ σοφία, ἐν ᾗ σοφίᾳ 
καὶ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον πεποίηκεν· αὐτὸς δὲ οὗτος ὁ κύριος κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν λέγεται λόγος διὰ τὰ λογικὰ καὶ κατ’ 
ἐπίνοιαν λέγεται σοφία διὰ τὰ σοφιζόμενα (ATHAN. Ad ep. Aeg. et Lib. 12, 5: 52 (Hansen, Metzler, Savvidis). 
23 I have mentioned this above, speaking about the first use of participation language in Arius and the 
Arians.  
24 Arius and Eusebius of Nicomedia speak about non-participation of Christ in the Father (see above), but, 
obviously, by the same token this also implies non-participation of any other created beings in the Father.   
25 I have mentioned this above, speaking about the third use of participation language in Arius and the 
Arians. 
26 πολλαὶ δυνάμεις εἰσί· καὶ ἡ μὲν μία τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστιν ἰδία φύσει καὶ ἀίδιος· ὁ δὲ Χριστὸς πάλιν οὐκ ἔστιν 
ἀληθινὴ δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ μία τῶν λεγομένων δυνάμεών ἐστι καὶ αὐτός, ὧν μία καὶ ‹ἡ ἀκρὶς καὶ ἡ κάμπη› 
οὐ δύναμις μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ‹μεγάλη› προσαγορεύεται· αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ καὶ ὅμοιαί εἰσι τῷ υἱῷ, περὶ ὧν καὶ 
Δαβὶδ ψάλλει λέγων· ‹κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων›. καὶ τῇ μὲν φύσει, ὥσπερ πάντες, οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ 
τρεπτός, τῷ δὲ ἰδίῳ αὐτεξουσίῳ, ἕως βούλεται, μένει καλός· ὅτε μέντοι θέλει, δύναται τρέπεσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς 
ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς τρεπτῆς ὢν φύσεως. διὰ τοῦτο γάρ», φησί, «καὶ προγινώσκων ὁ θεὸς ἔσεσθαι καλὸν αὐτὸν 
προλαβὼν ταύτην αὐτῷ τὴν δόξαν δέδωκεν, ἣν ἂν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔσχε μετὰ ταῦτα (ATHAN, Contra Arianos 
5, 7-8: 114-115 (Metzler, Savvidis, Lieferung)). 
27 From the quotation in the previous note is not very clear whether Arius considered all beings to belong 
to the “powers” of the created world or (keeping in mind the references to beetles and caterpillars) only the 
living (but not rational) beings.  
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4.3. Paradigms of Participation and Universals in Arius and Origen 
 
If we now view the topic of participation in Arius in the light of the history of philosophy 
and theology, we may notice that the doctrine of Arius, according to which the Son received that 
name and was made God by participation, and that He and all the people in general participated 
in the Godhead, has obvious Platonic connotations and well corresponds to the Platonic 
paradigm of participation. The same can be said about the doctrine of participation of Christ and 
most likely ordinary people in the Logos and Wisdom inherent in the Godhead. These themes 
show several parallels with the doctrine of Origen on participation of the Son in the divinity of 
the Father,28 which corresponds to the trend I1 in the above discussion of the discourses of 
participation in Origen. It might have been Origen who influenced Arius in that respect.29 The 
difference between Arius and Origen is that for Origen the Son possessed the divinity and the 
divine qualities of the Father in a substantial, and not circumstantial way, whereas Arius insisted 
on the opposite. 
If my reconstruction of the doctrine of Arius on participation of various realms of the 
created world in God’s own inherent Power, Logos, and Wisdom is correct, there is a certain 
typological similarity between the doctrines of Arius and Origen. Some types of created beings 
in both authors participate in the highest principle, which acts (or in which something acts) as a 
kind of universal-before-things in relation to the beings of the created world. As we have seen, 
according to one of the arguments involving natural participation in Origen, all beings 
participated in a God the Father according to their existence, while rational beings participated in 
the Son according to their rational capacity. In Arius, if my reconstruction of his theory is 
correct, all beings – or perhaps only the living beings – participate in the Power, inherent in the 
Godhead; rational beings participate in the Logos or Reason inherent in the Godhead, while wise 
rational beings participate in the Wisdom inherent in the Godhead. The doctrine of Origen does 
not lead to a clear understanding what these participated universal-before-things might have 
been: as I have shown above, Origen both used the discourse of participation of the types of 
created beings in the Persons of the Trinity, and spoke about all created beings as naturally 
participating in the logoi contained in divine Logos-Wisdom. The doctrine of Arius, however, 
offers a consistent doctrine of the participated universals-before-things, when Arius speaks about 
specific participated realities in God – God’s own Power, Logos, and Wisdom. 
                                                 
28 ORIGEN, In Joan. II, 2, 17, 4-6 (Blanc). 
29 Cf R. WILLIAMS, The Logic of Arianism, “Journal ofTheological Studies”, 34 (1983), p. 75. 
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In that respect the theological systems of Origen and Arius manifest a fundamental 
difference as far as the status of Christ-the Son is concerned. In Origen the Son-Logos is 
participated in by the created beings and therefore in a sense is a universal-before-things, since 
all rational beings participate in this Logos who also contains the logoi of all things of the 
created world. However, according to the Arius, the Son was not participated in but was Himself 
participating; He did not correspond to any universal, but Himself participated in a universal – 
the Logos inherent in the Godhead.  
There is one more radical difference between the doctrines of Origen and Arius related to 
the subject of participation – the notion of the non-participated (ἀμέθεκτος), absent from Origen 
and appearing in Arius probably for the first time in Christian literature. This notion, as it seems, 
make it possible to speak about the Neoplatonic background of the subject of participation in 
Arianism, which had not yet surfaced in Origen. 
 
4.4. Neoplatonism of Arius? 
 
As we have seen, according to the Arian doctrine, God, on the one hand, was non-
participated as the Father and the Unbegotten, and, on the other hand, He was participated in 
through His own Power, Logos and Wisdom. In the system of Arius, Christ was also 
participating being as possibly the entire realm of created beings. The emergence of the concept 
of non-participatedness in the Arian doctrine make it possible to discern the Neoplatonic triad of 
participation, the participating – the participated – the non-participated. In addition, the 
participated principles in the Godhead (Power, Wisdom, and Logos), which Arius taught about, 
can be associated with the participated henads in the philosophical system of Iamblichus. 
The concept of non-participation was probably introduced in the philosophical language by 
Iamblichus. Accordingly, Iamblichus was the leading figure in the formation of the participation 
triad in the philosophical thought of the Late Antiquity and the likely author of the doctrine of 
henads, later elaborated in detail by the Neoplatonists Syrianus and Proclus. Iamblichus (ca. 
240–ca. 325 A.D.) was an older contemporary of Arius (256–336 A.D.) and theoretically could 
have had an impact on the conceptual framework used by Arius. 30 
                                                 
30 The possible impact of Neoplatonic philosophy on the doctrine of Arius has already been suggested in 
the literature. Thus, Rowan Williams in his studies (The Logic of Arianism and Arius: Heresy and Tradition, 
London 1987, p. 31 etc.) attempted to find the Neoplatonic ground for the formulas used by Arius. These 
attempts were criticized in the article by Christopher Stead (C. STEAD, Was Arius a Neoplatonist?, “Studia 
Patristica”, 32 (1997), pp. 39–51). Arius could have become acquainted with the doctrine of Iamblichus ca. 300 
in Syria, when Iamblichus was teaching in Antioch and Apamea. R. Williams (Arius: Heresy and Tradition, p . 
31) analyzed three expressions of Arius in respect to which or in respect to the associated polemics around which 
one could speak of Neoplatonic influence. These included, first, the expression “τῆς τοῠ Πατρὸς οὐσίας ἴδιος” as 
applied to the Son (ATHAN. Contra Arianos 1, 10). The context of the expression according to R. Williams, 
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The concept of non-participation was employed in late Platonism for indicating the cause 
which, while generating the effects similar to itself, remained unaffected by the process of 
generation. The One was such non-participated entity in the standard doctrine of the later 
Platonists, in the way it was formulated by Proclus. There also was an intermediate link between 
the One and the many, which was represented by the so-called “henads.” Henads are participated 
entities which, while remaining distinct from the subsequent level of reality, still correlated with 
it in a certain way. This means that henads were no longer completely transcendental to the 
multiple as it was the case with the One which was above being.31 Originating from the One as 
from their cause, the henads are similar to the One and thus are unities, yet not the unities in 
                                                                                                                                                             
demonstrated Arius’ knowledge of Porphyry’s Isagoge (R. WILLIAMS, The Logic of Arianism, pp. 58-62). 
Second, the expression μέρος ὁμοούσιον (ATHANASIUS, Werke, Dritter Band. Erster Teil, Urkunde 8, S. 12) 
which R Williams correlated this possible knowledge of Arius with the passage from De Myst. III, 21, 150.9 of 
Iamblichus (R. WILLIAMS, The Logic of Arianism, pp. 63-66). Third, the polemical concept of “οὔτε δύο 
αγέννητα” (ATHAN. Prim. or. contra Arianos 14), put forward by the Arians against the Niceans. R. Williams 
thus suggested the influence of the commentators on Aristotle (Alexander of Aphrodisias and Porphyry) on 
Christian writers (R. WILLIAMS, The Logic of Arianism, pp. 66-81; R. WILLIAMS, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, 
pp. 215-229). I will not dwell on the details of R. Wiliams’ arguments in favor of the influence of Neoplatonic 
authors on Arius nor on the debate of Christopher Stead with the arguments of Rowan Williams. I should only 
note that, in my opinion, both R. Williams, and C. Stead were not completely correct in presenting the 
philosophical discussion concerning the participation issue. Thus, R. Williams distinguished two meanings of 
participation in the philosophical tradition of Antiquity: the Platonic paradigm which implied a vertical sense of 
participation, and a paradigm which I call “Aristotelian,” and which implied a “lateral” or “horizontal” sense of 
participation as opposed to the vertical sense. Firstly, R. Williams gave an imprecise formulation of the latter 
type of participation as “the relation between substances which are formally identical,” understanding this in 
such a way that “for two substances to ‘participate’ in or with each other is for both to belong to one γένος” (R. 
WILLIAMS, The Logic of Arianism, p. 68. C. Stead noted the imprecision of the formulation, see Was Arius a 
Neoplatonist?, pp. 47-48). However, participation in the Aristotelian sense is not a relation between the 
participated entities, but the relation between the thing and its substance, that is, between the participating and 
the participated (Top. 121a10-15, 122b20-22, see above). Secondly, R. Williams named Alexander of 
Aphrodisias and Porphyry as the authors who, contrary to Plato’s “vertical” paradigm of participation, 
introduced a new paradigm of participation in a horizontal sense. According to R. Williams, in elaborating the 
vertical paradigm, these authors relied on Aristotle’s criticism of standard Platonic understanding of participation 
(R. WILLIAMS, The Logic of Arianism, p. 68; IDEM., Arius: Heresy and Tradition, p. 220). However, as we have 
seen, this new paradigm of participation was introduced by Aristotle, although, indeed, it was later adopted by 
Alexander of Aphrodisias and Porphyry. Aristotle was the first philosopher who started to speak about 
participation, bearing in mind participation of an individual in his own substance, whose carrier he was (Top. 
122b20-22, see above) instead of participation in the idea, transcendent for that individual. Thirdly, R. Williams 
argued that in the framework of horizontal participation, the very concept of “participation” was understood in a 
metaphorical sense (R. WILLIAMS, The Logic of Arianism, p. 68; IDEM., Arius: Heresy and Tradition, p. 217). In 
his claim R. Williams seems to proceed from the notion that the true meaning of participation is Platonic, and 
other uses of the term suggest its improper sense. For me it is obvious that the meaning inherent in the 
Aristotelian (horizontal) sense of participation is as standard and consistent as the Platonic sense, and that the 
authors who followed this paradigm used the concept of participation in the proper sense. The mistake of 
Christopher Stead, who criticized the concept of Neoplatonic background behind the Arian doctrine proposed by 
Rowan Williams, was that he did not recognize the fact that Porphyry might have used any other paradigm of 
participation apart from the Platonic. Thus, C. Stead denied that Porphyry in his Isagoge used the concept of 
participation in a horizontal (in my terminology, in the Aristotelian) sense (C. STEAD, Was Arius a 
Neoplatonist?, pp. 47-48, cf. 50). However, as I showed above, the Aristotelian paradigm of participation was 
quite explicitly used in Porphyry’s Isagoge. 
31 S. MESYATS, Iamblichus’ exegesis of “Parmenides” hypotheses and his doctrine of divine henads, in E. 
Afonasin, J. Dillon, and J. Finamore (eds.), Iamblichus and the Foundations of Late Platonism, Leiden: Brill 
2012, pp. 153-154; cf. PROCLUS. Inst. theol. 116. 
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themselves. Each henad is the unity wrapped in particular quality – the unity of a particular kind 
of being (the henad of Mind, Soul, Nature, etc.). 
In the doctrine of Iamblichus, who lived several generations earlier than Proclus and who 
seems to be the founder of the Neoplatonic doctrine of henads,32 as far as we can see, the henads 
play the following role. Iamblichus taught about two Ones. The first One was absolutely 
transcendent, non-participated, ineffable, and ungraspable, either through affirmations or through 
negations. The other One, which was the cause of all beings, according to Proclus, was described 
by negations of the first hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides, and these negations in an apophatic 
way pointed to that whose cause was that One.33 For example, the statement, “The One is not 
whole” in some way pointed to the One as the cause of the whole.34 Other negations applied to 
the One in the framework of the first hypothesis as well pointed to the One as the cause of the 
negated predicate. Thus, according to the reconstruction of the testimonies about the doctrine of 
Iamblichus, which can be primarily found in Proclus and Damascus, the henad in the doctrine of 
Iamblichus was the aspect of the second One as the cause of a certain class of beings, that is, the 
henad was the unity for a particular type of existence.35 According to Iamblichus, as the aspects 
of the One the henads were also described by negations of the first hypothesis of Parmenides36; 
the henads were supra-substantial (as belonging to the scope of the first hypothesis) and at the 
same time they are the causes of beings.37 Iamblichus explained that the first One, which was 
higher than being and which could not be grasped either by affirmations or by negations, was 
non-participated; the other One, which could be grasped by negations of the first hypothesis of 
Parmenides, was the cause of being, and constituted the henads in various modes of causality / 
participation, simultaneously remaining non-participated (that is, unrelated to its effects) and 
participated (that is, related to its effects) by various kinds of participating beings.38 
Thus it seems that the doctrine of Arius manifests the conceptual structure which in some 
respect is similar to that of Iamblichus. Arius speaks about the Father / the Unbegotten as non-
participated in by the Son, intending to emphasize the impossibility to correlate God with the 
Son-Christ, just as with anything else God created, despite the fact that God was the creative 
cause of the Son and all beings. This meaning of the concept of non-participation indicating 
impossibility to correlate the cause with the caused, was originally embedded in the Neoplatonic 
concept of the non-participated entity. And when Arius used that concept speaking about non-
                                                 
32 Cf J. DILLON, Iamblichus and the origin of the doctrine of henads, “Phronesis” 17 (1972); IDEM, 
Appendix В in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta, Leiden 1973, pp. 412-416. 
33 PROCLUS, Theol. Plat. III, 82, 4-22. 
34 PROCLUS, In Parm. 1107, 9-20. 
35 S. MESYATS, Iamblichus’ exegesis, p. 165. 
36 See in PROCLUS, In Parm. 1054, 37 - 1055, 2; 1066, 16-21; 1066, 28-33; Theol. Plat. III, 82, 12-18. 
37 See in PROCLUS, In Parm. 1066, 26-28. 
38 S. MESYATS, Iamblichus’ exegesis, pp. 167-170. 
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participation of the Son in the Father / the Unbegotten, he implied the connotations similar to 
those which Iamblichus and later other Neoplatonists had in mind using the concept of non-
participation as applied to the highest principle. This aspect shows a fundamental difference 
between the doctrines of Arius and Origen: the theology of Origen did not know the concept of 
non-participation, which was consistent with correlation between the Father and the Son and the 
eternal production of the cosmos by God in the doctrine of Origen. Arius, however, denied any 
correlation between God / the Father and of the Son / Christ (and even more so, God and the 
world), and therefore applied the concept of non-participatedness to the Godhead.39 
Going back to the comparison of the concepts of participation in Arius and Iamblichus, we 
should note that the nature of the Power, Logos, and Wisdom inherent in the Godhead is similar 
in the doctrine of Arius to the nature of henads in Iamblichus. Power, Logos, and Wisdom are 
the realities in the Godhead which possess distinct qualities, and while remaining transcendental 
they are the participated principles for the individual realms of being which were participating in 
them. 
We should also note that there is an analogy, albeit not very strict, between the doctrines of 
Arius and Iamblichus in terms of the nature of transcendence which the highest principle had. 
According to the testimony of Proclus, the doctrine of Iamblichus concerning the One which was 
the cause of beings (the second One) entailed the apophatic way of describing its relationship 
with a multiplicity of beings. The specific nature of the Iamblichian apophatics in respect to the 
second One was that each negated predicate implicitly indicated that whose cause was the One. 
Arius spoke of the Godhead in a similar way, “God Himself, because He is as He is, is ineffable 
for all. ... We name Him Unbegotten due to the one begotten by nature; we praise Him as having 
no beginning due to the one who has a beginning; we honorably call Him eternal due to the one 
begotten in time (Αὐτὸς γοῦν ὁ θεὸς καθό ἐστιν ἄρρητος ἅπασιν ὑπάρχει. … ἀγέννητον δὲ αὐτόν 
φαμεν διὰ τὸν τὴν φύσιν γεννητόν· τοῦτον ἄναρχον ἀνυμνοῦμεν διὰ τὸν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντα, ἀίδιον δὲ 
αὐτὸν σέβομεν διὰ τὸν ἐν χρόνοις γεγαότα)»40. Apparently, speaking about God in the passage, 
Arius followed the strategy which in some respects was similar to the strategy of Iamblichus 
                                                 
39 This fundamental difference between the doctrines of Origen and Arius was the reason why 
Christopher Stead denied the possibility of Neoplatonic influences on Arius, since Neoplatonic authors, similarly 
to Origen, shared the understanding common among non-Christian thinkers of Antiquity, according to which the 
cosmos perennially originated from the highest principle: «Origen had placed the Father in an eternal 
relationship, not only with the Son, but even in principle with the world. Arius asserts the Father’s priority, not 
only to the world, but to the Son. Accordingly the Son had a real and momentary beginning, even if it is not 
strictly a beginning in time. But this surely means that Arius stands at the furthest possible remove from the 
majority, or etemalist, school of Neoplatonic philosophers; from Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus» (C. STEAD, 
Was Arius a Neoplatonist?, p. 51). In my view, the difference in the fundamental theological and philosophical 
intuitions between Christian and non-Christian authors of Late Antiquity (including Arius and Iamblichus) does 
not preclude the use of the technical language taken from the doctrines of non-Christian philosophers by the 
Christian authors for their own purposes. For this reason I believe that this argument of C. Stead cannot be 
considered valid.  
40 ATHAN. Ad ep. Aeg. et Lib. 15: 242 (Hansen, Metzler, Savvidis). 
  
50
when Iamblichus was describing the second One. For Arius, the ineffable God was called in an 
apophatic manner, but in such a way that the negation in respect to God in some way also 
pointed to Him and revealed Him. The only reservation we should make is that a clear similarity 
to the specific Iamblichian apophatic strategy of naming the One is hindered – although not 
cancelled – by the name of ἀΐδιος (“eternal”) given to God, which, unlike other names listed by 
Arius, does not appear in the form of negation as was the case with the first two names, ἀ-
γέννητος (unbegotten) and ἄναρχος (with no beginning). 
We can summarize our findings in the following way: 1) Iamblichus introduced the 
concept of non-participation as applied to the highest principle into the philosophical language. 
This concept with connotations similar to those used in Platonism appears in the doctrine of 
Arius. 2) The introduction of this concept by Iamblichus triggered the emergence of the 
participation triad: participating–participated–non-participated in the later Platonism; 
accordingly, this triad can also be found in Arius. 3) The subject of participation in the doctrine 
of Iamblichus was associated with his concept of the participated henads (playing the role of 
universals-before-things) which were the causes of various realms of beings. The theological 
system of Arius also reveals the entities similar to the Neoplatonic henads. 4) There is a (non-
strict) similarity in terms of specific ways of apophatic description of the highest principle in 
Iamblichus and Arius. 
If we keep in mind all the above as well as the fact that Iamblichus was an older 
contemporary of Arius, and Arius had a reputation of a person “not without the knowledge of 
dialectics,”41 we may suggest that Iamblichus might have had an impact on the philosophical and 
theological language of the Arian doctrine, which among other things is manifested in regard to 
the subject of participation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 Ср.: SOZOM. Hist. 1, 15. 
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Chapter 5 “Participation and universals in the Eunomian controversies” 
 
5.1. The Eunomian controversies: the context 
 
 
Next, I turn to the theme of universals and the theme of participation in Gregory of Nyssa’s 
oeuvre. First I focus on the polemic between Gregory and Eunomius. To do this, preliminary I 
will touch upon the context of the Eunomian controversies, as well as Eunomius’ and Gregory of 
Nyssa’ life, thought and threir milieu.  
In the second half of the fourth century, the Neo-Nicean party whose main representatives 
were the members of the so-called Cappadocian circle, began to be formed around Basil of 
Caesarea. This party wanted to restore the status of the Nicean doctrine and the Nicean Creed 
which were pushed into the background after the Arian reaction, following the First Ecumenical 
Council. The Neo-Niceans accomplished a fundamental theological and philosophical synthesis 
based on the doctrine of the divinity of all the Persons of the Trinity. In the process, in their 
polemics with the Arians (or rather, with the so-called Neo-Arians1 who denied the divine status 
of the Son and the Holy Spirit), the Neo-Niceans used more advanced philosophical language 
than their Nicaean predecessors.  
We can identify two important points with regard to the contribution of Basil of Caesarea 
and his followers from the Cappadocian circle (Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa) to 
the development of the Trinitarian doctrine in its relation to the concept of consubstantiality. It 
was this understanding of the Trinitarian doctrine that has acquired the status of Orthodoxy in the 
Christian Empire. 
First, it was the rethinking of how the concept of “consubstantiality” might be applied to 
the Persons of the Trinity. According to this new understanding, “consubstantiality” had to be 
understood in the “horizontal” sense of commonness between the Persons of the Trinity, which 
should be considered similar to the species common to its constituent individuals,2 while in the 
pre-Cappadocian theology, as we have mentioned, the normative concept was rather a derivative 
understanding of the commonness between the Father and the Son.3 The Neo-Niceans also 
                                                 
1 These were the representatives of the next generation of Arian movement after Arius and his immediate 
followers. As the most prominent neo-Arian thinkers we may mention Aetius and Eunomius, who changed the 
Arian theology by eliminating the trend related to the apophatic theology.  
2 Cf., for example, BAS. Eun., PG 29b, 637-640; Ep. 236 (228), 6. 
3 The predecessors of the Cappadocian Fathers in the anti-Arian polemics, Eustathius of Antioch and 
Athanasius of Alexandria, might speak about consubstantiality understood in the horizontal sense, but only 
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referred to the commonness understood in such a way as the “logos of substance,”4 or the “logos 
of being.” 
Secondly, it was the combination of the language of “consubstantiality” and the language 
of the “three hypostases of the Trinity,” each having a corresponding “hypostatic property.” The 
language of the three hypostases with their hypostatic properties was borrowed by Basil of 
Caesarea from the Homoiousians, yet, it ultimately goes back to Origen. By combining the 
language of “consubstantiality” and the language of the “three hypostases,” Basil updated the 
terminological framework: he introduced the concepts of “logos of substance,” referring to 
consubstantiality understood in the horizontal sense, and “tropos (manner) of existence,”5 
corresponding to the properties of each hypostasis of the Trinity.6 Both of these expressions – the 
“logos of substance” and the “tropos of existence” – were to become common in the Byzantine 
thought for expressing the commonness of being and the manners of individual existence.7 
One of the main polemists against the Neo-Niceanism was Eunomius. Eunomius belonged 
to the ecclesiastical movement called Anomoeanism, or neo-Arianism8, which followed the 
teaching of Arius. Eunomius and his teacher Aetius were the intellectual leaders of this party. 
They inherited the doctrine proposed during the first phase of the arian controversy (320-340AD) 
by Arius and his followers, they developed this doctrine and even changed it in some parts.  Neo-
                                                                                                                                                             
concerning individual human beings (Eustathius of Antioch in THEODORET. Eran. 100, 6-12 (Ettlinger); Ath. De 
Decr. 53), but not the Persons of the Trinity. J. Zachhuber thinks that Eustathius of Antioch influenced the 
emergence of the non-derivative Trinitarian doctrine of the Cappadocians since in one fragment (R. LORENZ, Die 
Eustathius von Antiochien zugeschriebene Schrift gegen Photin”, “Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche 
Wissenschaft” 71 (1980), pp. 122-124) Eustathius deviates from the Nicean derivative language concerning the 
divinity of the Son, common to the pre-Cappadocian theology, namely, that the name of “God” refers to the 
divine nature and not to the Persons of the Trinity (see J. ZACHHUBER, Basil and the Three-Hypostases-
Tradition,“Zeitschrift fiir Antikes Christentum”, 5 (2001), pp. 82–83).  
4 See, for example, Eun., PG 29b, 520, 556. The explicit language of the “logos of substance” was 
introduced by Aristotle and developed by his commentators (J. ANTON, The Aristotelian Doctrine 
of Homonyma in the Categories and Its Platonic Antecedents”, “The Journal of the History of Philosophy” 6 
(1968), fasc. 4, pp. 315-326; IDEM., Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle’s Doctrine of Homonyma, “The Journal 
of the History of Philosophy”, 7 (1969), fasc. 1, pp. 1-18).  
5 This expression may have go back to the commentators of Aristotle, see ALEX. APHROD. In Prior 
Analytics 197, 2; In Topics 179, 4, 295.6; In Met. 725, 6-7. Cf. also ELIAS. In Isag. 36, 11, 206, 19; AMMON. In 
De Interpr. 246, 24.  
6 More precisely, Basil used the concept rather to refer to the manner of origination (that is, in relation to 
the Son and the Holy Spirit, originating from the Father but not from the hypostasis of the Father), see: BAS. 
CAES. De S. Spirit 18; C. Sab. et Arium et Anom., PG 31, 613A), while other Cappadocians and the later 
Byzantine authors used this expression in relation to all three Persons of the Trinity, that is, referrin to the 
manner of existence of the Persons. However, in the fourth book of Against Eunomius (the problem of its 
authorship is not resolved but it might have belonged to Basil), this expression was used in the latter sense (PG 
29, 681).  
7 See the overview in P. SHERWOOD, The Earlier Ambigua of S. Maximus the Confessor and his 
Refutation of Origenism, Rome 1955, pp. 155-165. 
8 The orthodox opponents of Aetius and Eunomius called them Anomeans (BAS., Eun., PG 29, 500, 27), 
i.e. “heterousians”, however it is not entirely a correct naming, because, first of all, Arius also stated that Christ 
is not similar to God, and second, in a certain way, – namely, though the will – according to Aetius and 
Eunomius Christ is similar to God (PHILOSTORGIUS 4, 12; 6, 1). Therefore, in line with some contemporary 
researches (M. WILES, Archetypal Heresy: Arianism through the Centuries, Oxford 1996, pp. 30-31), I will call 
the movement led by Aetius and Eunomius – Neo-Arianism, and their teaching is “Neo-Arian”. 
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Arians like their forerunners stated that Christ is not a true God and does not have the same 
nature as God the Father, instead he possesses a created nature. However, contrary to Arius, 
whose doctrine settled with apophatic discourse, neo-Arians focused on kataphatic and 
rationalistic approach. As Ronald Heyne9 reasonably mentions, this probably was in part caused 
by Arius’ insistence on God’s unknowability, and this is exactly what gave to their opponents the 
means, which put Arians in a difficulty, i.e. given that divine nature is unknowable and beyond 
expression it is possible to argue for the plausibility of eternal birth of Son from God and His 
consubstantiality with God, having said that, the way how Son  is born  from Father and how He 
is consubstantial to Father – is beyond human comprehension.  Therefore, neo-Arians were in 
need of formalization of the discourse which operates with the notion of divine nature (essence) 
and the nature of Son. They persisted that Christians are supposed to know what they worship 
and what is the essence of worshiped; if a Christian is not capable to determine what is this 
essence, then he does not know what worships.10 In line with this, the methodology used in the 
teaching of neo-Arians, unlike the teaching of the first phase of the Arian controversy, displays 
the predominance of rationalistic motifs in their doctrine – from the standpoint of emphasis on 
knowledge and expression of being of God and Christ through the image language. That is to 
say, Aetius and Eunomius, the chief representatives of neo-Arians, associated the fixed notions 
“unbegotten” and “begetting” with essence of God and essence of Son (Christ) correspondingly, 
and based on these tried to justify the points of their system, referring to logical foundations.    
Eunomius was born roughly in the twenties of the fourth century; he studied to be a scribe. 
After his parents’ death Eunomius, who was eager to study rhetoric, moved to Constantinople, 
then to Antioch, from where he was dispatched to Alexandria by Secundus of Ptolemais in order 
to be a secretary and adjunct of Aetius. After the death of the Emperor Gallus Aetius together 
with Eunomius returned to Antioch, and befriended with bishop Eudoxius of Antioch.  
After the Council of Constantinople in 359 the emperor Constantius sent Aetius into exile. 
By the Council Eunomius already wrote his "Apology". In the "Apology" of Eunomius, as well 
as in the treatise of Aetius "Sintagmation", there had been declared a new, rationalist approach in 
accordance with the arian movement. Shortly after, Constantius changed his attitude towards the 
Arians and Eunomius became bishop of Cyzicus. Receiving bishopric Eunomius asked Eudoxius 
to return Aetius from the exile and requested cancellation of his deposition. Due to the fact that 
Eudoxius did not fulfill this promise, and because of dissatisfaction of the flock about the views 
of Eunomios, he forsook Cyzicus and founded his own church community.11 During the reign of 
the Emperor Julian, Aetius tried to reconcile in Constantinople with the church hierarchs, 
                                                 
9 R. HEINE, Perfection in the Virtuous Life, Philadelphia Patristic Foundation 1975, p. 135. 
10 BAS. CAES. Ep. 234, 1. 
11 THEOD. Hist. 2, 29; PHILOSTORGIUS 6, 13; 7, 5 
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however, these attempts failed and Aetius with Eunomius began to ordain bishops for their own 
jurisdiction.12 At the end of seventieth of the fourth century Eunomius, in the capacity of 
response to the work “Against Eunomius” by Basil the Great, started to publish the books of his 
“Apology for the Apology”. After the death of the emperor Valens in 378 Eunomius was 
summoned to Constantinople, where he presented a creed, whereby the Emperor Theodosius 
issued a decree regarding his subversion.13 Eunomius died roughly in 396.14 
Eunomius’ doctrine, expounded in his Apology, implies the opposition of God as the 
highest principle that has no prior cause for existing, and Christ, God’s product — the very fact 
of Christ being derived and preconditioned excludes regarding his existence to be of the same 
kind as that of his initial cause.15 Since Christ was born, he had a cause of his existence, 
therefore, according to Eunomius, Christ cannot be called God according to his essence; his 
essence is creation.16 Similarly, Christ’s essence is expressed with the notion “offspring” 
(γέννημα),17 while God’s essence is denoted as “unbegotten” (ἀγέννητος).18 For Eunomius, 
words which denote essence differ from the terms that result from abstracting efforts of the 
human mind to form the image of an object’s essence; Eunomius called these latter words κατ’ 
ἐπίνοιαν and thought they might be ignored.19 Eunomius’ doctrine was opposed by Basil of 
Caesarea who presented his view in the treatise Contra Eunomium (early 360s), where he 
rejected Eunomius’ position expounded in the Apology. Basil of Caesarea maintained that words 
do not denote any essence, but only features of what is denoted, since essence is neither 
comprehensible, nor denotable by words. And the way we understand God and express our 
understanding is only κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν. In his Apology for the Apology (the late 380s), written in 
response to Contra Eunomium of Basil of Caesarea, Eunomius advanced more arguments for the 
theory of ἐπίνοια and his theological doctrine as well. 
The methodological framework, upon which Eunomius builds propositions developed in 
the "Apology" and then in his next treatise is as follows: Eunomius drew a distinction between 
the two ways of (theological) analysis: first, when conclusions are made based on the knowledge 
                                                 
12 PHILOSTORGIUS 8, 2. 
13 Сodex Тheod. 1, 5, 6 (Nullis haeretikus). 
14 About the life of Eunomius and historical outline of the eunomian controvery see: E. CAVALCANTI, 
Studi Eunomiani, Roma 1976, pp. 1-22; R. VAGGIONE, Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Nicene Revolution, Oxford  
2000; J. NARVAJA, Teología y piedad en la obra de Eunomio de Cízico, Rome: Pontificia Università Lateranense 
Istituto Patristico Augustinianum 2003. On Aetius see: Th. KOPECEK, A History of Neo-Arianism, Vol. I, II, The 
Philadelphia Patristic Foundation 1979, vol. I, pp. 61-132. 
15 EUNOM. Apol. VII. The edition of Apologia: EUNOMIUS. The Extant Works, ed. and trans. by R. 
Vaggione, Oxford 1987. 
16 EUNOM. Apol. XII. 
17 EUNOM. Apol. XII, 6-7. 
18 EUNOM. Apol. VII, 11. 
19 EUNOM. Apol. VIII. 
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about essences, or, as Eunomius puts it – "law of nature"20 and, secondly, when judgment about 
the nature of the subject is done on a basis of knowledge about its activities. Each of these ways, 
according to Eunomius, leads to the understanding that the Son is neither essentially like nor 
consubstantial with God. It works in the first case, because the essence of God is that He is 
unbegotten, i.e. He does not have a cause and origin for Himself, but the essence of Son is 
begetting, i.e. he has a beginning and a cause, and thus "unbegotten" and "begetting" cannot be 
the same essence or possess essences similar to each other. The second way – from activities to 
essences, – according to Eunomius demonstrates unlikeness and inconsubstantiality of the Son 
with the Father owing to the fact that, since the Son is a creature of God, and the Spirit of the 
Son, therefore it follows that the Spirit cannot be of the same essence with the Son, nor the Son 
with God, and what is more they cannot have even similar essences. 
The second apology of Eunomius, named "Apology for the Apology"21 was written as a 
response to the work of Basil of Caesarea "Refutation of the Apology of the Impious Eunomius", 
which Basil wrote as a disproof of Eunomius’ "Apology." Unfortunately, the second apology of 
Eunomius preserved only in the fragments and in expositions by others. The main (although not 
a single one) source in this respect is the works of Gregory of Nyssa: "Contra Eunomium" and 
"Refutation of Eunomius"22, written as a confutation of the claims made in "Apology for the 
Apology". As much as can be reconstructed based on the retelling and the surviving fragments, 
the first part of the first book of the second apology of Eunomios is devoted to the publishing 
story of his first apology. In the second part of the first book Eunomius defends the point of the 
first apology (7, 3-15), which consists in the idea that the actual name of God’s essence is 
unbegotten, and in general, it deals with the theme of ousia and its application to the Father, the 
Son and the Spirit, as well as talks about the nature of angels. In addition, in the first book of 
“Apology for the Apology” Eunomius develops the concept about the ways of knowledge: from 
entities to activities and vice versa. The second book of "Apology for the Apology" dedicated to 
critique of St. Basil’s statement that all names applied to God are human thinking i.e. the fruit of 
human consciousness. Eunomius opposes to this teaching an idea, according to which all divine 
names have the same meaning, and he also develops a concept that human language is given by 
God. Also in this book he discusses a question, already elaborated by Aetius in “Sintagmatione” 
                                                 
20 EUNOM. Apol. XX, 13. 
21 Gregory of Nyssa (Eun. 1, 226, 2, 10-11; 2, 3, 6–16 and 4, 19 (Jeager)) and Photius (Bibl. 138; data 
available for Photius probably goes back to Gregory of Nyssa) both mention that “Apology for the Apology” 
consists of three books, however the historian Philostorgius who was a part of eunomian community (and when 
was young even met Eunomius), mentions five books. Most likely, Eunomius wrote five books in response to 
Basil the Great, but Gregory responded only to three of them (EUNOMIUS. The Extant Works, pр. 79-81). 
Eunomius started to issue books of his second apology roughly two decades after appearance of Basil’s treatise; 
first books began to appear near the time of Basil’s death, i.e. in the very beginning of the seventieth of the 
fourth century. 
22 The edition: Gregorii Nysseni opera, Libri I et II (Vulgo I et XIIb), ed. W. Jaeger. Leiden 1960. 
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that unbegotten is not deprivation. The third book of "Apology for the Apology” is dealing with 
the discussion on the nature of the Son and the theme of incarnation.  
As had been noted above, among contemporaries of Eunomius the author who led a 
polemic with concepts of his “Apology for the Apology” was Gregory of Nyssa.  
Gregory was born about 335 in a Christian family. His sister Macrina together with elder 
brother Basil (future bishop of Caesarea) made significant influenced on Gregory. Their father 
tried to give good education to the children, but, unlike Basil, Gregory for the sake of studying 
was not able to do trips to the centers of education,23 he studied first at the elementary school, 
and then in schools of rhetoric. Based on writings of Gregory, one can say that he studied not 
just philosophy and rhetoric, but also medicine and classical literature as well. In 357 Gregory 
was made a reader. In 372 Basil the Great, being guided by ecclesiastical and political motives, 
made Gregory a bishop of a small town of Nyssa. 
During the reign of the emperor Valens Gregory was persecuted. At the end of 375 during 
the omiyskom counsel Gregory was deposed in absentia and his chair was occupied by another 
person.24 Within three years, Gregory led the wandering life until the time when after Valens’ 
death in 378, his exile was revoked by the Emperor Gratian.25 Soon after, Gregory returned to 
Nyssa, where he had to struggle with omiams and eunomians.26 In April, 380 Gregory went to 
Sebaste to participate in the election of the bishop, where he unexpectedly was elected as a 
bishop of Sebaste.27 However, after new elections in Sebaste Gregory forsook his cathedra and 
returned to Nyssa, where on request of his brother Peter he wrote first two books of his treatise 
"Contra Eunomium". Gregory took an active part in the II Ecumenical Council. After the 
Counsel, according to the decree of the emperor Theodosius, Gregory was one of three bishops 
who were declared to be guardians of orthodoxy in Ponte. Towards the end of the eightieth of the 
fourth century Gregory withdrew from duties associated with church policy. He lived in a 
monastery in Nyssa,28 where he led ascetic life, and was engaged in literary work. The exact date 
of his death is unknown. 
In his writings against Arius Gregory of Nyssa continues and develops the polemics started 
by his brother Basil of Caesarea. Gregory’s oeuvre against Arius consists of four treatises, but it 
is also divided into separate books (this division was made after the death of Gregory).29  
                                                 
23 GREG. NYSS. Ep. 13. 
24 BAS. CAES. epp. 237, 239.   
25 GREG. NYSS. Ep. 6, 6-11. 
26 GREG. NYSS. Ep. 19, 11. 
27 GREG. NYSS. Ep. 19, 5. 
28 GREG. NYSS. Ep. 6, 10; 18, 5; 21, 2. 
29 According to the codices of Bavarian version, the corpus consists of twelve books, but according to the 
majority of codices of Livinian version, it is divided into thirteen books (the fifth book of the Bavarian version 
includes two books in Livinian version). 
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The work of Gregory "Contra Eunomium" consists of three books. Shortly after the issue 
of Eunomius' “Apology for the Apology” its copy came to Gregory, however not for a long 
while, that is why Gregory did not have enough time to get familiar with this treatise or made his 
own copy. Nevertheless, Gregory managed to make critical notes on the first book of Eunomius’ 
work, what he then revised and issued. This is the first treatise written by Gregory against 
Eunomius after the death of Basil, on request of his brother Peter, approximately in 380. This 
work is the first book of Gregory’s “Contra Eunomium” according to Migne addition.30 In its 
first part Gregory defends the memory about Basil, the second part is devoted to the refutation of 
Eunomius triadology. Then Gregory issues the second treatise, which is a continuation of the 
first, and refutes the second book of "Apology for the Apology". It constitutes the second part of 
the twelfth book of "Contra Eunomius" according to Migne’ edition.31 In the treatise Gregory 
discusses the status and significance of the names of "begotten" and "unbegotten", raises 
questions related to the theory of names and comprehension of the nature of language. Later on, 
in 382-383 years, Gregory issued another treatise devoted to the refutation of the third book 
"Apology for the Apology", published by Eunomius, probably after the first two. This treatise 
deals with issues related to Christology and triadology and also polemicizes about biblical 
quotations, which were the textual ground for the Arians. This treatise is books from third to the 
first half of the twelfth according to Migne’s edition.32 The fourth treatise of Gregory of Nyssa, 
dedicated to the controversy with Eunomius – an independent from the rest – is a refutation of 
"The Confession of Faith", which was presented to the emperor Theodosius by Eunomius at the 
Council of Constantinople in 383, this treatise is the second book of anti-Eunomian corpus of 
Gregory published by Migne.33 
 
 
5.2. Description of a Human Being through the “Concurrence of Properties” in Basil of 
Caesarea and its Theological and Philosophical Context 
 
1. The writings, important for the history of the Patristic thought and for the history of 
philosophy as a whole contain some key texts which are important for several lines of further 
development of thought. I would like to focus on one of these texts from the writings of Basil of 
Caesarea. This passage can be found in the beginning of the second book of Basil’s Contra 
                                                 
30 PG 45, 372-464. 
31 PG 45, 909-968. 
32 PG 45, 572-908.   
33 PG 45, 464-572. 
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Eunomium.34 Arguing with the doctrinal positions of the Apology,35 written by the Neo-Arian 
(Anomoean) leader Eunomius who insisted on a rigid relationship between the name of an 
individual and his substance, Basil comes to distinguishing between the general substance and 
the particular properties, united by the name: 
 
 
Καίτοι τίς ἂν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ σωφρονῶν πρόσθοιτο, ὅτι ὧν τὰ ὀνόματά 
ἐστι διάφορα, τούτων παρηλλάχθαι καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἀνάγκη; Πέτρου γὰρ καὶ 
Παύλου, καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς ἀνθρώπων πάντων προσηγορίαι μὲν διάφοροι, οὐσία 
δὲ πάντων μία. Διόπερ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀλλήλοις ἐσμέν· τοῖς δὲ 
ἰδιώμασι μόνοις τοῖς περὶ ἕκαστον θεωρουμένοις ἕτερος ἑτέρου διενηνόχαμεν. 
Ὅθεν καὶ αἱ προσηγορίαι οὐχὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν εἰσι σημαντικαὶ, ἀλλὰ τῶν 
ἰδιοτήτων, αἳ τὸν καθ' ἕνα χαρακτηρίζουσιν. Ὅταν οὖν ἀκούωμεν Πέτρον, οὐ 
τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ νοοῦμεν ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος (οὐσίαν δὲ λέγω νῦν τὸ ὑλικὸν 
ὑποκείμενον, ὅπερ οὐδαμῶς σημαίνει τοὔνομα), ἀλλὰ τῶν ἰδιωμάτων ἃ περὶ 
αὐτὸν θεωρεῖται τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐντυπούμεθα. Εὐθὺς γὰρ ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης 
νοοῦμεν τὸν τοῦ Ἰωνᾶ, τὸν ἐκ τῆς Βηθσαϊδᾶ, τὸν ἀδελφὸν Ἀνδρέου, τὸν ἀπὸ 
ἁλιέων εἰς τὴν διακονίαν τῆς ἀποστολῆς προσκληθέντα, τὸν διὰ πίστεως 
ὑπεροχὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν τὴν οἰκοδομὴν τῆς Ἐκκλησίας δεξάμενον· ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν 
οὐσία, ὡς ἡ ὑπόστασις νοουμένη. Ὥστε τὸ ὄνομα τὸν χαρακτῆρα μὲν ἡμῖν 
ἀφορίζει τὸν Πέτρου· αὐτὴν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ παρίστησι τὴν οὐσίαν. Πάλιν 
ἀκούσαντες Παῦλον, ἑτέρων ἰδιωμάτων συνδρομὴν ἐνοήσαμεν· τὸν Ταρσέα, 
τὸν Ἑβραῖον, τὸν κατὰ νόμον Φαρισαῖον, τὸν μαθητὴν Γαμαλιὴλ, τὸν κατὰ 
ζῆλον διώκτην τῶν Ἐκκλησιῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὸν ἐκ τῆς φοβερᾶς ὀπτασίας εἰς τὴν 
ἐπίγνωσιν ἐναχθέντα, τὸν ἀπόστολον τῶν ἐθνῶν. Ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα ἐκ μιᾶς 
φωνῆς τῆς Παῦλος περιορίζεται. Καίτοιγε, εἴπερ ἀληθὲς ἦν, ὅτι ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα 
διενήνοχεν, ἐναντίως ἔχουσιν αἱ οὐσίαι, ἐχρῆν δήπου καὶ Παῦλον καὶ Πέτρον 
καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς ἀνθρώπους ἅπαντας ἑτερουσίους ἀλλήλοις εἶναι. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο 
οὐδεὶς οὕτως ἀμαθὴς καὶ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως ἀνεπίσκεπτος, ὥστ' ἂν εἰπεῖν 
προαχθῆναι· Ἐκ πηλοῦ γὰρ, φησὶ, διήρτισαι σὺ, ὡς κἀγώ· οὐδὲν ἕτερον τοῦ 
                                                 
34 Concerning the date of the Eun., there is an agreement that it was written in the beginning of the 
theological activity of Basil, that is, in the first half of the 360s. The most cautious scholars attribute the treatise 
to the period between 360 and 366. The exact date of the treatise is based on the date of two letters of Basil (Ep. 
20 and 223), which contain references to it (S. HILDEBRAND, A Reconsideration of the Development of Basil’s 
Trinitarian Theology: the Dating of Ep. 9 and ‘Eun.’, “Vigiliae Christianae”, 58 (2004), pp. 390-403). 
35 The Apology of Eunomius was probably written by the time of the Council of Constantinople, held in 
December, 359, and was read at the Council in response to the accusations made by the representatives of the 
Homoiousian party (Th. KOPECEK, A History of Neo-Arianism, vol. 2, pp. 305-306). 
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λόγου ἢ τὸ ὁμοούσιον πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀποσημαίνοντος· ψευδὴς ὁ τῇ 
διαφορᾷ τῶν ὀνομάτων τὸ τῆς οὐσίας διάφορον ἕπεσθαι σοφιζόμενος. 
 
But what sane person would agree with this logic that there must be a 
difference of substances for those things whose names are distinct? For the 
designations of Peter and Paul and of all people in general are different, but 
there is a single substance for all of them. For this reason, in most respects we 
are the same as one another, but it is only due to the distinguishing marks 
considered in connection with each one of us that we are different, each from 
the other. Hence the designations do not signify the substances, but rather the 
distinctive features that characterize the individual. So whenever we hear 
‘Peter,’ the name does not cause us to think of his substance - now by 
'substance' I mean the material substrate which the name itself cannot ever 
signify - but rather the notion of the distinguishing marks that are considered in 
connection with him is impressed upon our mind. For as soon as we hear the 
sound of this designation, we immediately think of the son of Jonah, the man 
from Bethsaida, the brother of Andrew, the one summoned from the fishermen 
to the ministry of the apostolate, the one who because of the superiority of his 
faith was charged with the building up of the church. None of these is his 
substance, understood as hypostasis. Hence the name (τὸ ὄνομα) determines 
for us the character of Peter. It cannot ever communicate the substance itself. 
Likewise, when we hear ‘Paul,’ we think of a concurrence of other 
distinguishing marks: the man from Tarsus, the Hebrew, as to the law a 
Pharisee, the disciple of Gamaliel, the zealous persecutor of the churches of 
God, the man who was brought to knowledge by a terrifying vision, the 
Apostle to the Gentiles. All these things are encompassed by the single term 
Paul. Moreover, if it were true that the substances of things whose names differ 
are opposed, then Paul and Peter and all people in general must be different in 
substance from one another. But there is no one so stupid and so inattentive to 
the common nature that he would be led to say this - after all, the passage: You 
have been formed from clay, as also have [Jb 33:6] signals nothing other than 
that all human beings are of the same substance. This being the case, whoever 
  
60
evasively argues that difference in substance follows upon difference in names 
is a liar36. 
 
Further Basil went on to say the relationship between the names of the Divine Persons and 
their common substance needed to be understood in the same way as the relationship between 
Peter and Paul and their common substance. A. Choufrine has shown37 that it was this passage 
that Gregory of Nyssa used in the so-called Letter 38 of Basil of Caesarea. The Letter, currently 
attributed by most scholars to Gregory of Nyssa,38 reinforced and developed the analogy 
invented by Basil, and illustrated the notion of generality and differences between the hypostases 
of the Holy Trinity, drawing on the example of human individuals.39 
Let us identify the scope of problems discussed in the passage. They include the 
relationship between the general and the particular, the problem of human cognition and the 
object of cognitive activities, the status of naming, as well as description and representation of a 
human individual. This article analyzes the position of Basil of Caesarea concerning these 
problems as well as some other philosophical and theological topics against a wide 
philosophical, theological and ecclesiastical background of the fragment quoted above. 
2. The principle of individuation is one of the most important problems addressed in the 
passage. Basil solves it through the use of the concept of concurrence (συνδρομή) of properties. 
We should have a closer look at Basil’s argument and first turn to the doctrine of the Stoics.  
When the head of the Skeptic Academy Arkesilaos made a stand against the Stoics, one of 
the stumbling blocks was the so-called Treatise on Growth (περὶ αὐξήσεως λόγος), composed by 
Epicharmus Comicus.40 The Treatise called into question the sameness of an individual who was 
undergoing the process of quantitative changes, for example, during food intake. In contrast to 
the understanding of a human being as a whole which was identical to the sum of its parts and 
                                                 
36 Eun., PG 29b, 577c–580b, SC 305, 18-22 Sesboüé/Durand, trans. by Mark DelCogliano and Andrew 
Radde-Gallwitz, in: SAINT BASIL OF CAESAREA, Against Eunomius, The fathers of the Church; v. 122, 
Washington  2011, pp. 134-136, slightly revised. 
37 A. CHOUFRINE, The Development of St. Basil’s Idea of “Hypostasis”, “Studi sull’Oriente Cristiano”, 7 
(2003), fasc. 2, pp. 22-24. 
38 See, for example, the conclusions of R. Hübner and P. Fedwick in R. HÜBNER, Gregor von Nyssa als 
Verfasser der sog. Ep. 38 des Basilius: Zum unterschiedlichen Verständnis der ousia bei den kappadokischen 
Brüdern, in J. Fontaine, Ch. Kannengiesser (eds.), Epektasis: Mélanges patristiques offerts au cardinal Jean 
Daniélou, Paris 1972, pp. 463-490; P. FEDWICK, Commentary of Gregory of Nyssa on the 38th Letter of Basil of 
Caesarea, “Orientalia Christiana Periodica”, 44 (1978), fasc. 1, pp. 31-51. There is no doubt that the so-called 
“Letter 38” was written by Gregory of Nyssa later than Against Eunomius of Basil of Caesarea. 
39 Ep. 38, 3; PG 32, 328cd. The notion of a certain specific quality set in accordance with hypostasis, 
which was used in the Letter 38 and implied in the above passage of Basil of Caesarea (who in this case did not 
use the concept of hypostasis in the technical Nicean sense), goes back to the Homoiousians (Basil Ancyra and 
George Laodicean), see EPIPH. Panar. 73, 16, PG 42, 432-433. 
40 DK 23 B 2; Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, eds. H. Diels, W. Kranz, vol. 1, Berlin: Wiedmann 1960, 
Ss. 195-197. 
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whose principle of individuation was the amount of matter,41 the Stoic Chrysippus proposed a 
concept which for the first time as David Sedley noted,42 made an attempt to answer the question 
of what made it possible for a person to carry his or her identity throughout the flow of time. 
Specific Stoic position on the issue was shaped by two factors: firstly, by the obvious identity of 
a human individual throughout his life, and secondly, by the Stoic epistemology which rejected 
the skepticism of the followers of the Academy and proclaimed that every true sage was capable 
of receiving unmistakable “comprehensive impressions.”43 
Insisting on the capacity to know the individuals, the Stoics argued that each thing was 
unique, and no two indistinguishable things existed (at least, for a sage). In this regard, in a 
human being Chrysippus distinguished between the underlying substrate which was in constant 
change, and the constant qualities – the general quality and the particular individual quality 
(ἰδίως ποιόν), peculiar for each human being and serving as his substantial characteristic. This 
quality made it possible for an individual human being to maintain sameness and stability during 
the lifetime in spite of the flow of time.44 According to Chrysippus, it could be formalized and 
expressed in the language. We should note that the notion of the particular quality in the Stoic 
system was developed for safeguarding the individuality of human beings, and not of individual 
things in general.45 
Although according to the Stoics the particular quality of an individual human “remained 
from birth to death,” it nevertheless had a capacity to increase and decrease.46 Thus, having 
established the differentiation of the levels of being in the description of an individual and 
having distinguished between the substrate and the special unique quality of an individual 
accessible for knowledge, Chrysippus proposed an original solution for his time: an individual 
was unconfused yet indivisible unity of ever-moving material substrate and the particular 
individual quality, stable over the lifetime. It is important that the Stoics insisted that the 
particular quality could not be the same for several individuals (this followed from the general 
                                                 
41 The doctrine of Heraclitus presents here an obvious philosophical context (see DK 22 B 91; Die 
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, S. 171). The doctrine of the constant transiency of humanity as far as his material 
component is concerned, can be also found in Plato (Symp. 207de). Plato mentions Epicharmus as a philosopher 
who, along with Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Homer taught on the constant flux of the material 
world (Theaet. 152e). Despite this reference, Plato was accused by Alcimus of stealing ideas from Epicharmus 
(see DIOG. LAERT. 3, 9-10). However, the problem of finding the principle of identity for the humans as material 
beings, implicit in the comedy of Epicharmus, was not a central issue in philosophical inquiries of Plato or 
Aristotle. Only in the controversy between the Stoics and the Academy, the problem of the human identity 
became the main issue of the philosophical research (D. SEDLEY, The Stoic Criterion of Identity, “Phronesis” 27 
(1982), p. 255). 
42 Ibid., 261. 
43 CIC. Academica 2, 41, 77-78; DIOG. LAERT. 6, 162, 177. 
44 See Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. II, fr. 395, 762.   
45 D. SEDLEY, The Stoic Criterion, p. 272, n. 16. 
46 See PLUT. De comm.. not. 44, 1083d; POSID. Fr. 96: LS 28D (A. LONG., D. SEDLEY, The Hellenistic 
Philosophers, Vol. 1, 2, Cambridge 1987, vol. 2, p. 171). 
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principle of the Stoic philosophy, namely, that no two things, indistinguishable from each other 
may exist), and vice versa – one individual cannot have two particular qualities.47  
This doctrine of the general quality and particular qualities was reflected in the Stoic 
teaching on the parts of speech. According to Diogenes Laertius, Chrysippus distinguished 
between the proper name (ὄνομα) and the appellative name (προσηγορία). Chrysippus’ student 
Diogenes of Babylon gave them the following definition, “The appellative name (προσηγορία) is 
the part of speech denoting general quality (κοινὴν ποιότητα), for example, “man” or “horse.” 
The proper name (ὄνομα) is the part of speech, indicating particular quality (ἰδίαν ποιότητα), for 
example, Diogenes or Socrates.”48 
Such a distinction between the proper names and the appellative names was used by the 
Alexandrian grammarians. At the same time, sources indicate that there were two traditions of 
defining ὄνομα and προσηγορία. If Apollonius Dyscolus and the subsequent tradition 
correlated49 them with particular and general qualities of the denotation of utterance, Dionysius 
of Thrace and his grammatical tradition50 correlated them with general and particular substances, 
which can be associated with the Aristotelization of the Alexandrian grammar.51 
Based on the evidence of some of the later sources, it can be assumed that the Stoics could 
understand the particular quality as a combination of qualities. The surviving testimony of 
Dexippus on the principle of individuation of individuals belonging to the same substance, is as 
following: 
 
Οἱ μὲν οὖν λύοντες τὴν ἀπορίαν ταύτην κατὰ τὸ ἰδίως ποιόν, τοῦτ' ἔστιν 
ὅτι ὁ μὲν φέρε γρυπότητι ἢ ξανθότητι ἢ ἄλλῃ συνδρομῇ ποιοτήτων ἀφώρισται, 
ἄλλος δὲ σιμότητι ἢ φαλακρότητι ἢ γλαυκότητι, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερος ἑτέραις, οὐ 
καλῶς μοι δοκοῦσι λύειν· 
 
                                                 
47 Although Plutarch criticized the Stoics that according to their doctrine, “two particular qualities may 
appear in one substance, and... one and the same substance that has one particular quality then takes over another 
[particular quality] and keeps both” (PLUT. De communibus notitiis, 36, 1077d), this conclusion in no way would 
have been shared by the Stoics, but was ascribed to them by Plutarch, allegedly as a result of their belief in the 
world fire, when Zeus and the Providence come close and coexist in the same ethereal substance. In fact, the 
Stoic concept that Providence has the same relation to Zeus as the soul relates to the person, mentioned by 
Plutarch in the same passage, contradicts his opinion (D. SEDLEY, “The Stoic Criterion”, 267). 
48 DIOG. LAERT. 7, 58 = Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. III, fr. 22. 
49 See, for example, Apollonii Dyscoli de constructione libri quattuor, ed. G. Uhlig (Grammatici Graeci 
2.2), Leipzig 1910, pp. 142, 1 - 143, 3; Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem grammaticam, ed. A. Hilgard, 
(Grammatici Graeci 3.1), Leipzig 1901, pp. 358, 28-32; 524, 9-10. 
50 Dionysii Thracis Ars grammatica, ed. G. Uhlig, Grammatici Graeci 1.1, Leipzig 1883, pp. 33, 6-34, 2; 
Georgii Choerobosci Prolegomena et scholia in Theodosii Alexandrini canones isagogicos de flexione nominum 
et verborum, ed. А. Hilgard (Grammatici Graeci 4.1), Leipzig 1894, p. 105, 23-25. 
51 Cf. D. ROBERTSON, A Patristic Theory of Proper Names, “Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie” 84 
(2002), fasc. 3.  
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<…> Those who solve this difficulty on the basis of the peculiarly 
qualified – that one individual is distinguished, say, by hookedness of the nose, 
by blondness, or by some other concurrence of qualities, another by snubness, 
baldness, or greyness of the eyes, and again another by other qualities – do not 
seem to me to solve it well.52   
 
 
A. Long and D. Sedley saw the employment of the Stoic terminology in the use of qualities 
in the passage and considered the fragment to be a testimony on the Stoic ontology.53 Yet, they 
pointed out to a strange nature of the fragment, since the substantial status of the particular 
quality sought by the Stoics, seems to be somewhat in the fragment since these general qualities 
may change during the life of an individual.54 
However, there are a number of reasons confirming the suggestion that the fragment of 
Dexippus, referring to the unfolding of the particular quality through the combination of general 
qualities, may still reflect the authentic Stoic doctrine. Thus, as A. Lloyd rightly observed, 
according to the Stoic doctrine of the categories, the particular quality of a person can be viewed 
as a complex set of qualities.55 Lloyd had in mind the normative principle of the Stoic doctrine – 
viewing the subject from several points of view with the help of four Stoic categories, each one 
revealed by the following category. In the run of this process of consideration, the subject was 
being identified progressing from a lesser certainty to a greater certainty, and from the point of 
view of non-relativity (corresponding to the category of the substrate) to the point of view which 
revealed all kinds of relationships between the subject and the world (corresponding to the 
category of relation). 
It remains unclear whether it is possible to assume that the Stoic tradition made its way 
from the understanding of the particular quality as capable of increase or decrease (that is, of 
change) to the description of the particular quality through a set of qualities. However, we may 
definitely see a clear difference in emphasis – in the latter case much more emphasis is put on 
the epistemological function of the particular quality of an individual and the possibility of 
determining the particular quality in the process of knowledge. 
                                                 
52 DEX. In Cat. 30, 23-26, greek text in: A. LONG, D. SEDLEY, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 2, pp. 
173-174 (LS 28J), trans. by A. Long and D. Sedley in The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 169, slightly 
revised. 
53 Long and Sedley published the fragment in the section of the Ontology (Ibid., pp. 166-185). 
54 Ibid., vol. 1, 174; vol. 2, 174-175. 
55 A. LLOYD, Grammar and Metaphysics in the Stoya, in A. Long (ed.), Problems in Stoicism, London 
1971, p. 66. 
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In the Platonic School, the concept of “concurrence” (συνδρομή) emerged, on the one 
hand, in the skeptical “New Academy” for expressing the need to have a multitude of true 
notions in order to obtain a single true notion of a sensible thing (including an individual human 
being). For example, according to Carneades, our notion of Socrates would be true if each of the 
notions related to Socrates and converged into a singularity really pointed to something typical 
for Socrates.56 On the other hand, this topic is relevant to the method of defining material things 
through aggregation (τὸ ἄθροισμα) of qualities, which goes back to Plato57 and can be found, for 
example, in Albinus.58 In Plotinus, the topic of concurrence appears in the Enneads VI 3. 8. 20, 
26, where the philosopher says that the sensual substance is the accumulation (συμφόρησις) or 
mixture (μίγμα) of qualities. Typically, speaking about substance as a combination of qualities 
Plotinus along with the entire Platonic tradition intends to show that the sensual singular 
substance is a “quasi substance,” a substance not in the proper sense of the word, but only an 
imitation of the true intelligible substance.59 
However, the notion of the concurrence of properties in Basil of Caesarea may well be 
related to the treatment of same topic by Porphyry, since among other philosophers of the 
Platonic tradition it was Porphyry who applied the topic of concurrence (aggregation) of qualities 
in his logical writings for describing a human individual. 
In his logical treatises Porphyry at least twice mentioned individuation of singularities 
through the aggregation of qualities. He dwelled on the subject in greater length in the Isagoge 
and more briefly in his Short Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. Thus he argues in the 
Isagoge: 
 
Socrates is said to be an individual, and so are this white thing, and this 
person approaching, and the son of Sophroniscus60 (should Socrates be his 
only son). Such items are called individuals because each is constituted of 
proper features the assemblage of which will never be found the same in 
anything else—the proper features of Socrates will never be found in any 
other of the particulars.  
 
                                                 
56 SEX. EMP. Adv. Math. 176-179. 
57 Theaet. 157b-c; cf.: ibid., 209с; Phil. 14а, 15b. 
58 ALBINUS. Epit. 4, 7. 
59 See Enn. 6, 3, 8, 30-37. Cf. 6, 3, 15, 32-36. 
60 With respect to the words, “... and this approaching, and the son of Sophroniscus” I am following the 
reading of J. Barnes (J. BARNES, Porphyry. Introduction, p. 8), whereas the reading in the classic edition of A. 
Busse is as follows, “... and this approaching son of Sophroniscus.” For more detail, see F. ADEMOLLO, 
Sophroniscus’ Son is Approaching: Porphyry, Isagoge 7.20-1, “The Classical Quarterly”, 54 (2004), fasc. 1, pp. 
322-325. In addition to the textual arguments in favor of his reading, Barnes points to an important example in a 
work of Aristotle (Anal. Pr. 43а35–6), which probably was the source of Porphyry. 
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ἄτομον δὲ λέγεται ὁ Σωκράτης καὶ τουτὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ οὑτοσὶ ὁ 
προσιὼν  Σωφρονίσκου υἱός, εἰ μόνος αὐτῷ εἴη Σωκράτης υἱός. ἄτομα οὖν 
λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅτι ἐξ ἰδιοτήτων συνέστηκεν ἕκαστον, ὧν τὸ ἄθροισμα 
οὐκ ἂν ἐπ' ἄλλου ποτὲ τὸ αὐτὸ γένοιτο· αἱ γὰρ Σωκράτους ἰδιότητες οὐκ ἂν 
ἐπ' ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν κατὰ μέρος γένοιντο ἂν αἱ αὐταί61. 
 
 
In the treatise On Aristotle categories, Porphyry uses the concept of the “concurrence” 
(συνδρομή) of qualities with similar wording: 
 
Socrates does not differ from Plato in virtue of specific differentiae, but in 
virtue of a particular concurrence of qualities, in virtue of which, and <not> by 
specific differentiae, Plato is differentiated from Socrates.   
  
εἰδοποιοῖς μὲν γὰρ διαφοραῖς οὐ διενήνοχεν Σωκράτης Πλάτωνος, ἰδιότητι δὲ 
συνδρομῆς ποιοτήτων, καθ' ἣν εἰδοποιῷ διενήνοχεν Πλάτων Σωκράτους62. 
 
In his logical treatises Porphyry tried to neutralize the anti-Platonic stance of Aristotle’s 
Categories and therefore insisted on understanding the Aristotelian Categories as a treatise on 
the methods of expression and not on the modes of existence of things,63 implying that this 
treatise described only the reality of the thought or the reality of the logical reasoning. 
Relying on his tree of the universals, Porphyry distinguished between the predicates in 
accordance with the expanse of classes, comprised by the predicates: the highest genus was said 
of all underlying genera; the lower genera were said of the genera below them, etc. Such a 
system had a rule: each predicate was said either of something wider than itself or of something 
identical to it in extension. The lowest class of predicates which can only be said of themselves, 
is the class of “singularities” (τὸ ἄτομον).64 Thus, Porphyry made a claim, impossible for 
Aristotle, that the singularity itself was a predicate.65 According to Aristotle, individual qualities 
of a thing were within the subject, but were not said of the subject.66 Porphyry, however, 
accepted that the single could be expressed in the saying in the same way as the higher elements 
                                                 
61 PORPH. Isagoge 7, 19-24 (Busse), trans. by J. Barnes, Porphyry: Introduction, 8. 
62 Idem., In Cat. 129, 9-10 (Busse), trans. by S. Strange in PORPHYRY. On Aristotle's Categories. Ithaca, 
New York 1992, p. 140. 
63 Ibid., 58, 4-21. 
64 Idem., Isagoge 7, 18-19. 
65 See A. LLOYD, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Oxford 1990, pp. 43-44. 
66 ARISTOT. Cat, 1а23-29. 
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in the genus-species tree. Facing the need to specify a “zero” class, corresponding to the 
singularity of the species, which would have required a simple pointing with finger, Porphyry 
proposed to consider the singularity as if from the reverse side for expressing this specificity in 
thought and language. He suggested looking at the singularity not through the prism of genus-
species relationships, but through the unique aggregation of qualities. In order to express these 
singularities in saying, Porphyry modified the above rule: certain predicates could be said of 
each of the singularities; the aggregation of predicates was unique for each singularity, and that 
aggregation constituted a sort of definition for the given singularity.67  
Going back to the testimony of Dexippus, we can point out that there is evidence that 
Porphyry could use the Stoic doctrines in his logical writings.68 Therefore, it can be assumed, as 
does R. Chiaradonna,69 that Dexippus combined Porphyry’s concept of singularities with the 
Stoic doctrine of the particular quality, arguing with Porphyry and bearing in mind the influence 
of the elements of the Stoic doctrine on him, but not willing to criticize Porphyry directly. 
Dexippus could also have in mind that Aristotle, the author of the Categories (the writing which 
Porphyry comments upon in his Isagoge), criticized the way of individuation through the 
combination of qualities.70 
3. Among the Christian writers Origen was the predecessor of Basil of Caesarea as far as 
the description of an individual through the combination of qualities is concerned. R. Sorabji 
pointed to the passage of Origen,71 which probably was behind Basil’s idea to use the example 
that he cited in the fragment under discussion, namely, On Prayer 24: 
 
„ὄ ν ο μ α ” τοίνυν ἐστὶ κεφαλαιώδης προσηγορία τῆς ἰδίας ποιότητος τοῦ 
ὀνομαζομένου παραστατική· οἷόν ἐστι τὶς ἰδία ποιότης Παύλου τοῦ 
ἀποστόλου, ἡ μέν τις τῆς ψυχῆς, καθ' ἣν τοιάδε ἐστὶν, ἡ δέ τις τοῦ νοῦ, καθ' ἣν 
τοιῶνδέ ἐστι θεωρητικὸς, ἡ δέ τις τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ, καθ' ἣν τοιόνδε ἐστί. τὸ 
τοίνυν τούτων τῶν ποιοτήτων ἴδιον καὶ ἀσυντρόχαστον πρὸς ἕτερον (ἄλλος 
γάρ τις ἀπαράλλακτος Παύλου ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν οὐκ ἔστι) δηλοῦται διὰ τῆς 
„Παῦλος” ὀνομασίας. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπων, οἱονεὶ ἀλλασσομένων τῶν ἰδίων 
ποιοτήτων, ὑγιῶς κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἀλλάσσεται καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα· μεταβαλούσης 
                                                 
67 See the discussion in the comments of J. Barnes to the Isagoge: J. BARNES, Porphyry. Introduction, pp. 
150-154. 
68 The Stoic influence on Porphyry was noted by Simplicius in his Commentary on the Categories (2, 8-
9). Explicit Stoic connotations can be traced in the passage of Porphyry, which Simplicius cited in the same 
work (Ibid., 48, 11-16). 
69 R. CHIARADONNA, La teoria dell’individuo in Porfirio e l’ΙΔΙΟΝ ΠΟΙΟΝ stoico, “Elenchos: Rivista di 
studi sul pensiero antico”, 21 (2000), fasc. 2, pp. 317-328. 
70 ARIST. Met. 1040а8-15; this was indicated by J. Barnes (J. BARNES, Porphyry. Introduction, p. 153). 
71 R. SORABJI, The Philosophy of Commentators, 200–600 AD: A Sourcebook, vol. 3, Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press 2005, pp. 226-227. 
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γὰρ τῆς τοῦ „Ἀβρὰμ” ποιότητος, ἐκλήθη „Ἀβραὰμ,” καὶ τῆς τοῦ Σίμωνος, ὁ 
„Πέτρος” ὠνομάσθη, καὶ τῆς τοῦ διώκοντος τὸν Ἰησοῦν „Σαοὺλ,” 
προσηγορεύθη ὁ „Παῦλος.” 
 
A proper name then is a concise appellative that presents the distinctive quality 
of what is named, for example, there is a distinctive quality of the Apostle 
Paul, one for his soul by which it is the way it is, one for his intellect by which 
it can contemplate the kinds of thing it does, one for his body by which it is the 
way it is. The unique feature which is unconformable with anyone else, since 
there is no one else in existence indistinguishable from Paul, is displayed 
through the naming of Paul. But with humans, names can validly be changed 
according to scripture72, as if the unique qualities were being changed. For 
example, when the quality of Abram changed he was called Abraham, when 
Simon's changed he was named Peter, and when Saul's changed, the enemy of 
Jesus, he was addressed as Paul.73  
 
The Stoic inspiration of the passage is obvious. Origen used the Stoic notion of ἰδία 
ποιότης (“particular quality”) in the spirit of its technical use by the Stoics as the unifying 
principle of multiplicity, bound by the inner unity.74 In addition, following the Stoic tradition 
which we have seen in Diogenes of Babylon, Origen juxtaposed the names and the quality, 
although he did not follow the Stoic distinction between the ὄνομα and the προσηγορία. 
Thus, Origen reproduced the idea of the Stoics, according to which the name of an 
individual was in accordance with his individual quality, distinguishing him from other people.75 
As we have noted, according to Chrysippus, two particular qualities corresponding to the proper 
names could not coexist in the single substance of a given individual. Chrysippus illustrated this 
point using the example of certain Dion whose special quality was having all his members, and 
Theon whose special quality was missing a leg. If Dion loses his feet, he would become Theon, 
while the former Theon would disappear.76 
                                                 
72 κατὰ τὴν γραφήν. In respect of understanding of these words I follow to the treatment of William A. 
Curtis’ translation of On Prayer (CCEL); in Sorabji’s translation: “…in their spelling”. 
73 PG 11, 492bc, trans. R. SORABJI, The Philosophy of Commentators, 200–600 AD: A Sourcebook, vol. 
3, p. 227. 
74 See Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. II, fr. 391. 
75 Origen was strongly influenced by the understanding of names in the magical sense, which was quite widespread in the Middle Platonism. See J. 
DILLON, The Magical Power of Names in Origen and Late Platonism, in R. Hanson, H. Crouzel (eds.), Origeniana Tertia, Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo 1985, 
pp. 203-216. Yet here, due to the general Stoic context we need to speak about the influence of the Stoic ontological and semantic doctrine. 
76 «Chrysippus <…> in his work On the Growing, creates a freak of the following kind. Having first 
established that it is impossible for two particular qualities (ἰδίως ποιούς) to occupy the same substance (οὐσίας) 
jointly, he says: 'For the sake of argument, let one man be thought of as whole-limbed, the other as minus one 
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This example confirms the fact that the Stoic doctrine postulated unequivocal 
correspondence between the particular quality and the name of an individual. Origen followed 
the reasoning similar to that of Chrysippus: the substantial change in the qualities resulted in the 
change of the name for the individual. In Origen’s model, the instrument that safeguarded the 
self-identity of an individual was the “particular quality” which could also be changed. The 
difference in the language of Chrysippus and Origen is that speaking about human individuals, 
Chrysippus spoke about “substances” which had particular qualities, and Origen did not.77 
It should also be noted that our passage from of the Contra Eunomium by Basil of 
Caesarea quite clearly shows the Stoic overtones. This is evident when Basil writes about the 
general substance of people as a material substrate (τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον) in addition to the 
argument about human individuals as carriers of various qualities. The presence of the Stoic 
overtones in Basil’s doctrine of substance was pointed to by R. Hübner. He noted that for the 
both ontological orders, distinguished by Basil (for the created and the uncreated), Basil used the 
Stoic model as far as substance was concerned; in the case of the uncreated realm he used the 
created realm as an analogy.78 One can agree with R. Hübner, provided that this was just one of 
                                                                                                                                                             
foot. Let the whole-limbed one be called Dion, the defective one Theon. Then let one of Dion's feet be 
amputated.' The 'question arises which one of them has perished, and his claim is that Theon is the stronger 
candidate. These are the words of a paradox-monger rather than of a speaker of truth. For how can it be that 
Theon, who has had no part chopped off, has been snatched away, while Dion, whose foot has been amputated, 
has not perished? 'Necessarily', says Chrysippus. 'For Dion, the one whose foot has been cut off, has collapsed 
into the defective substance of Theon, and two particular qualities cannot occupy the same substrate. Therefore it 
is necessary that Dion remains while Theon has perished (Χρύσιππος γοῦν ὁ δοκιμώτατος τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐν 
τοῖς περὶ Αὐξανομένου τερατεύεταί τι τοιοῦτον· προκατασκευάσας ὅτι δύο ἰδίως ποιοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας 
ἀμήχανον συστῆναι, φησίν· „Ἔστω θεωρίας ἕνεκα τὸν μέν τινα ὁλόκληρον, τὸν δὲ χωρὶς ἐπινοεῖσθαι τοῦ ἑτέρου 
ποδός, καλεῖσθαι δὲ τὸν μὲν ὁλόκληρον Δίωνα, τὸν δὲ ἀτελῆ Θέωνα, κἄπειτα ἀποτέμνεσθαι Δίωνος τὸν ἕτερον 
τοῖν ποδοῖν.” Ζητουμένου δὴ πότερος ἔφθαρται, τὸν Θέωνα φάσκειν οἰκειότερον εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ 
παραδοξολογοῦντος μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀληθεύοντος. πῶς γὰρ ὁ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀκρωτηριασθεὶς μέρος, ὁ Θέων, 
ἀνήρπασται, ὁ δ' ἀποκοπεὶς τὸν πόδα Δίων οὐχὶ διέφθαρται; „Δεόντως, φησίν, ἀναδεδράμηκε γὰρ ὁ ἐκτμηθεὶς 
τὸν πόδα Δίων ἐπὶ τὴν ἀτελῆ τοῦ Θέωνος οὐσίαν, καὶ δύο ἰδίως ποιοὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐ δύνανται 
εἶναι. τοιγαροῦν τὸν μὲν Δίωνα μένειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸν δὲ Θέωνα διεφθάρθαι.”)» (PHILO. De aetern. mun. 48–49 
(= Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. II, fr. 397), trans. by David Sedley, in: D. SEDLEY, The Stoic Criterion, 
pp. 267-268, slightly revised). 
John Bowin argued that in this case, in his polemics with the Academics Chrysippus challenged exactly 
the premises of the Treatise on Growth from the comedy of Epicharmus (J. BOWIN, Chrysippus’ Puzzle about 
Identity, “Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy” 24 (2003), pp. 244-246). In turn, David Sedley has shown that 
the reasoning of Chrysippus presented by Philo suggested that one-legged Theon was a part of Dion who had all 
his members, that is, the name of Theon designated the body of Dion minus one Dion’s leg (D. SEDLEY, “The 
Stoic Criterion”, p. 269). 
77 The opponent of Basil Eunomius followed a similar logic, according to which the name uniquely 
corresponded to the property, that is, to a particular substance (Eunomius did not distinguish between the 
“substance” and the “property”). In his Apology he argued that the Son and the Father could not be of the same 
substance since the same substance could not be simultaneously begotten and unbegotten, and if the Son 
becomes of the same substance as the Father, he would become unbegotten and consequently, the Father would 
cease to beget, that is, both would lose their properties (Apol. XIV, in EUNOMIUS. The Extant Works, p. 50). 
Thus, the participation in the substance, according to Eunomius, involved the participation in name (cf. Apol. IX, 
X–XII, in EUNOMIUS. The Extant Works, p. 44). However, judging from the terminology used by Eunomius, 
which is quite common, it is unlikely that he might use the Stoic doctrine in this respect (the influence of the 
Stoic tradition in Eunomius can rather be seen in his doctrine of language, see below). 
78 R. HÜBNER, Gregor von Nyssa als Verfasser der sog. “Ep. 38” des Basilius, Paris: Beauchesne 1972, 
Ss. 478-481. Balas and Robertson also pointed to the Stoic elements in Basil’s doctrine of substance, see D. 
  
69
the trends in Basil’s doctrine of substance79 along with the Aristotelian trend.80 However, 
Hübner was wrong in claiming that the material substrate (τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον) of all people, 
mentioned by Basil in the passage under discussion, corresponded to the “general quality” 
(κοινῶς ποιόν) in the Stoics,81 since the general quality could not have been viewed by the Stoics 
in the “generic” terms. 
Apparently, Hübner was misled by the words of Basil that all humans were made of clay, 
and it is this clay that Hübner associated with the “general quality.” However in this case Basil 
simply quoted the Book of Job, understanding clay metaphorically as something that indicated 
the prime matter devoid of quality, and the subject to formation. Basil did not mean that all 
people were made directly of clay, that is, that clay was really present in each human as a kind of 
common quality.  
Keeping in mind the strategies of Basil, which he pursued in the Contra Eunomium, we 
may argue that Basil’s understanding of substance in our passage as the material substrate is 
based on one of the understandings of “substance” by the Stoics in the sense of the qualityless 
substrate, formed by qualities.82 Basil needed this concept to convince his readers by analogy in 
the idea that the divine substance cannot be comprehended in our thought and expressed in 
speech – similarly to inexpressible and incomprehensible prime matter as opposed to particular 
qualities accessible to thought.83 Basil’s identification of “substance,” understood in this manner, 
and “hypostasis” in our passage84 only shows that Basil refuted the thesis of Eunomius, using the 
terminology of his opponent.85 
                                                                                                                                                             
BALAS, The Unity of Human Nature in Basil’s and Gregory of Nyssa’s Polemics against Eunomius”, Studia 
Patristica 14:5 (1976), p. 279 and D. ROBERTSON, Stoic and Aristotelian Notions of Substance in Basil of 
Caesarea, “Vigiliae Christianae” 52 (1998), pp. 396-406. 
79 A. Choufrine disagrees with this statement of R. Hübner arguing that Basil rejects the divisibility of the 
divine substance (BAS. CAES. Eun. 1, 19, PG 29b, 556A; cf. Ep. 361, PG 32, 1101A), while divisibility is 
inherent in substance understood as substrate (A. CHOUFRINE, The Development of St. Basil’s Idea of 
‘Hypostasis’, p. 15). However, one may also argue that divisibility of substrate in Basil’s understanding is 
essentially irrelevant to the divine substance, described by analogy with the substrate (as it was noted by R. 
Hübner) and for certain purposes – in order to indicate that the divine substance was unknowable and 
inexpressible in speech (see below). 
80 The formalization of the concept of essence by means of the Aristotelian conceptual framework is 
manifested in Basil’s use of the expression “logos of substance” (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) or “logos of being” (λόγος 
τοῦ εἶναι), fundamental for the Aristotelian philosophy (Eun. 1, 5, 19, PG 29b, 520, 556), reflected the unity of 
the hypostases of the Holy Trinity in substance; whereas for indicating the mode of being for each hypostasis in 
the Eun., Basil used the expression τρόπος τῆς ὑποστάσεως (Ibid. 1, 15; PG 29b, 548a), while in the Homily 
Contra Sabellianos et Arium et Anomoes, Basil used the expression τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως (PG 31, 613a) which 
later became common for the Byzantine theological language. This expression may go back to the commentators 
of the logical works of Aristotle (both expressions can be translated as “the mode of existence” or “mode of 
being”). For the discussion of the balance between the Stoic and Peripatetic elements in Basil’s doctrine of 
substance, see Robertson, “Stoic and Aristotelian Notions of Substance.” 
81 R. HÜBNER, Gregor von Nyssa als Verfasser, S. 476. 
82 See Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. I, fr. 493; vol. II, fr. 318, 374, 376, 380. 
83 Cf. Eun. 2, 5, PG 29b, 580c and 1, 12-13 and 15, PG 29b, 540c–541bc and 548ab. 
84 «...None of these is his substance, understood as hypostasis (ἡ ὑπόστασις)».  
85 Cf. the words of Eunomius, which Basil refutes, “…We take it that his hypostasis is the very same as 
that which is signified by his name, granted that the designation applies properly to the essence (αὐτὴν εἷναι τὴν 
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Thus the topic of the “concurrence of properties” in the passage under discussion brings us 
back to a number of various historical and philosophical contexts. On the one hand, this is the 
Stoic tradition, and more specifically the physical and ontological perspectives of the Stoic 
tradition. In this regard, the conceptual system of Basil implied that there was material substrate 
constituting the substance of all human beings, as well as of the whole of the created world,86 
and it was “shaped” by the qualities of Peter and Paul. On the other hand, these qualities in the 
way they are described by Basil do not quite resemble the physical qualities (which can only 
endow matter with forms). In fact, their purpose as a whole was to provide a narrative, an 
account of each individual, which, as it was rightly noted by P. Kalligas,87 was the novelty of 
Basil’s approach. And in this regard, Basil constantly emphasized the capacity of these 
properties to be represented in the human mind,88 which brings his approach close to that of 
Porphyry, for whom the properties, individualizing the singularity, possessed an epistemological 
status. 
In addition, the language of Basil brings him closer to Porphyry: for indicating the 
properties Basil used the terms ἰδίωμα and ἰδιότητες, which are close to Porphyry’s usage, while 
the Stoics traditionally used the terms ποιόν or ποιότης. Thus, given the likely interpenetration of 
Stoic and Neoplatonic traditions in the Late Antiquity in respect to the concurrence of qualities, 
we may argue that Basil also shows a synthetic position. 
This duality in the use of different conceptual systems, namely, the ontological framework 
and the framework of intellectual comprehension, is also reflected in the functions of the concept 
of χαρακτήρ in our passage from the Contra Eunomius of Basil: the totality of properties behind 
each name, which arise in our mind when we hear the name, forms the representation / χαρακτήρ 
of a person. On the one hand, the subject of χαρακτήρ / representation, pointing to a certain unity 
                                                                                                                                                             
ὑπόστασιν ἣν σημαίνει τοὔνομα, ἐπαληθευούσης τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῆς προσηγορίας” (Apol. XII, 9-10 (Vaggione), in 
EUNOMIUS, The Extant Works, 48, slightly revised; for a lengthier citation from Eunomius, see below). Using the 
term “ὑπόστασις,” in the passage Eunomius followed the terminology typical for the Arian movement (and 
going back to Origen). This terminology described three hypostases of the Trinity (in such a way that the 
hypostasis of God is infinitely higher than the hypostasis of Christ which, in turn, is infinitely higher than the 
Spirit); see the corresponding passage in the Thalia of Arius, cited by Athanasius of Alexandria in De Synodis 
15, PG 26, 708a. Thus, there is no reason to contrast this passage of Basil with the theological language of the 
so-called Letter 38 of Gregory of Nyssa, as A. Choufrine does. Cf. “… [in the Letter 38] the proper names, 
although they do not signify substance - the point in which the author of the letter agrees with Basil - do (contrary to 
what Basil says [in his Eun. 2.4 (PG 29b, 577C-580B)]) signify hypostases)» (A. CHOUFRINE, The Development of 
St. Basil’s Idea of ‘Hypostasis’, p. 23).   
86 Eun. 2, 24, PG 29b, 628C, as well as BALAS, The Unity of Human Nature, p. 278. 
87 P. KALLIGAS, Basil of Caesarea on the Semantics, in K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Byzantine Philosophy and 
its Ancient Sources, Oxford 2002, p. 45. 
88 Cf. «So whenever we hear ‘Peter,’ the name does not cause us to think of his substance (Ὅταν οὖν 
ἀκούωμεν Πέτρον, οὐ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ νοοῦμεν ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος). <…> When we hear ‘Paul,’ we think of a 
concurrence of other distinguishing marks (Πάλιν ἀκούσαντες Παῦλον, ἑτέρων ἰδιωμάτων συνδρομὴν 
ἐνοήσαμεν…) <…> ». 
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which occurs in the human soul from a variety of thoughts or representations about something,89 
appears already in the first book of the Contra Eunomium90 and can also be seen in the passage 
under discussion. On the other hand, another function of this concept points to the individuality 
of a person, to his destiny, to that what “happens” to him,91 and this function reflects how it 
would be used in Byzantium in the later times. 
One may argue that the topic of the material substance in Basil’s writings was treated from 
the viewpoints of both Platonic and Stoic traditions. The Platonic tendency in viewing material 
substance by Basil is manifested in the widely discussed passage from his Hexaemeron, where 
Basil speaks of material substance as of the substrate, composed by and limited by the totality of 
the intellegible qualities.92 This topic was also touched upon by Basil’s brother, Gregory of 
                                                 
89 The concept of χαρακτήρ, understood as a kind of imprint or impression, arising in the soul from an 
aggregate of “thoughts” on a certain object, has Stoic connotations. According to Zeno, Cleanthes, and some 
other Stoics, the impression (φαντασία) is the “imprint (τύπωσις) in the soul,” similar to an imprint which 
originates from seal on wax (Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. I, fr. 58; vol. II, fr. 53, 55–60). When Philo 
speaks about this imprint, he uses the word χαρακτήρ and notes that such imprints are perceived by the mind and 
are stored in memory (PHILO, Immut. 43). Von Arnim placed this fragment of Philo in his collection of Stoic 
fragments (Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. II, fr. 458), however, Philo’s language is already the result of the 
assimilation of the Stoic ideas. In our case, the possible impact on the language of Basil was made by Philo 
rather than the Stoics. We should note that both according to the Stoics and to Philo the imprint on the soul 
might originate only from the objects of sense perception. 
90 «Now some of the names applied to God are indicative of what is present to God; others, on the 
contrary, of what is not present. From these two something like an impression (χαρακτήρ) of God is made in us, 
namely, from the denial of what is incongruous with him and from the affirmation of what belongs to him (Ἐν 
τοίνυν τοῖς περὶ Θεοῦ λεγομένοις ὀνόμασι, τὰ μὲν τῶν προσόντων τῷ Θεῷ δηλωτικά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον, τῶν 
μὴ προσόντων. Ἐκ δύο γὰρ τούτων οἱονεὶ χαρακτήρ τις ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἔκ τε τῆς τῶν ἀπεμφαινόντων 
ἀρνήσεως καὶ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὁμολογίας.)» (Eun. 1, 10, PG 29b, 533с, trans. by DelCogliano and 
Radde-Gallwitz, in SAINT BASIL OF CAESAREA, Against Eunomius, p. 105). 
91 If we take into account this aspect, the hypothesis of D. Robertson seems to be not very convincing. 
According to D. Robertson, Basil was influenced by the Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus where the concept of 
χαρακτήρ was associated with the name of the subject of discourse, inflected for cases for avoiding homonymy 
(D. ROBERTSON, A Patristic Theory, p. 19). 
92 «If we were to wish to discover the essence of each of the beings which are offered for our 
contemplation, or come under our senses, we should be drawn away into long digressions, and the solution of the 
problem would require more words than I possess, to examine fully the matter (Ἡ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἔρευνα 
ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ἢ τῶν κατὰ θεωρίαν ὑποπιπτόντων ἡμῖν, ἢ τῶν προκειμένων ἡμῶν τῇ αἰσθήσει, μακρὸν καὶ 
ἀπηρτημένον λόγον ἐπεισάγει τῇ ἐξηγήσει, ὡς πλείονας ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ προβλήματος τούτου σκέψει 
καταναλίσκεσθαι λόγους τῶν λοιπῶν, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται ῥηθῆναι περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ζητουμένων·). <…> In the same 
way, as concerns the earth, let us resolve not to torment ourselves by trying to find out its essence, not to tire our 
reason by seeking for the substance which it conceals. Do not let us seek for any nature devoid of qualities by the 
conditions of its existence, but let us know that all the phenomena with which we see it clothed regard the 
conditions of its existence and complete its essence. Try to take away by reason each of the qualities it possesses, 
and you will arrive at nothing. Take away black, cold, weight, density, the qualities which concern taste, in one 
word all these which we see in it, and the substrate vanishes (Τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τῆς γῆς συμβουλεύωμεν 
ἑαυτοῖς, μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν ἥτις ποτέ ἐστι, μηδὲ κατατρίβεσθαι τοῖς λογισμοῖς αὐτὸ τὸ 
ὑποκείμενον ἐκζητοῦντας, μηδὲ ζητεῖν τινα φύσιν ἔρημον ποιοτήτων, ἄποιον ὑπάρχουσαν τῷ ἑαυτῆς λόγῳ, ἀλλ' 
εὖ εἰδέναι, ὅτι πάντα τὰ περὶ αὐτὴν θεωρούμενα εἰς τὸν τοῦ εἶναι κατατέτακται λόγον, συμπληρωτικὰ τῆς οὐσίας 
ὑπάρχοντα. Εἰς οὐδὲν γὰρ καταλήξεις, ἑκάστην τῶν ἐνυπαρχουσῶν αὐτῇ ποιοτήτων ὑπεξαιρεῖσθαι τῷ λόγῳ 
πειρώμενος. Ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποστήσῃς τὸ μέλαν, τὸ ψυχρὸν, τὸ βαρὺ, τὸ πυκνὸν, τὰς κατὰ γεῦσιν ἐνυπαρχούσας αὐτῇ 
ποιότητας, ἢ εἴ τινες ἄλλαι περὶ αὐτὴν θεωροῦνται, οὐδὲν ἔσται τὸ ὑποκείμενον)» (Hom. in hex. 1, 8, PG 29b, 
20–21, trans. in NPNF II-8, slightly revised). I do not agree with the opinion of J. Zachhuber (J. ZACHHUBER, 
Stoic Substance, Non-Existent Matter? Some Passages in Basil of Caesarea Reconsidered, “Studia Patristica”, 
41 (2006), pp. 425-431) that in our fragment Basil had in mind not that taking away all the qualities from the 
material substance of earth would leave “nothing,” but that the search for the substance of earth was a futile 
occupation. 
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Nyssa in his Hexaemeron93 and in the treatises On the soul and the resurrection94 and On the 
making of man,95 where Gregory emphasized that any material thing was composed of 
intelligible qualities as if of ideas. A. Armstrong suggested that the position, according to which 
the material substrate was a set of qualities, was adopted by Basil as a result of reading the 
Enneads of Plotinus. Armstrong argues that Basil must have borrowed his position from the 
unknown Platonists who commented upon Timaeus 52a8 and whom Plotinus criticized in the 
Enneads 2, 4, 11, 10-13.96 However, P. O’Cleirigh quite convincingly suggested97 that Basil here 
builds upon the idea expressed in the 4th Book of the De Principiis of Origen.98 
It is possible to agree with R. Sorabji on the Platonic inspiration behind Basil’s 
understanding of material substance as a substrate composed of the totality of intelligible 
qualities, developed by Gregory of Nyssa as a part of his theory on matter as the totality of 
immaterial ideas.99 The understanding of the sensible substance in line with the Stoic tradition 
exactly implies that substance cannot be exhausted by qualities only, since after the removal of 
intelligible qualities there always remained a certain residue, the qualitiless substrate, which 
cannot be comprehended by the mind and expressed in speech. Thus, in our fragment of the 
Contra Eunomium as well as in other places of this treatise of Basil100 we may find the 
understanding of the material substance, based on the Stoic, and not Platonic philosophical 
tradition. 
This conclusion can be correlated to the fact that Basil, unlike Gregory, used the concept of 
“concurrence” (συνδρομή) as a philosophical terminus technicus exclusively when he discussed 
human individuals, but did not use it for inanimate material things. Yet, if in the Platonic 
tradition the concept of “concurrence” or “aggregation” of qualities was used indiscriminately in 
relation to human individuals or inanimate material objects, the Stoic philosophical tradition 
developed an understanding of the process of individuation through the concurrence of 
properties, applicable only to the human individuals. Thus, Basil’s use of the concept may also 
indicate the Stoic background. 
                                                 
93 GREG. NYS. Apol. in hex., PG 44, 69bc.  
94 Idem., De an. et res., PG 46, 124bd. 
95 Idem., De opif. hom. 24, PG 44, 212d–213b. 
96 A. ARMSTRONG, The Theory of the Non-Existence of Matter in Plotinos and the Cappadocians, “Studia 
Patristica” 5 (1962), p. 427.  
97 P. O’CLEIRIGH, Prime Matter in Origen’s World Picture, “Studia Patristica” 16 (1985), pp. 262-263. 
98 Orig. De Principiis 4, 7, 34, in ORIGÈNE, Traité des principes, vol. 3, eds. H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti, 
Sources Chrétiennes 268, Paris 1980, pp. 416-418. It follows from Basil’s use of Origen’s passage that while 
borrowing the ideas from the De Principiis, Basil polemicized with the notion of the uncreated matter.  
99 R. SORABJI, Gregory of Nyssa: The Origins of Idealism”, in Time, Creation and the Continuum. 
Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, London 1988, pp. 292-293. Richard Sorabji points to an 
Enneades of Plotinus (6, 3, 8) and to Simplicius’ paraphrase of Porphyry’s ideas in In Aristotelis physicorum 
libros commentaria (230, 34–231, 7) being the Platonic parallels to these ideas. In general, R. Sorabji correlated 
the doctrine of the Cappadocian Fathers with the idealist philosophical position of G. Berkeley. 
100 Cf. Eun., PG 29b, 540c, 541bc.  
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When Gregory of Nyssa addressed the topic of the concurrence of properties, unlike Basil 
he did not distinguish between the human individuals and inanimate objects quite in the spirit of 
the Platonic tradition. Gregory, being inclined to Platonism, might have not accept the ideas 
which Basil received from the physical and ontological tradition of the Stoic doctrine, including 
Basil’s emphasis on understanding the substance of the created beings as the material substrate. 
As D. Balas showed,101 when Gregory of Nyssa commented upon our fragment of Basil in his 
own Contra Eunomium, he emphasized the Platonic (with some reservations) understanding of 
the human nature as a generic substance common to all human beings and existing in the 
individuals, as opposed to Basil’s emphasis on the understanding of a single nature of people in 
terms of the common substrate. When Gregory cited Basil’s passage under discussion and 
reached the words, “now by 'substance' I mean the material substrate (οὐσίαν δὲ λέγω νῦν τὸ 
ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον),” he quoted the phrase in the way opposite to the original, “now by 
'substance' I mean not the material substrate (οὐσίαν δὲ λέγω νῦν οὐ τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον).”102 
D. Balas pays particular attention to this fact, assuming that Gregory corrected the passage which 
did not fit his views and the needs of his polemics with Eunomius. 
P. Kalligas did not take into account the background of Stoic physics in our passage of 
Basil and identified the philosophical background of the passage with the Platonic tradition.103 
This allowed him to speak of the extreme nominalist leanings of Basil, comparable to the 
nominalism of William of Ockham.104 We may agree that the discussed conceptual framework of 
Basil does seem nominalist in some respect, exactly in Ockham’s sense, that is, in the sense that 
for building it just like Ockham Basil needed to establish the hierarchy of genera and species. 
However, Basil’s emphasis on the physical realism, associated with his use of Stoic 
philosophical tradition makes it difficult to ascribe nominalism to Basil in some other more 
normative sense, when it is believed that general concepts do not correspond to the objects in 
reality.  
At this point we need to put together the main points of Basil’s polemical position in the 
passage under discussion. For doing that, we should take a closer look to the passage from the 
Apology of Eunomius, which Basil of Caesarea attempted to refute in the passage: 
                                                 
101 D. BALAS, The Unity of Human Nature, pp. 278-279. 
102 GREG. NYSS. Eun. III, 5, 22, 7–8 (Jaeger). 
103 P. KALLIGAS, Basil of Caesaria, pp. 46-47; the articles of L. Turcescu on the Letter 38 of Gregory of 
Nyssa show the same position, see L. TURCESCU, ’Person’ versus ‘Individual,’ and Other Modern Misreadings 
of Gregory of Nyssa, “Modern Theology”, 18 (2002), fasc. 4, p. 530; IDEM., The Concept of Divine Persons in 
Gregory of Nyssa’s to His Brothers Peter, on the Difference between Ousia and Hypostasis, “Greek Orthodox 
Theological Review” 42 (1997), fasc. 1-2, pp. 74-77. 
104 «…We are led to the conclusion that Basil, in his attempt to rebut Eunomius' naturalist theory of 
names, extended the ontological theory we find in Porphyry, but which has its roots in the sceptical Academy, 
towards an extreme nominalist position as concerns the semantics of proper names—a position which stood as 
the most complete and the most seductive such contribution to philosophical thought, at least until the time of 
William of Ockham» (P. KALLIGAS, Basil of Caesaria, p. 47).  
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ὅτι δὲ καὶ εἷς υἱὸς (μονογενὴς γάρ), ἐνῆν μὲν τὰς τῶν ἁγίων φωνὰς 
παραθεμένους δι’ ὧν υἱὸν καὶ γέννημα καὶ ποίημα καταγγέλλουσι (ταῖς τῶν 
ὀνομάτων διαφοραῖς καὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας παραλλαγὴν ἐμφαίνοντας) <…> 
γέννημα τοίνυν φαμὲν τὸν υἱὸν κατὰ τὴν τῶν γραφῶν διδασκαλίαν, οὐχ ἕτερον 
μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν νοοῦντες, ἕτερον δέ τι παρ’ αὐτὴν τὸ σημαινόμενον, ἀλλ’ 
αὐτὴν εἷναι τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἣν σημαίνει τοὔνομα, ἐπαληθευούσης τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῆς 
προσηγορίας 
 
As for showing that the Son too is one, being only-begotten, we could rid 
ourselves of all care and trouble in that regard simply by quoting the words of 
the saints in which they proclaim the Son to be both 'offspring' and 'thing 
made', since by distinguishing the names they show the difference in essence as 
well. <…> We call the Son 'offspring', therefore, in accordance with the 
teaching of the Scriptures105. We do not understand his essence to be one thing 
and the meaning of the word which designates it to be something else. Rather, 
we take it that his hypostasis is the very same as that which is signified by his 
name, granted that the designation applies properly to the essence106. 
 
We should recall that Eunomius put emphasis on the difference between God and Christ 
(the Son) in substance, deriving this, among other things, from the fact that their true names had 
different and oppositing meaning. The names, typical for God and the Son – “Unbegotten” 
(ἀγέννητος) and “the Begotten One” (γέννημα) – for Eunomius were not the names understood 
in the magical sense similarly to the Iamblichian names of the gods, as his position is often 
misunderstood.107 These names reflect the notions, most appropriate to God and the Son 
according to the true understanding of their natures, since God has no cause for his existence, 
while the Son does.108 
                                                 
105 Prov. 8:22; cf. 1 Cor. 1:24. 
106 Apol. XII, 1-4, 6-9, trans. by R. Vaggione, in EUNOMIUS, The Extant Works, pp. 46-48, slightly 
revised. Here the fragment of the Apology is cited in a lengthier form than it was cited by Basil is his treatise 
(Eun., PG 29b, 573), since Basil’s refutation is built on a wider text of Eunomius than the passage cited. 
107 J. Daniélou based his conclusions on this supposition when he tried to prove the influence of the 
Cratylus exegesis of the Iamblichian school on the theory of names of Eunomius (J. DANIÉLOU, Eunome l’arien 
et l’exégèse néoplatonicienne du Cratyle, “Revues des études grecques” 69 (1956), pp. 412-432). See the 
criticism of such an understanding in J. RIST, Basil’s ‘Neoplatonism’: Its Background and Nature, in Fedwick P. 
(ed.), Basil of Caesarea: Christian, Humanist, Ascetic, Toronto 1981, pp. 185-188; D. BIRIUKOV, The Strategies 
of Naming in Polemic between Eunomius and Basil of Caesarea in Context of Antic Philosophical Tradition, 
“Scrinium. Revue de patrologie, d’hagiographie critique et d’histoire ecclesiastique”, 4 (2008), p. 119. 
108 EUNOM. Apol. VIII, in EUNOMIUS, The Extant Works, p. 40. 
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The difference in the Eunomian understanding of the names of the Holy Trinity from the 
magical understanding which we may see, for example, in Origen and Iamblichus, is that the 
conclusion on the importance of the formal aspect of naming, that is, of name’s sound is derived 
from the principle of the natural relationship between names and things as opposed to 
conventional relationship. At the same time, the meaning of name do not play any significant 
role both for Origen and for Iamblichus as far as Iamblichus’ teaching on theurgy is 
concerned.109 This is reflected in the fact that both Origen and Iamblichus assumed the critical 
importance of some sacred language; they did not consider it necessary to understand the 
meaning of the words in this language. Thus, Origen emphasized the power of the Jewish names 
of God, denying any validity of the name if it is translated into another language,110 and 
Iamblichus insisted that the names of Eastern gods should be preferred.111 Eunomius, however, 
does not show such magical understanding of names. On the contrary, the crucial names for the 
Eunomian doctrine of the Father and the Son have unambiguous meaning: for example, the name 
“Unbegotten” contains the meaning, indicating the specific charactery of the divine existence as 
opposed to the created existence. The meaning is defined by the fact that Eunomius constructs 
the names on the basis of his understanding of the named entities; he extensively demonstrates 
on the basis of his pre-defined principles why the true name of God was “Unbegotten,” and the 
true name of the Son was “the Begotten One.” 
In the above passage, Eunomius uses the arguments “from names,” according to which the 
substance of Christ cannot diverge from “the signified” (τὸ σημαινόμενον) of his name (“The 
Begotten one”), corresponding to the result of the mental comphenension of his substance. As its 
premise, the Eunomian argument “from names” has the idea about the wise men who know the 
nature of things as well as the names which fit things and correspond to their nature. This 
concept was widespread in Antiquity and in the Hellenistic period112 and is reflected in the 
Bible113. T. Kopecek believes that this case shows the impact of Middle Platonic ideas on 
Eunomius, since this position is most clearly expressed in Albinus.114 Yet, in our view, the Stoic 
terminology used by Eunomius speaks rather about the impact of the Stoic conceptual 
                                                 
109 On Iamblichus in that respect, cf. G. SHAW, Theurgy and the Soul. The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus 
University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press 1995, p. 111. 
110 ORIGEN. C. Celsum 5, 12; 45, PG 11, 1249c, 1253.  
111 IAMBL. De myst. 7, 5. 
112 With regard to the belief in the wise establisher of names in Antiquity, see PLATO, Crat. 387d4-5; 
ALBINUS, Epit. 6, 10; AMMON. In De interpret. 1, 3, 34-40b. It is noteworthy that many authors of Antiquity 
advanced the view on names as having been established by God, without speaking about names’ correspondence 
to the named objects’ nature, but implying it, see CICERO. Tusc. disp. 25, 62, De rep. 3, 2; ORIG. C. Celsum 5, 
30; PHILO. Leg. Alleg. 2, 14-15. 
113 Gen. 2:20. 
114 ALBINUS. Epit. 6, 10-11; Th. KOPECEK, A History of Neo-Arianism, vol. 2, pp. 321, 329-332. 
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fremework. Thus, the concept of τὸ σημαινόμενον (the signified), used by Eunomius is identical 
to the notion of the λεκτόν, fundamental to the Stoic system. 
The introduction of this concept by the Stoics led to the deeper understanding of language 
and linguistic processes in comparison to Aristotle. In fact, Aristotle’s three-partite structure of 
language: the signifying (sounds) – the representation (thought) –  the object,115 thanks to the 
concept of “meaning” in the Stoics, was transformed into a four-partite structure: the signifying 
(sounds) – the signified (semantic objectivity, revealed in the word, or the lekton) – the 
representation (thought) – the object.116 The concept of the “signified” which for the Stoics was 
an intermediary between the word and the thing117 united the thought and the word, which were 
disconnected in Aristotle.118 This concept, in turn, became very suitable for the development of 
the possibility to select and to know the correct names of the things, the nature of which is 
known. It was popular in the Hellenistic era, but is found among the Stoics,119 and later, as we 
have seen, in Eunomius, exactly in relation to the notion of τὸ σημαινόμενον.120 These is the 
                                                 
115  ARIST. De interpet. 1, 3. 
116 See SEX. EMP. Adv. Math. 8, 11-12. In the passage Sextus mentions but does not specifically elaborate 
upon the third member of the structure, that is, the thought. Specifically on the “signified,” cf.: «signification is 
the actual state of affairs revealed by an utterance, and which we apprehend as it subsists in accordance with our 
thought, whereas it is not understood by those whose language is different although they hear the utterance 
(σημαινόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῆς δηλούμενον καὶ οὗ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ 
παρυφισταμένου διανοίᾳ, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι οὐκ ἐπαΐουσι καίπερ τῆς φωνῆς ἀκούοντες)» (Ibid. = Stoicorum 
Veterum Fragmenta, vol. II, fr. 166 = LS 33B, in A. LONG, D. SEDLEY, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 2, pp. 
195-196). This means that “the signified” differs from the thought in that the thought is not a reality belonging to 
the language, whereas “the signified” belongs both to the reality of thought and to the reality of language (cf.: 
«…whereas it is not understood by those whose language is different although they hear the utterance»).  
117 Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. II, fr. 168. 
118 The doctrine of Aristotle entailed the isomorphism not between the word and the thought, but between 
the thing and the thought (A. LLOYD, Grammar and Metaphysics, p. 65). 
119 See the comments of Long and Sedley on the fragment of DIOG. LAERT. 7, 83 (LS 31C): A. LONG, D. 
SEDLEY, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 2, pp. 187-188, as well as the article A. LONG, Stoic Linguistics, 
Plato’s Cratylus, and Augustine’s De dialectica, in D. Frede, B. Inwood (eds.), Language and Learning. 
Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age, Toronto 2005, pp. 36-55. 
120 The fact that Eunomius understood language in terms of the fourfold paradigm which included the 
notion of “meaning,” is revealed in the following passage of the Apology: « …we need not try to conform 
meanings to names exactly or try to distinguish those of differing expressions, but must rather direct our 
attention to the concepts inherent in the underlying objects and accommodate the name accordingly (for the 
natures of objects are not naturally consequent on the verbal expressions: rather, the force of the names is 
accommodated to the objects in accordance with their proper status (μήτε πάντη τοῖς ὀνόμασι συνεξομοιοῦν 
πειρᾶσθαι τὰς σημασίας, μήτε μὴν παραλλάττειν παρηλλαγμένων, ταῖς δὲ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐννοίαις 
προσέχοντας ἀκολούθως ἐφαρμόττειν τὰς προσηγορίας (ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ταῖς φωναῖς πέφυκεν ἀκολουθεῖν τῶν 
πραγμάτων ἡ φύσις, τοῖς δὲ πράγμασιν ἐφαρμόζεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων δύναμις)» (Apol. XVIII, 
4-9, in EUNOMIUS, The Extant Works, pp. 54-57). The importance of the concept of “meaning” for Eunomius is 
also revealed in the passage from the Eun. of Gregory of Nyssa, which is dedicated to the refutation of the 
Eunomius’ attempts to refute the passage of Basil discussed in this study: « <…> I do not like to insert in my 
own work the nauseous stuff our rhetorician utters, or to display his ignorance and folly to contempt in the midst 
of my own arguments. He goes on with a sort of eulogy upon the class of significant words which express the 
subject (οὐ γάρ μοι φίλον τοῖς ἐμοῖς παρεντιθέναι πόνοις τὴν ναυτιώδη φλυαρίαν τοῦ ῥήτορος καὶ τὸ ἀμαθὲς 
αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀνόητον διὰ μέσου τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων ἐνστηλιτεύεσθαι. ἔπαινον γάρ τινα διεξέρχεται λόγων τῶν 
σημαντικῶν τὸ ὑποκείμενον φανερούντων) <…>» (3, 5, 23, 4 – 24, 2: 168 (Jaeger)). Notably, the fact that 
Eunomius did not identify the linguistic reality with the ontological reality (the tendency of which is embedded 
in the “magical” understanding of language), follows from his words, «God, whether these sounds are silent, 
sounding, or have even come into existence, and before anything was created, both was and is unbegotten (ὁ 
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historical and philosophical background of the teaching of Eunomius on the mandatory 
relationship between the name and the substance of the Son121. 
Accordingly, in the passage under discussion Basil refuted Eunomius’ approach to naming 
which required the establishment of a rigid connection between the name, the meaning, the 
thought, and the object, and shifted from Eunomian line of argumentation, involving the use of 
the appellative name, that is, referring the reader to a particular predefined meaning (“The 
Unbegotten,” “The Begotten One”), to the realm of the proper nouns (“Peter,” “Paul”) – the 
lexical items, by definition not allowing for the use of the concept of the predefined meaning. 
Avoiding the concept of “meaning,” Basil actively used the terminology that refered the reader 
to mental processes. 
Now we can summarize our argument. For refuting the position, presented in the Apology 
of Eunomius, Basil shifted the scope from the realm of theology to the realm of the material 
world. For doing that he used the conceptual framework of the Stoic physics, accepting the 
notion of the human substance as general material substrate, formed by the qualities, but not 
exhaused by them, as oppoesd to the understanding of the material nature in the Platonic 
framework, used by Basil in his other works. Basil needed it for putting emphasis on the fact that 
substance as such, both created and uncreated, was unknowable and could not be expressed in 
speech, while only qualities (properties) could be known and expressed. Following one of the 
aspects of the Stoic doctrine or Alexandrian grammarians who developed this topic, as well as 
the passage from Origen’s De oratione, Basil highlighted and developed the point that names 
corresponded not to substances as Eunomius claimed, but to the qualities. 
We should note that when Basil says that qualities correspond to the proper names, while 
the substance common for all humans is the material substrate, he uses the elements of the Stoic 
doctrine only as a tool for illustrating his own position. When Basil resorted to Stoic conceptual 
tools, he did not adopt the Stoic system in its entirety, since it was common for the Stoic doctrine 
not only to perceive substance as qualitiless general substrate, but also to have the notion of a 
singular substance which is a “part” of the underlying substrate.122 The use of the Stoic concept 
of singular substances which are individualized by specific quality accessible for knowledge, 
would have rather been in favor of the position of Eunomius. Thus in the fragment under 
discussion Basil focuses on substance as qualitiless substrate and on an individual as described 
                                                                                                                                                             
θεός, καὶ σιωπώντων καὶ φθεγγομένων καὶ γεγενημένων καὶ πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι τὰ ὄντα, ἦν τε καὶ ἔστιν 
ἀγέννητος)» (Apol. VIII, 5-7, in EUNOMIUS, The Extant Works, pp. 42-43).  
121 In general see: BIRIUKOV, The Strategies of Naming.  
122 On “substance,” understood by the Stoics as a singular substance, see PHILO. De aeternitate mundi 48-
49 (=Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. II, fr. 397). On the singular substance as a part of substance-prime 
matter among the Stoics, see Ibid., vol. I, fr. 87 = Ibid., vol. II, fr. 316). 
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by the aggregation of qualities, but does not mention considering human individuals as singular 
substances. 
While for proving the unequivocal correspondence of name and substance Eunomius used 
the fourfold division of the language, going back to the Stoics, the position of Basil in terms of 
the understanding the language can be described as close to the Aristotelian. Indeed, there is 
nothing in his argument that would indicate the concept of “meaning”; it involved the three-part 
structure: the word (the name) – the representation (the thought) – the object, typical for the 
Aristotelian position. To avoid the possibility of the unequivocal indication of the individual, 
which would be the evidence in favor of the Eunomian argument, Basil had to abandon the Stoic 
notion of a special substantial quality of a human being, typical for Origen (whom Basil used in 
support of his argument), as well as Origen’s idea, consistent with the philosophical position of 
the Stoics, that the change in a specific quality of the Apostles and other Biblical characters 
would entail the change of their names.123 Thus, probably for avoiding this thorny issue, Basil 
did not mention the fact of changing Apostle Paul’s name. 
The rejection of the Stoic notion of the particular quality entailed the disregard for the very 
division of qualities into the general and the particular, and in linguistic terms the disregard for 
the distinction between the ὄνομα and the προσηγορία, which corresponded to these types of 
qualities according to the Stoics.124 Instead, in the process of individualizing a person Basil lists 
a number of different qualities and unlike the Stoics does not distinguish between them 
according to types, bringing them into unity through the principle of concurrence (συνδρομή) of 
properties, borrowed from the Stoic-Platonic framework, that is, through the listing the qualities. 
The notion of χαρακτήρ played the role of the “particular quality” in Basil. That notion, on the 
one hand, had psychological connotations: it pointed to a set of representations concerning 
human individuals – Apostles Peter and Paul (in this case, an echo of ancient philosophical 
tradition); on the other hand this concept pointed to the individuality of each person and to the 
specific character of his life, which later becomes a hotly debated topic in Byzantium in the 
polemics between the Iconophiles and the Iconoclasts. 
                                                 
123 See above, ORIG. De or. 24, PG 11, 492bc. 
124 We would like to draw attention to a strange phrase of Basil in our fragment, «<…> the designations 
(προσηγορίαι) of Peter and Paul and of all people in general are different …». There are many more people than 
their names, and the difficulties caused by homonymy (that is, in this case by the same names of people) troubled 
the minds of philosophers already in the time of Democritus (see E. HEITSCH, Die Entdeckung der Homonymie, 
Mainz, Wiesbaden 1972). Later the problems of homonymy were dealt with in the Greek textbooks on grammar, 
and Basil had to be aware of this. In the view of the subsequent phrase, «… the designations (αἱ προσηγορίαι) do 
not signify the substances, but rather the distinctive features that characterize the individual», it could mean that 
Basil was referring to the fact that the sets of properties, but not the names (ὄνομα), were different for each 
person, and these sets were specified by the concept of προσηγορία. However, if we look at Basil’s use of terms 
in the entire passage, we may see that he used ὄνομα and προσηγορία synonymously.  
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The qualities, listed by Basil, included both general and relative properties as well as those 
properties which uniquely placed the person within the sequence of the events of his life.125 The 
passage of Contra Eunomium by Basil of Caesarea is the richest among the cited fragments of 
various ancient authors, which describe an individual human through the concurrence of 
properties. In addition to the general properties and the properties of relationships, according to 
Basil, a person was defined through the full range of what “happened” to him, that is, through his 
personal history.126 
 
 
5.3. The discussion on application of the principle “greater-lesser” to essence, and 
problem of universals 
 
In the first book of “Contra Enomium” Gregory of Nyssa adduces the following extensive 
quote from Eunomius’ “Apology for the Apology”. 
 
The whole account of our doctrines is summed up thus; there is the Supreme 
and Absolute Being, and another Being existing by reason of the First, but after It 
though before all others; and a third Being not ranking with either of these, but 
inferior to the one, as to its cause, to the other, as to the energy which produced it: 
there must of course be included in this account the energies that follow each 
Being, and the names germane to these energies. Again, as each Being is 
absolutely single, and is in fact and thought one, and its energies are bounded by 
its works, and its works commensurate with its energies, necessarily, of course, 
                                                 
125 The fact that Basil also presented a human individual by means of general properties, points to the 
problems with the argument of Ch. Yannaras who on the basis of the Cappadocian Fathers developed an 
understanding of “personhood” which he correlated with hypostasis as that which was opposed to commonness 
and universality, typical for the notion of “substance.” Consequently, according to Yannaras, “personality” or 
“person” is that which cannot be described by any general qualities which the person possesses (Ch. YANNARAS, 
Person und Eros. Eine Gegenüberstellung der Ontologie der griechischen Kirchenväter und der 
Existenzphilosophie des Westens, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht in Göttingen 1982, Ss. 24-26). 
126 Interestingly, this approach of Basil was carried on by the last Iconoclastic Patriarch John the 
Grammarian (837–843) who challenged the epistemological position of the Iconophiles on the basis of 
contextual and narrative identification of name’s denotation. In one of the three surviving fragments, Patriarch 
John relied upon our passage of Basil). The fragment of Patriarch John the Grammarian runs as follows: “It is 
impossible to characterise a concrete man by a concept unless with an explanation through words, by means of 
which one can comprehend and define each being. For the proper accidents of a concrete being by which it has 
been separated from those belonging to the same species and, in another manner, by which it is communicated to 
those [who belong to different species], do not contribute in any manner and in any aspect to the perception of 
sight. For one cannot derive one’s race or mark one’s country, the certain kind of profession one spends time on, 
the sort of company one keeps, and the rest of the forms of conduct are not known except by means of words, 
whereas it is impossible to truly distinguish a certain individual by means of some images” (trans. By Vladimir 
Baranov in IDEM., Amphilochia 231 of Patriarch Photius as a Possible Source on the Christology of the 
Byzantine Iconoclasts, “Studia Patristica”, 68 (2013), p. 376, see the Greek text in J. GOUILLARD, Fragments 
inédits d’un antirrétique de Jean le Grammarien, “Revue des études byzantines”, 24 (1966), pp. 173-174).  
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the energies which follow these Beings are relatively greater and less, some being 
of a higher, some of a lower order; in a word, their difference amounts to that 
existing between their works: it would in fact not be lawful to say that the same 
energy produced the angels or stars, and the heavens or man: but a pious mind 
would conclude that in proportion as some works are superior to and more 
honourable than others, so does one energy transcend another, because sameness 
of energy produces sameness of work, and difference of work indicates difference 
of energy. These things being so, and maintaining an unbroken connexion in their 
relation to each other, it seems fitting for those who make their investigation 
according to the order germane to the subject, and who do not insist on mixing 
and confusing all together, in case of a discussion being raised about Being, to 
prove what is in course of demonstration, and to settle the points in debate, by the 
primary energies and those attached to the Beings, and again to explain by the 
Beings when the energies are in question, yet still to consider the passage from 
the first to the second the more suitable and in all respects the more efficacious of 
the two127. 
 
M. Barnes128 finds the closest match between the triadic structure of Eunomius’ teaching 
represented in the quotation above and the text of the seventh book of "Preparation for the 
Gospel" written by Eusebius of Caesarea, who also speaks about taxonomy of the three essences, 
the first of which is unbegotten.129 However, Eusebius says nothing about the simplicity of each 
                                                 
127 GREG. NYSS. Eun. I, 1, 151-154 (Jeager), transl. in GREGORY OF NYSSA, Against Eunomius, Translated 
by W. Moore, H.A. Wilson and H.C. Ogle, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 5, edited by 
Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co 1893. Πᾶς ὁ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς 
δογμάτων συμπληροῦται λόγος ἔκ τε τῆς ἀνωτάτω καὶ κυριωτάτης οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τῆς δι' ἐκείνην μὲν οὔσης μετ' 
ἐκείνην δὲ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων πρωτευούσης καὶ τρίτης γε τῆς μηδεμιᾷ μὲν τούτων συνταττομένης, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν 
διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν, τῇ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καθ' ἣν γέγονεν ὑποταττομένης, συμπεριλαμβανομένων δηλαδὴ πρὸς τὴν 
τοῦ παντὸς λόγου συμπλήρωσιν καὶ τῶν ταῖς οὐσίαις παρεπομένων ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῶν ταύταις προσφυῶν 
ὀνομάτων. πάλιν δ' αὖ ἑκάστης τούτων οὐσίας εἰλικρινῶς ἁπλῆς καὶ πάντη μιᾶς οὔσης τε καὶ νοουμένης κατὰ 
τὴν ἰδίαν ἀξίαν, συμπεριγραφομένων δὲ τοῖς ἔργοις τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, καὶ τῶν ἔργων ταῖς τῶν ἐργασαμένων 
ἐνεργείαις παραμετρουμένων, ἀνάγκη δήπου πᾶσα καὶ τὰς ἑκάστῃ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἑπομένας ἐνεργείας ἐλάττους τε 
καὶ μείζους εἶναι, καὶ τὰς μὲν πρώτην τὰς δὲ δευτέραν ἐπέχειν τάξιν, συνόλως τε εἰπεῖν πρὸς τοσαύτην 
ἐξικνεῖσθαι διαφοράν, πρὸς ὁπόσην ἂν ἐξικνῆται τὰ ἔργα· ἐπεὶ μηδὲ θεμιτὸν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐνέργειαν εἰπεῖν καθ' ἣν 
τοὺς ἀγγέλους ἐποίησεν ἢ τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἢ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ' ὅσῳ τὰ ἔργα τῶν ἔργων 
πρεσβύτερα καὶ τιμιώτερα, τοσούτῳ καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς ἐνεργείας ἀναβεβηκέναι φαίη ἄν τις εὐσεβῶς 
διανοούμενος, ἅτε δὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὴν ταὐτότητα τῶν ἔργων ἀποτελουσῶν, καὶ τῶν παρηλλαγμένων 
ἔργων παρηλλαγμένας τὰς ἐνεργείας ἐμφαινόντων. οὕτω δὲ τούτων ἐχόντων  καὶ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσει τὸν 
εἱρμὸν ἀπαράβατον διατηρούντων, προσήκει δήπου τοὺς κατὰ τὴν συμφυῆ τοῖς πράγμασι τάξιν τὴν ἐξέτασιν 
ποιουμένους καὶ μὴ φύρειν ὁμοῦ πάντα καὶ συγχεῖν βιαζομένους, εἰ μὲν περὶ ταῖς οὐσίαις κινοῖτό τις 
ἀμφισβήτησις, ἐκ τῶν πρώτων καὶ προσεχῶν ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐνεργειῶν ποιεῖσθαι τῶν δεικνυμένων τὴν πίστιν καὶ 
τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων τὴν διάλυσιν, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ἀμφιβολίαν διαλύειν ἐκ τῶν οὐσιῶν, 
ἁρμοδιωτέραν γε μὴν καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἀνυσιμωτέραν ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἐπὶ τὰ δεύτερα κάθοδον. 
128 M. BARNES, The Background and Use of Eunomius’ Causal Language, in Arianism after Arius. Essays 
on the Development of the Fourth Century Trinitarian Conflict, Edinburgh 1993, pp. 220-221. 
129 EUS. Praep. VII, 12; 15. 
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member of the triad, nor touches upon the principle "greater-lesser" which is of a big importance 
for the neo-arian controversy. Apparently, this is what constitutes the specificity of Eunomius’ 
teaching. 
 
5.3. The principle “greater-lesser” in Eunomius 
 
When Gregory further discusses certain points of the passage given above, he instead of 
Eunomius’ words: “... It is necessary that activities following each of the essences were some 
lesser, but the others greater” (ἀνάγκη δήπου πᾶσα καὶ τὰς ἑκάστῃ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἑπομένας 
ἐνεργείας ἐλάττους τε καὶ μείζους εἶναι), adduces the words: “it is of necessity to believe as if 
the essence of some is less, and others is more (ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐλάττους τε καὶ μείζους τὰς οὐσίας 
οἴεσθαι δεῖν εἶναι)». 130 That is to say, Gregory of Nyssa, first used Eunomius’s text about 
“greater and lesser” energies where Eunomius expresses the principle put forward by him 
already in the first “Apology”, according to which the nature of things is determined through its 
activities (see above), but then treats the words of Eunomius as if the latter teaches about 
applicability of the principle “greater-lesser” to essence. Perhaps it might be explained by the 
fact that Gregory of Nyssa, on his own admission,131 was writing his refutation in a hurry, 
because eunomians did not distribute their books broadly, and he was able to keep a copy of 
“Apology for the Apology” only for a short while.  
Basil of Caesarea also by implication witnesses in favor of the argument that the doctrine 
of Eunomius did not actually imply an idea of applying greater-lesser principle to essence, in the 
way how Gregory treats it when he criticizes Eunomius. 
While refuting the propositions of the “Apology” in his treatise “Against Eunomius” Basil 
understands Eunomius’s interpretation of John. 14:28 in such a way, so that Eunomius insists 
that the result of the activities is always less than the subject of the activities (and, therefore, the 
essence of the Son according to Eunomius is not the same as the essence of the Father).132 At the 
same time Basil writes: “Of course according to your wisdom [i.e. according to Eunomius. – D. 
B.] it is not possible to say that one essence is more or less than the other. Therefore, according 
to them and truth as well the considered word “more” does not show any superiority in terms of 
essence”.133 Consequently, Basil also does not admit that Eunomius applied the principle greater-
lesser to the category of essence.  
                                                 
130 GREG. NYSS. Eun. I, 1, 317; I, 1, 282 and 321.   
131 См.: Ep. 19. 
132 BAS. Eun., PG 29, 565-566. 
133 IDEM. Eun., PG 29, 568 (Ὅλως δὲ οὐσία οὐσίας, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὑμετέραν σοφίαν, μείζων καὶ ἐλάττων 
οὐ λέγεται. Ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τούτους, καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὐδενὶ ἂν τρόπῳ τὴν κατ' οὐσίαν ὑπεροχὴν ὁ 
προκείμενος λόγος τοῦ μείζονος ἐμφαίνοι) 
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Then what does really Eunomius say in “Apology” and in “Apology for the Apology”? He 
speaks about superiority (ὑπεροχή) and preeminence of essence of the Father to the Son (and the 
Spirit).134 Most likely it was this concept which served for Gregory as a source to attribute to 
Eunomius the applicability of the principle “greater-lesser” to the category of essence. 
In this regard, Gregory proceeds from the position expressed in Aristotle’s “The 
Categories”, according to which nature does not allow for a greater or lesser degree. Indeed, 
Aristotle mentions this in “The Categories” 2b, 26-27 and then in 3b 33ff he explains what he 
has in mind, namely that it is not possible to speak about the first essence (individual) as 
pertaining in a greater or lesser degree to the second essence (its species) than the other first 
essence (another individual) pertains to it or than it itself pertains at some different time. 135 
Based on this proposition of “The Categories”, Gregory, on the one hand accuses Eunomius in 
ignorance of the basics of dialectic and thus false premises in theology, and on the other hand he 
develops his own philosophy in respect of the principle “greater-lesser” (to be discussed in 
details later). 
Researchers do not tend to notice an outlined by me inconsistency between the words of 
Eunomius in the quotation from “Contra Eunomium” I, 1, 151-154, adduced by Gregory of 
Nyssa, and the way how Gregory understands Eunomius’ position in his treatise subsequently.136 
David Balas even argues for inconsistency of Eunomius, in what he on the one hand insists on 
simplicity of each of them, and on the other hand applies the principle of “greater-lesser” to the 
three essences of the highest triad, that in turn implies complexity and state of compound.137  In 
this case Balas takes after Gregory of Nyssa in his understanding of Eunomius, who criticized 
Eunomios, and treated him in the spirit of Plotinian doctrine.138 
                                                 
134 EUNOM. Apol. X, 3 Concerning the “Apology of the Apology” see above given quote from GREG. 
NYS. Eun. 1, 1, 151, 4. Eunomius’ approach, involving a taxonomy of beings can be associated with an approach 
of the disciple of Iamblichus Dexippus. Dexippus in his commentary on “The Categories” of Aristotle, 
endeavors to challenge the critique offered by Plotinus to the aristotelian "Categories," and uses for these 
purposes the appropriate places from “On Aristotle's Categories” by Porphyry and “Comments on the 
categories” by Iamblichus. On this basis, contrary to Plotinus’ accent on the principle of a greater reality of 
intelligible entities and the illusory nature of the material ones, he argues for the descending taxonomy of 
essences, asserting that the principle of the essence pervades all ranks of reality, from the intelligible to the 
sensible level, from the supreme being downwards in descending order (DEX. In Cat. 40, 25 - 41, 3). 
135 ARIST. Cat. 3b33-4a9. 
136 See the papers D. BALÁS, ΜΕΤΟΥΣΙΑ ΘΕΟΥ. Man’s Participation in God’s Perfections according to 
St. Gregory of Nyssa, Rome, 1966, pp. 55, 57, 125, 130; A. MEREDITH, The Divine Simplicity. Eun., 1.223-241, 
in “Eun. I” en la produccion literaria de Gregorio de Nisa, Pamplona 1988, pp. 345-346; J. ZACHHUBER, 
Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa, pp. 94-98, where the point that Eunomius applied the principle more-less to 
essence is taken for granted.  
137 D. BALAS, ΜΕΤΟΥΣΙΑ ΘΕΟΥ, p. 125, n. 31. 
138 Apparently, it comes from the argument of Gregory. According to this reasoning, simplicity implies 
incomplexity, i.e. the lack of distinction between the subject and the predicate which partakes to the subject. The 
quantity which is implied where there is something more and something less, suggests this distinction, and 
accordingly, quantity is incompatible with simplicity. God's nature is simple and good, and since it is simple, His 
goodness is not quantitative, that is, it cannot increase or decrease, which means that the nature of God is 
unlimited. According to Gregory of Nyssa, when Eunomius introduces a taxonomy in his triad of essences, he 
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5.4. The principle greater-lesser: the themes of participation and universals 
 
As was stated above, there is no trustworthy proofs that Eunomius applied the principle 
greater-lesser to the category of essence. However, there can be stated that Gregory of Nyssa in 
the first book of “Contra Eunomium” led a polemic with Eunomius taking for granted that 
Eunomius did this.  
Gregory following commonly known propositions of Aristotle’s “The Categories”, adopted 
most likely from Porphyry’s “Isagoge”139 insists that the principle greater-lesser should not be 
applied to essence but to quality.  
 
Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ σοφὸς εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα βούλεται καὶ διαπτύει τοὺς ἄνευ 
λογικῆς ἐντρεχείας ἐπιχειροῦντας τῷ γράφειν, εἰπάτω τοῖς καταφρονουμένοις 
ἡμῖν, ἐκ ποίας σοφίας τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον τῆς οὐσίας ἐγνώρισε. τις <ὁ> 
λόγος ὁ τὴν τοιαύτην διαφορὰν παραστήσας, ὅτι οὐσία τις ἑτέρας οὐσίας 
μᾶλλον ἔστι; κατ' αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ σημαινόμενον τῆς οὐσίας· μὴ γὰρ δὴ 
προφερέτω τὰς τῶν ποιοτήτων ἢ τὰς τῶν ἰδιωμάτων διαφοράς, ὅσαι περὶ τὴν 
οὐσίαν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἐπινοίας καταλαμβάνονται, ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον 
οὖσαι 
 
What sort of skill he has detected a greater and a less in essence? What is 
his method for establishing that one essence is more of an essence than another 
essence,—taking essence in its plainest meaning, for he must not bring forward 
                                                                                                                                                             
makes the essence of the Son not simple, but with a touch of complexity, and the essence of the Spirit in this 
case is even more complex. The concept of Eunomius being understood in such a way resembles the approach of 
Plotinus, under which the simplicity is inherent only in the highest cause, which is at the top of the ontological 
hierarchy. However the descent of the ontological order involves an increasing complexity and multiplicity. It is 
Plato who says that only the One is truly simple, while the Mind being as it is, i.e. the one who thinks can be 
defined through multiplicity and complexity. See Enn. 5, 3 (esp. 11–13) and D. O’MEARA, Plotinus: An 
Introduction to the Enneads, Oxford 2005, pp. 43–49. 
139 I believe that this can be testified by the fact how Gregory actively used “Isagoge” in his writings, 
what is clear from my arguments given in the chapter 7, “Synthesis of Biblical and Logical-Philosophical 
Descriptions of the Order of Natural Beings in De opificio hominis 8 by Gregory of Nyssa”, of this dissertation. 
At the same time the way how Gregory uses certain propositions typical for the representation of “The 
Categories” in “Isagoge” also supports the given hunch. Such is the combination of the discourse of participation 
of individuals to species and the concept “more-less” used by Gregory, what will be discussed in depth later.  As 
has been mentioned earlier this combination of concepts can be found in Porphyry’ "Isagoge" (см.: Isagoge 10: 
17.3-13 (Busse)) but not in Aristotle.  
  
84
those various qualities and properties, which are comprehended in the 
conception of the essence, and gather round it, but are not the subject itself? 140 
 
Gregory elaborates this topic as talking about the relation between individual and species as well 
using the language of participation. In this case Gregory takes over Basil the Great141 and uses 
the discourse of “logos of essence” (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας), which was first introduced by Aristotle 
and then adopted by his commentators and especially Porphyry.142 Each entity has its own 
unchanged logos of essence, which cannot be increased or decreased, and thus it is not possible 
to participate to the second essence in a greater or lesser degree. Gregory deals with this in the 
fifteenth chapter of the first book of “Contra Eunomium”: 
 
What disadvantage, on the score of being, as compared with Abraham, 
had David who lived fourteen generations after? Was any change, so far as 
humanity goes, effected in the latter? Was he less a human being, because he 
was later in time? Who would be so foolish as to assert this? The logos of their 
essences (τῆς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος) is the same for both: the lapse of time does not 
change it. No one would assert that the one was more a man for being first in 
time, and the other less participates in the [human] nature (μετέχειν τῆς 
φύσεως) because he sojourned in life later; as if humanity had been exhausted 
on the first, or as if time had spent its chief power upon the deceased. For it is 
not in the power of time to define for each one the measures of nature, but 
nature abides self-contained, preserving herself through succeeding 
generations: and time has a course of its own, whether surrounding, or flowing 
by, this nature, which remains firm and motionless within her own limits143. 
 
Here in a polemic manner related to the discussion on greater-lesser theme, Gregory 
exemplifies the Aristotelian paradigm of participation, according to which the participation 
reflects the relation between individuals and the nature (species), which they carry. This implies 
the existence of human nature as the universal-in-things, i.e. in the human individual. Gregory 
says that this universal, i.e. human nature, is present in the same way in humanity through the 
time, although individuals belonging to this nature, are born and die in the course of the time.  
                                                 
140 Eun. I, 180, 1 – 182, 1 (Jaeger), transl. in transl. in GREGORY OF NYSSA, Against Eunomius.  
141 См.: BAS. CAES, Eun., PG 29, 556, 14-27. 
142 For the discussion on Porphyry’s use of this discourse, and a list of appropriate citations see: J. 
ANTON, Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle’s Doctrine of Homonyma, “Journal of the History of Philosophy”, 
VII/1 (1969), pp. 3–6.  
143 GR. NYSS., Eun. I, 1, 173, 2 - 175, 1 (Jaeger), transl. in GREGORY OF NYSSA, Against Eunomius. 
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The combination of theme of participation to the general nature (essence) with the theme 
of "greater-lesser" refers to Porphyry’s “Isagoge”.144 But the argument about inapplicability of 
the principle “greater-lesser” to the general nature, related to the topic of time, recalls how 
Aristotle in “The Categories” was talking about the impossibility of the application of this 
principle to the category of essence, who at the same context deals with the problem of time.145  
It is worth nothing that while talking about possible application of the principle greater-
lesser to essence, Gregory slightly changes the thesis. Namely, in the case of three supreme 
essences (The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit) in the teaching of Eunomius, it is not 
appropriate to talk about the first and the second essence (individual and species), what is taken 
for granted in the Aristotelian thought, because he restricts the application of the principle 
greater-lesser to essence, which Gregory of Nyssa uses here. Eunomius clearly states in the 
adduced quote (Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium 1, 1, 151-154), the Father, the Son and the 
Spirit are the essences which are simple and unique in a way, and this determines that the 
discourse of genus-individual cannot be applied here. 
Further in the first book of Contra Eunomium Gregory elaborates his theory of the 
hierarchy of beings and uses the theme of “greater–lesser” and the conceptual framework of 
“greater–lesser” participation in a significantly modified way compared to how this topic was 
treated in Porphyry and Aristotle. Gregory introduces the pronounced Platonic context in the 
subject and writes the following in chapter 22 of the first book: 
 
Now the ultimate division of all being is into the Intelligible and the 
Sensible (τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν). <…> Reason again divides [the 
Intelligible] into the uncreate and the created, inferentially comprehending it: 
the uncreate being that which effects the Creation, the created that which owes 
its origin and its force (τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ εἶναι) to the uncreate. In the Sensible 
world, then, is found everything that we comprehend by our organs of bodily 
sense, and in which the differences of qualities (αἱ τῶν ποιοτήτων διαφοραὶ) 
involve the idea of more and less, such differences consisting in quantity, 
quality, and the other properties. But in the Intelligible world—that part of it, I 
mean, which is created, — the idea of such differences as are perceived in the 
Sensible cannot find a place: another method (τρόπος), then, is devised for 
discovering the degrees of greater and less. The fountain, the origin, the supply 
of every good is regarded as being in the world that is Uncreate Nature (τῇ 
                                                 
144 Isagoge X, 17.3–13, see above.  
145 Cat. 3b33–4a9, see above.  
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ἀκτίστῳ φύσει), and the whole creation inclines to that, and touches and shares 
(ἐφαπτομένη καὶ μετέχουσα) the Highest Nature (τῆς ὑψηλῆς φύσεως) by 
virtue of its part (τῆς κοινωνίας) in the First Good: therefore it follows from 
this participation in the highest blessings varying in degree according to the 
amount of freedom in the will that each possesses, that the greater and less in 
this creation is disclosed according to the proportion of this tendency in each. 
Created intelligible nature stands on the borderline between good and the 
reverse, so as to be capable of either, and to incline at pleasure to the things of 
its choice, as we learn from Scripture; so that we can say of it that it is more or 
less in the heights of excellence only in proportion to its removal from the evil 
and its approach to the good. Whereas uncreate [intelligible] nature (ἡ ἄκτιστος 
φύσις) is far removed from such distinctions (διαφορᾶς): it does not possess the 
good by acquisition, or participate (οὐδὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν) only in the goodness of 
some good which lies above it: by essence (τῇ φύσει) it is good, and is 
conceived as such: it is a source of good, it is simple, uniform, incomposite  
<…>. But it has distinction within itself in keeping with the majesty of its own 
nature, but not conceived of with regard to quantity, as Eunomius supposes: 
(indeed the man who introduces the notion of less of good into any of the 
things believed to be in the Holy Trinity must admit thereby some admixture of 
the opposite quality in that which fails of the good: and it is blasphemous to 
imagine this in the case either of the Only-begotten, or of the Holy Spirit): we 
regard it [i.e. the uncreate nature. – D. B.] as consummately perfect and 
incomprehensibly excellent yet as containing clear distinctions within itself 
which reside in the peculiarities of each of the Persons: as possessing 
invariableness by virtue of its common attribute of uncreatedness, but 
differentiated by the unique character of each Person146.  
 
In the passage Gregory shows how the principle of “greater–lesser” can be applicable to all 
realms of reality, including the uncreated reality. Gregory speaks about the division of beings 
into classes, discussing division in greater detail in his other writings.147 In our passage Gregory 
distinguishes between intellectual and sensible natures (this distinction points to Platonic 
intuitions), and between uncreated and created beings belonging to intellectual nature (this point 
                                                 
146 GR. NYSS., Eun. I, 1, 270, 1-277, 13 (Jaeger), transl. in GREGORY OF NYSSA, Against Eunomius. Cf. 
GR. NAZ., or. 23, 11: PG 35, 1164A-B. 
147 GR. NYSS. De hom. op. VIII, PG 44, 144C–148C; De an. et res.: PG 46, 57D–60D. See chapter 7, 
“Synthesis of Biblical and Logical-Philosophical Descriptions of the Order of Natural Beings in De opificio 
hominis 8 by Gregory of Nyssa” of the thesis. 
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reveals the fundamental differences of Gregory and Platonism). In his discussion of what 
belongs to the sensible realm, Gregory states that “greater–lesser” is applicable to qualities and 
uses the Aristotelian discourse. Moving on to the created intellectual nature (referring to the 
angelic powers and intellect as a part of the human being), Gregory points out that in this case, 
“greater” and “lesser” can be applied not to the degree of the presence of qualities, but only used 
in terms of greater or lesser aspiration to the highest good depending on the disposition of will 
and consequently to greater or lesser participation in the divine substance. We may see here the 
presence of the Platonic discourse of participation combined with reference to 2 Pet. 1: 3–4. 
According to Gregory, the notion of “greater” or “lesser” degree of participation cannot be 
applied to uncreated nature since uncreated nature is perfect. This conclusion of Gregory can be 
associated with his position articulated in the same Contra Eunomium that the divine nature has 
its logos of substance,148 and that the Aristotelian concept did not imply qualifications of 
“greater” or “lesser.” 
In the passage Gregory links the topic of “greater–lesser” with the Platonic dichotomy 
according to participation / according to nature: the principle of “greater–lesser” cannot be 
applied to uncreated nature because the uncreated possesses all good things according to nature 
and not according to participation, which is the way to appropriate good things for the beings 
belonging to the created realm. Thus, according to Gregory, the principle of “greater–lesser” is 
applicable only to the realm of beings which exist according to participation.  
In his study on participation in Gregory of Nyssa, David Balas analyzed the same fragment 
of Contra Eunomium and claimed149 that by contrasting the possession of good according to 
participation with possession of good according to nature, Gregory followed Basil of Caesarea 
who wrote in the third book of his Contra Eunomium that the angelic powers are sanctified 
according to participation in the measure of their love of God and strength of desire, while the 
Holy Spirit being the giver of holiness, possesses holiness according to nature and not according 
to participation: 
 
The principalities and powers and all such creatures, which have holiness 
from diligence and attention, are holy by nature. Ater all, yearning for the 
good, they receive a measure of holiness proportionate to their love for God. 
Furthermore, when iron is placed in the middle of fire, while it does not cease 
to be iron, it is nonetheless inflamed by the intense contact with the fire and 
admits the entire nature of fire into itself. And so in both outward appearance 
                                                 
148 Cf. GR. NYSS., Eun. I, 1, 373, 1 - 375, 7 (Jaeger). 
149 D. BALAS, ΜΕΤΟΥΣΙΑ ΘΕΟΥ, pp. 61-62. 
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and activity the iron is transformed into fire. Likewise, the holy powers, from 
their communion (κοινωνίας) with that which is holy by nature, possess a 
holiness that pervades their whole subsistence, and they become connatural 
with that which is holy by nature. The holy powers and Holy Spirit differ in 
this regard: for the latter, holiness is nature, whereas for the former, being 
made holy comes from participation (ἐκ μετουσίας). Those for whom the good 
is adventitious and introduced from another possess a nature that can change 
(τῆς μεταπτωτῆς εἰσι φύσεως). Indeed, Lucifer who rises at dawn would 
neither have fallen nor been cut down to the earth [Is 14: 12] if by nature 
(φύσει) he was not capable of admitting that which is worse150. 
 
However, we have seen151 that the Platonic concept of according to participation / 
according to nature emerged in the Christian literature before Basil in Origen.152 After Origen it 
appeared, for example, in Athanasius of Alexandria.153 Thus, in my opinion, we cannot claim 
that Gregory of Nyssa borrowed this concept from Basil. In general, the Patristic writers opposed 
by substance and by participation in order to maintain a distinction between the created and the 
divine when speaking of the uniting of the first to the second, and to emphasize the status of the 
uncreated as such154. If we can make any generalizations about what can be found in the works 
of the Niceans in this regard, it is the following: created beings are deified by participation in the 
divine substance, without becoming God according to their substance, while the Persons of the 
Trinity are God by substance, not by participation. 
There are both differences and similarities in Gregory’s and Basil’s thoughts on the 
subject. Firstly, Basil speaks about participation of the angelic powers in holiness granted by the 
Holy Spirit, while Gregory speaks about participation of beings belonging to intellectual nature 
in uncreated divine nature. Secondly, unlike Basil Gregory used the technical terminology which 
was borrowed from the tradition going back to Aristotle’s Categories. Gregory developed his 
                                                 
150 BAS. CAES., Eun. III: PG 29, 660.14-35, transl. in: SAINT BASIL OF CAESAREA, Against Eunomius, p. 
188. 
151 See chapter 3, “The paradigms of participation in the context of the topic of universals in Origen”. 
152 PG 12, 1656A.  
153 ATHAN. Contra gentes 46, PG 25, 93BC; Ep. quat. ad Serap. 2, 4, PG 26, 613С. 
154 About the opposition between by participation and by nature in Origen, Athanasius of Alexandria and 
the Cappadocians see D. BALÁS, ΜΕΤΟΥΣΙΑ ΘΕΟΥ, pp. 11-12, 60-62; Idem., Participation, in: The Brill 
Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa, ed. L. F. Mateo-Seco, G. Maspero, Leiden-Boston 2010, pp. 583; J. FINCH, 
Sanctity as Participation in the Divine Nature According to the Ante-Nicene Eastern Fathers, Considered in the 
Light o f Palamism, Drew University 2002 (Ph.D. Dissertation), pp. 244, 308, 351, 380; A. KOLP, Partakers of 
the Divine Nature. The Use of II Peter 1:4 by Athanasius, “Studia Patristica”, 17 (1982), pp. 1020-1021; K. 
NORMAN, Deification: the Content of Athanasian Soterilogy, Duke University 1980 (PhD Dissertation), p. 189. 
See also about Cyril of Alexandria: W. BURGHARDT, The Image of God in Man According to Cyril of 
Alexandria, Washington 1957, p. 11. 
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thought on the basis of the principle of “greater–lesser,” following the strategy of the division of 
beings. Thirdly, the principle of “greater–lesser” used by Gregory was based on the premise that 
the common nature (the logos of substance) is characterized by immutability, while volatility 
was the property of the quality of a thing. In the above passage Basil does not follow this 
principle; his theological language implies fundamentally mutable nature of anything which 
exists “according to participation.” Basil’s example of this point is the change in the nature of the 
angelic power Lucifer resulting from his fall. 
Nevertheless, in order to preserve the difference between the created and the divine in the 
case when the created in a special way participated in the divinity, both Gregory and Basil 
opposed that which was according to participation to that which was according to nature, 
revealing the use of the Platonic paradigm of participation in both authors. 
Going back to the discussion of Gregory’s passage (Contra Eunomium I, 1, 270, 1 – 277, 
13), I should note that the observation of David Balas concerning the influence of the language 
from Plotinus’ Ennead VI, 9 on Gregory’s passage under discussion seems to be quite 
reasonable. Indeed, just like Gregory, Plotinus says that we “incline” (νεύσαντες) to the One and 
the Good155 which is the source and the beginning of everything. Plotinus also tells us that our 
body participates (μετέχει)156 in the One and our soul may participate in It;157 human being as a 
whole as a living being endowed with reason, is a kind of unity in multiplicity since human 
being possesses the One according to communion and participation (μεταλήψει ἔχον καὶ μεθέξει 
τὸ ἕν).158 However, when speaking about participation in the One, Plotinus did not use the 
language borrowed from the works on logic in respect to the hierarchy of beings, as did Gregory. 
Another difference between Plotinus and Gregory pertaining to our discussion, is that Plotinus 
used the Platonic paradigm159 in which the One (the Good) was above substance. This was 
emphasized by Plotinus in Enneads VI, 9160, while Gregory spoke precisely about participation 
in divine substance. 
Thus, the topic of participation in the supreme principle as it unfolded in the first book of 
Contra Eunomium by Gregory of Nyssa contains important points, missing both from Basil of 
Caesarea and Plotinus. Firstly, Gregory discussed the hierarchy of beings which culminated in 
the highest, intellectual and uncreated, nature. This nature could be participated in to a greater or 
lesser extent by the beings belonging to the nature nearest to it in the hierarchy of beings, that is, 
                                                 
155 PLOT. Enn. VI, 9, 9, 11-12. 
156 IBID. VI, 9, 1, 38-39. 
157 IBID. VI, 9, 9, 48. 
158 IBID. VI, 9, 2, 16-24. 
159 See PLATO. Resp. 509b9. 
160 PLOT. Enn. VI, 9, 11, 41–42. 
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intelligent and created nature161 through which nature corresponding to the lower level in the 
hierarchy of beings, that is, created and sensible nature as a component in the composite human 
being could participate in the highest nature.162 Secondly, in his discussion of the specific aspects 
of participation in the supreme nature, Gregory adopted a concept borrowed from the works on 
logic of his time, which dealt with greater or lesser degree of presence of a particular quality in 
an individual being, and, accordingly, in the case of Porphyry’s Isagoge, of greater or lesser 
participation of the accident in it. In Gregory this notion is transformed into a discourse of 
greater or lesser participation of beings belonging to intellectual created nature in intellectual 
uncreated nature. 
As I have mentioned above, the topic of participation in the divine nature from our passage 
is a combination of the Scriptural reference to 2 Pet. 1: 4 and the Platonic discourse of 
participation, which is expressed in Gregory’s use of a typical Platonic concept according to 
participation / according to nature. Gregory believed that only that could participate in the 
divine nature (2 Pet. 1: 4), which by virtue of its created nature might possess good things only 
according to participation in that which was good according to nature. Thus, Gregory’s 
Scriptural reference was placed in a distinct philosophical context. 
However, it seems that there is another, not so explicit but quite an important aspect of the 
philosophical background in which Gregory set his Scriptural reference. This aspect is associated 
with the meaning behind the concept of the divine nature in the discussed passage. 
In my opinion, the whole train of Gregory’s thought in Contra Eunomium I, 1, 270, 1 – 
277, 13 suggests that speaking about (intellectual) uncreated nature (ἡ ἄκτιστος φύσις), 
participated in by intellectual created beings, Gregory had in mind not the divinity as such, but 
the common nature of the Persons of the Holy Trinity, and thus a universal. Gregory did not 
mention it explicitly, but I think that the whole logic of his reasoning suggests precisely that. 
This conclusion can be confirmed by the following points: 
                                                 
161 The principle of “greater–lesser” in its application to participation of beings belonging to intellectual 
created nature in the intellectual uncreated nature, in Gregory takes the shape of his famous doctrine of epektasis, 
the endless movement to the infinite divinity. This doctrine can be found, for example, in the same Chapter 22 of 
the first book of Eun. I, 1, 290, 1 - 291, 6 (Jaeger). The question on the Plotinian background of the doctrine of 
epektasis was extensively discussed in the literature (see, for example, K. CORRIGAN, Ecstasy and Ectasy in 
Some Early Pagan and Christian Mystical Writings, in W. Carroll and J. Furlong (eds.), Greek and Medieval 
Studies in Honor of Leo Sweeney, S J., New-York 1994, рp. 27-38), but one could argue that in explicit and 
clearly articulated way the topic of infinite participation in the supreme limitless principle is primarily typical for 
Gregory and not for Plotinus. 
162 In my opinion this is supported by the following words of Gregory from the passage under discussion, 
“...And the entire creation is turned to it, and by virtue of  communication in the first good, touches upon and 
partakes in the higher nature.” These words could have been understood as echoes Plotinian discourse of 
participation of all beings in the One if, on the one hand, we did not have Gregory’s emphasis in the remainder 
of the quotation that the participation in the divine nature is achieved through exercizing free choice of beings 
belonging to the intellectual nature and, on the other hand, if we did not have Gregory’s words later in Eun. III, 
3, 7, 1 - 8, 6 (Jaeger) that created beings by themselves can in no way participate in the divine nature. 
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1) Gregory listed several types of natures: sensible, intellectual created, and intellectual 
uncreated. Gregory’s discourse suggests that sensible nature is a kind of species for individual 
beings which belong to it, while intellectual created nature is also the species for individual 
beings which belong to it. It is clear that intellectual uncreated nature, standing in the argument 
of Gregory alongside the sensible and intellectual created natures, must have been the species for 
the corresponding individuals – the Persons of the Holy Trinity. 
2) Speaking about participation in uncreated nature, Gregory built up his argument in such 
a way that the concept of hypostasis emerged towards the end of the passage. In this way, the 
notion of uncreated nature, which was discussed throughout the entire passage, was put into the 
context of the notion of hypostasis, which referred the reader to the conceptual pair of “nature-
hypostasis,” well-established by the time when the treatise was composed, with “nature” 
referring to the common nature of the Persons of the Holy Trinity. 
We have seen that prior to Gregory, the notion of participation in the common nature of the 
Holy Trinity surfaced in Origen also in connection with reference to 2 Pet. 1: 3–4. Origen 
explicitly said that the divine nature, participated in by the human minds and heavenly powers 
was “the nature of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit”163 (the line N3 which I identified in 
my discussion of participation in Origen above). Both in Origen and Gregory, this participation 
in the common nature of the Persons of the Holy Trinity means that God endows the 
participating beings with good things which He has according to nature; both authors elaborated 
this topic in the context of the Platonic philosophical background. In Origen, the combination of 
the reference to 2 Pet. 1: 3-4 with the Platonic philosophical context within a wider discussion of 
unification with God seems to appear for the first time in Christian literature, and Gregory might 
have borrowed it from him. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
163 De Princ IV, 4, 9 (36) (see above). I should mention that Ilaria Ramelli quite clearly showed that 
Origen’s understanding of the relationship between the Persons of the Trinity showed a tendency towards anti-
subordinationism (I. RAMELLI, Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and its Heritage in the Nicene and Cappadocian 
Line, “Vigiliae Christianae” 65 (2011), pp. 21-49), that is, was close to the “horizontal” paradigm. In arguing 
that point Ramelli did not consider the fragments of Origen, which might indicate the subordinationist tendency 
in the Origen’s Trinitarian doctrine. In any case, the observations of Ramelli show that Origen’s Trinitarian 
doctrine contained distinct antisubordinationist tendency which seems to fit well Origen’s arguments about 
participation of intellects and the angelic powers in the nature of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit from De 
Princ IV, 4, 9 (36). 
  
92
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
93
 
Chapter 6, “The specifics of Gregory of Nyssa’s teaching of the universal and the 
particular, and its philosophical context” 
 
 
Subsequently, I will touch upon the problem of universals in Gregory of Nyssa in regard of 
a horizontal (Aristotelian) paradigm of participation, to be more precise in regard of its specific 
interpretation by Gregory of Nyssa. 
The parts of the writings where Gregory allegedly develops a “collective” theory of 
universals are actively discussed in scholar literature.1 This theory in terms of Johannes 
Zachhuber, presupposes “a view that sees universals as collections of its individual 
instantiations)”2. Different scholars suggest various understanding of the historical-philosophical 
background of the corresponding parts from Gregory’s writings. Hereafter I venture upon 
expounding my own understanding of this context.  
In the treatise “To Ablabius. On not three Gods” Gregory displays a bunch of peculiar 
ideas, which as many scholars assume are bound with the “collective” understanding of 
participation.  
Namely, as a part of his defense against accusations in tritheism and while using for these 
purposes elaborated by the Cappadocians analogy between hypostases of the Trinity and human 
individuals, Gregory speaks about the use of plural case applied to a so-called indivisible nature. 
It corresponds to the species of the thing; and in line with this he contrasts on the one hand a 
word usage which is correct in its meaning although is not commonly used in the language, and 
on the other hand there is a word which is used but not correct in its form. Back to the text, he 
says that it is not correct to use a word “man” with the meaning of human species in plural, 
although in a colloquial speech such a wording is absolutely natural. Inversely, the correct use is 
that where the word “man” is used in a singular. Gregory states that the reason is that since the 
word “man” points to the species, or to the nature, the use of this word in plural implies the 
presence of a multitude of natures. The necessary ensuing consequence is that human nature is 
no longer indivisible, but this seems to be absurd for Gregory of Nyssa. 
 
                                                 
1 H. CHERNISS, The Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa, “University of California Publications in Classical 
Philology”, 11 (1930), pp. 1–92, at 33; R. M. HÜBNER, Die Einheit des Leibes Christi bei Gregor von Nyssa: 
Untersuchungen zum Ursprung der ‘physischen’ Erlo¨sungslehre, Leiden 1974, Ss. 83-87; D. BALAS, Plenitudo 
humanitatis: The Unity of Human Nature in the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa, in D. F. Winslow (ed.), Disciplina 
Nostra: Essays in  Memory of Robert F. Evans, Cambridge, MA 1979, pp. 119-121; J. ZACHHUBER, Human Nature 
in Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance, Leiden 2000, pp. 64-70 and passim. 
2 J. ZACHHUBER, Gregory of Nyssa on Universals, “Journal of Theological Studies”, 56 (2005), p. 75. 
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Φαμὲν τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν κατάχρησίν τινα συνηθείας εἶναι τὸ τοὺς μὴ 
διῃρημένους τῇ φύσει κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα πληθυντικῶς ὀνομάζειν 
καὶ λέγειν ὅτι πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὅπερ ὅμοιόν ἐστι τῷ λέγειν ὅτι πολλαὶ φύσεις 
ἀνθρώπιναι. 
 
We say, then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those who are not 
divided in nature by the very name of their common nature in the plural, and 
saying they are “many men,” is a customary abuse of language, and that it would 
be much the same thing to say they are “many human natures”3. 
 
Elaborating his thought Gregory takes an example of calling upon a man. Such an action 
can be either successful or unsuccessful. The bishop of Nyssa says that if the word used for 
calling upon a certain man has a meaning of a common nature, then such a calling obviously will 
be unsuccessful. It is only a calling of a personal name of aimed individual (which distinguishes 
her from another man) what can give a positive result. It is caused by the fact that the personal 
name points to the subject, individual, while a common naming suggests only a shared nature. In 
the course of this epistemological reasoning, Gregory allows himself to make certain ontological 
utterances. A personal name, Gregory says, distinguishes the individual from the many, who 
partake to the common nature, although the nature of all individuals is the same (i.e. the same 
human nature, which is actually the only one to be called “man”). 
 
προσκαλούμενοι γάρ τινα, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς φύσεως αὐτὸν ὀνομάζομεν, ὡς ἂν μή τινα 
πλάνην ἡ κοινότης τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐμποιήσειεν, ἑκάστου τῶν ἀκουόντων ἑαυτὸν 
εἶναι τὸν προσκληθέντα νομίζοντος, ὅτι μὴ τῇ ἰδιαζούσῃ προσηγορίᾳ ἀλλ' ἐκ 
τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς φύσεως ὀνόματος ἡ κλῆσις γίνεται· ἀλλὰ τὴν ἰδίως ἐπικειμένην 
αὐτῷ (τὴν σημαντικὴν λέγω τοῦ ὑποκειμένου) φωνὴν εἰπόντες, οὕτως αὐτὸν τῶν 
πολλῶν ἀποκρίνομεν, ὥστε πολλοὺς μὲν εἶναι τοὺς μετεσχηκότας τῆς φύσεως, 
φέρε εἰπεῖν μαθητὰς ἢ ἀποστόλους ἢ μάρτυρας, ἕνα δὲ ἐν πᾶσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, 
εἴπερ, καθὼς εἴρηται, οὐχὶ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς φύσεώς ἐστιν 
ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ὁ Λουκᾶς ἢ ὁ Στέφανος, οὐ μήν, εἴ τις ἄνθρωπος, 
πάντως καὶ Λουκᾶς ἐστιν ἢ Στέφανος. 
 
When we address any one, we do not call him by the name of his nature, in order 
that no confusion may result from the community of the name, as would happen 
                                                 
3 Ad Abl. 40, 5-9 (Jaeger). 
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if every one of those who hear it were to think that he himself was the person 
addressed, because the call is made not by the proper appellation but by the 
common name of their nature: but we separate him from the multitude by using 
that name which belongs to him as his own;—that, I mean, which signifies the 
particular subject. Thus there are many who have shared in the nature—many 
disciples, say, or apostles, or martyrs—but the man in them all is one; since, as 
has been said, the term “man” does not belong to the nature of the individual as 
such, but to that which is common. For Luke is a man, or Stephen is a man4. 
 
Then Gregory refines the specifics of hypostases and nature on the basis of the categories 
countability/divisibility and unity. The hypostases are conformed to countability and division 
(διαμερισμός), but the nature to unity. Gregory calls nature as indivisible monad, although it is 
present through multitude (i.e. through individuals), it is whole and undivided by those who take 
part in it: 
  
Ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν τῶν ὑποστάσεων λόγος διὰ τὰς ἐνθεωρουμένας ἰδιότητας ἑκάστῳ τὸν 
διαμερισμὸν ἐπιδέχεται καὶ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἐν ἀριθμῷ θεωρεῖται· ἡ δὲ φύσις μία 
ἐστίν, αὐτὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡνωμένη καὶ ἀδιάτμητος ἀκριβῶς μονάς, οὐκ 
αὐξανομένη διὰ προσθήκης, οὐ μειουμένη δι' ὑφαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν 
οὖσα καὶ ἓν διαμένουσα κἂν ἐν πλήθει φαίνηται, ἄσχιστος καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ 
ὁλόκληρος καὶ τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον οὐ συνδιαιρουμένη. 
 
The idea of the hypostases admits of that separation which is made by the 
peculiar attributes considered in each severally, and when they are combined is 
presented to us by means of number; yet their nature is one, at union in itself, 
and an absolutely indivisible monad, not capable of increase by addition or of 
diminution by subtraction, but in its essence being and continually remaining 
one, inseparable even though it appear in plurality, continuous, complete, and 
not divided with the individuals who participate in it5. 
 
Later on Gregory gives an example, which is supposed to illustrate what has been said. He 
states that the words “people”, “army”, “counsel” are such that taken in singular they have a 
meaning of plural. This statement can be inspected through the word “man”; which itself means 
                                                 
4 Ad Abl. 40, 10-23 (Jaeger). 
5 Ad Abl. 40, 24 - 41, 7 (Jaeger). 
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something singular – human nature, although what belongs to the human nature is plural (i.e. 
human individuals, people). Thus, Gregory sums up that it is better to use the term nature in a 
correct way, namely not in plural but in singular. And if we cannot use it in such a form in 
colloquial language, then we must do such differentiation in theological language (and not to 
speak about three Divine natures). 
 
καὶ ὥσπερ λέγεται λαὸς καὶ δῆμος καὶ στράτευμα καὶ ἐκκλησία μοναχῶς πάντα, 
ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων ἐν πλήθει νοεῖται· οὕτω κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβέστερον λόγον καὶ 
ἄνθρωπος εἷς κυρίως ἂν ῥηθείη, κἂν οἱ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ αὐτῇ δεικνύμενοι πλῆθος 
ὦσιν, ὡς πολὺ μᾶλλον καλῶς ἔχειν τὴν ἐσφαλμένην ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐπανορθοῦσθαι 
συνήθειαν εἰς τὸ μηκέτι τὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα πρὸς πλῆθος ἐκτείνειν ἢ ταύτῃ 
δουλεύοντας τὴν ὧδε πλάνην καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ θεῖον δόγμα μεταβιβάζειν. 
 
And as we speak of a people, or a mob, or an army, or an assembly in the 
singular in every case, while each of these is conceived as being in plurality, so 
according to the more accurate expression, “man” would be said to be one, even 
though those who are exhibited to us in the same nature make up a plurality. 
Thus it would be much better to correct our erroneous habit, so as no longer to 
extend to a plurality the name of the nature, than by our bondage to habit to 
transfer to our statements concerning God the error which exists in the above 
case6. 
 
 Closer to the end of the treatise Gregory comes back to this theme. He again claims that it 
is incorrect to use the word nature in respect of many, and supports his argument declaring that 
nature cannot decrease or increase, although the nature is perceived in many. Countability, which 
implies the existence in a mode of multitude, is typical only for something individualized, i.e. 
confined spaciously etc. Something which is not individualized is neither countable, hence it 
cannot be represented in a mode of multitude. Such is the relation between the nature of gold (as 
uncountable and not individualized) and concrete golden coins (as countable and possessing 
individual features). The same argument is applied to human nature. It consists of many 
individuals, but “man” in them all is the same and one. 
 
τὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα ἡμαρτημένως ἡ συνήθεια εἰς πλήθους σημασίαν ἀνάγει, 
οὔτε μειώσεως οὔτε αὐξήσεως κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσγινομένης τῇ φύσει, 
                                                 
6 Ad Abl. 41, 7-15 (Jaeger). 
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ὅταν ἐν πλείοσιν ἢ ἐλάττοσι θεωρῆται. μόνα γὰρ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἀριθμεῖται, ὅσα 
κατ' ἰδίαν περιγραφὴν θεωρεῖται· ἡ δὲ περιγραφὴ ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ σώματος καὶ 
μεγέθει καὶ τόπῳ καὶ τῇ διαφορᾷ τῇ κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ χρῶμα καταλαμβάνεται· 
τὸ δὲ ἔξω τούτων θεωρούμενον ἐκφεύγει τὴν διὰ τῶν τοιούτων περιγραφήν. ὃ δὲ 
μὴ περιγράφεται οὐκ ἀριθμεῖται, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀριθμούμενον ἐν πλήθει θεωρηθῆναι 
οὐ δύναται. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸν χρυσόν φαμεν, κἂν εἰς πολλοὺς διακερματίζηται 
τύπους, ἕνα καὶ εἶναι καὶ λέγεσθαι· πολλὰ δὲ νομίσματα καὶ πολλοὺς στατῆρας 
ὀνομάζομεν, οὐδένα τῆς φύσεως τοῦ χρυσοῦ πλεονασμὸν ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν 
στατήρων εὑρίσκοντες. διὸ καὶ πολὺς ὁ χρυσὸς λέγεται, ὅταν ἐν ὄγκῳ πλείονι ἢ 
σκεύεσιν ἢ νομίσμασι θεωρῆται, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ χρυσοὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς ὕλης 
οὐκ ὀνομάζονται· εἰ μή τις οὕτω λέγοι, χρυσοὺς πολλούς, ὡς τοὺς δαρεικοὺς ἢ 
τοὺς στατῆρας, ἐφ' ὧν οὐχ ἡ ὕλη ἀλλὰ τὰ κέρματα τὴν τοῦ πλήθους σημασίαν 
ἐδέξατο. κυρίως γὰρ ἔστιν οὐχὶ χρυσοὺς ἀλλὰ χρυσέους τούτους εἰπεῖν. ὥσπερ 
τοίνυν πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ χρύσεοι στατῆρες, χρυσὸς δὲ εἷς, οὕτω καὶ πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ 
καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δεικνύμενοι, οἷον Πέτρος καὶ Ἰάκωβος 
καὶ Ἰωάννης, εἷς δὲ ἐν τούτοις ὁ ἄνθρωπος. 
 
<…> custom applies the name of a nature to denote multitude erroneously: 
since according to true reasoning neither diminution nor increase attaches to any 
nature, when it is contemplated in a larger or smaller number. For it is only those 
things which are contemplated in their individual circumscription which are 
enumerated by way of addition. Now this circumscription is noted by bodily 
appearance, and size, and place, and difference figure and colour, and that which 
is contemplated apart from these conditions is free from the circumscription 
which is formed by such categories. That which is not thus circumscribed is not 
enumerated, and that which is not enumerated cannot be contemplated in 
multitude. For we say that gold, even though it be cut into many figures, is one, 
and is so spoken of, but we speak of many coins or many staters, without finding 
any multiplication of the nature of gold by the number of staters; and for this 
reason we speak of gold, when it is contemplated in greater bulk, either in plate 
or in coin, as much, but we do not speak of it as many golds on account of the 
multitude of the material—except when one says there are many gold pieces 
(Darics, for instance, or staters), in which case it is not the material, but the 
pieces of money to which the significance of number applies: indeed, properly, 
we should not call them gold but golden. As, then, the golden staters are many, 
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but the gold is one, so too those who are exhibited to us severally in the nature of 
man, as Peter, James, and John, are many, yet the man in them is one7. 
 
 
Historical and philosophical context of these positions from the treatise of Gregory of 
Nyssa Ad Ablabium has been interpreted in different ways by different scholars. None of the 
interpretations that I am aware of seems satisfactory. Thus, in his extensive study, Human Nature 
in Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance,8 Johannes 
Zachhuber tried to prove that in Ad Ablabium Gregory manifested his understanding of nature in 
a collective sense of universals when he was discussing the notion of the total monad. According 
to J. Zachhuber, the same idea could be found in the so-called Letter 38, while Gregory’s 
concept of the whole man who was “in” the human individuals and whose correct expression by 
means of language was only possible in the singular, referred to the concept of the universal 
immanent to the things.  9 J. Zachhuber correlated the understanding of universals in a collective 
sense, which, according to him, appeared in Letter 38, with the concept of the “general man” of 
Alexander of Aphrodisias.10 J. Zachhuber also understood this concept in the sense of a 
collective universal. 11 In his study, “Gregory of Nyssa on Universals”12 Richard Cross criticized 
the theory of Johannes Zachhuber on a collective understanding of universals by Gregory of 
Nyssa. According to R. Cross, all disputable passages in Gregory were consistent with 
understanding of universals in immanent sense. R. Cross claimed that in Ad Ablabium Gregory 
not only did not follow the collective understanding of universals, but also argued with such an 
understanding on the part of the Neoplatonists, more precisely, with the understanding of 
universals appearing, as R. Cross believed, in Porphyry’s Isagoge. In his response to R. Cross,13 
J. Zachhuber did not discuss the historical and philosophical theory of R. Cross,14 instead 
attempting to reply to R. Cross’ objections to his concept of the collective understanding of 
universals in Gregory expressed in his book, Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa, J. Zachhuber 
elaborated his argument by clarifying that the collective sense of a universal / species in Gregory 
of Nyssa was to be understood not simply in the sense of an integral sum of the individuals 
belonging to a particular species, but in the sense of a “concrete whole.” In that respect J. 
Zachhuber suggested that the specific nature of this collective universal in Gregory was such that 
                                                 
7 Ad Abl. 53, 6 - 54, 4 (Jaeger). 
8 J. ZACHHUBER, Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical Background and Theological 
Significance, Leiden 2000. 
9 J. ZACHHUBER, Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa, p. 116. 
10 ALEX. APHROD. In Met. 426, 19-26 (Havduck). 
11 J. ZACHHUBER, Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa, p. 88. 
12 R. CROSS, Gregory of Nyssa on Universals,”Vigiliae Christianae” 56 (2002). 
13  J. ZACHHUBER, Gregory of Nyssa on Universals, “Journal of Theological Studies”, 56 (2005). 
14  J. ZACHHUBER, Gregory of Nyssa on Universals, p. 78. 
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the relation between the universal and the individual in it was similar to oneness-in-multiplicity 
as it was understood by Plotinus when he spoke of the one and the many in the hypostasis of the 
Mind.15 
As opposed to the previous studies, I believe that specific philosophical doctrine developed 
by Gregory in his treatise Ad Ablabium with some important points discussed in Letter 38 was 
based on the tradition of Aristotle’s Categories and the Neoplatonic commentaries on this 
treatise. 
In this regard, I discern several trends which were essential for the Gregory’s specific 
approach and his use of the philosophical language for describing the problem of the relationship 
between the general and the particular in Ad Ablabium and Letter 38. The following trends are 
manifested in the preceding philosophical tradition of Antiquity associated with the Categories 
and their commentaries: 1) the principle that division corresponds to the particular and 
individual, while unity corresponds to the species and the natural; 2) the concept of a “general 
person” as applied to the mankind; 3) the argument on participation of individual in the general, 
or of individuals in nature; 4) the principle of indivisibility of species by the individuals which 
participate in it, and 5) the principle of “greater–lesser.” 
We should start with the last point. When Gregory said in Ad Ablabium that the monad 
(that is, the nature or species) did not increase with addition and did not reduce with subtraction, 
16 he expressed in other words the thought from the passage in his Contra Eunomium I, 1, 173, 2 
– 175, 1 which I discussed above, that human nature was always in the same way present in the 
mankind, although individual humans belonging to it were born and died in time. The passage 
reveals a clear Aristotelian context associated with the topic of “greater–lesser” as applied to the 
category of substance. The same context is manifested in the words of Gregory when he justified 
the use of the name of nature only in the singular and said that the nature could neither decrease 
nor increase. 17  
The argument of Gregory in Ad Ablabium and especially in Letter 38 is based on the 
premise that the particular and the individual corresponded to division, while the species and the 
natural corresponded to unity. Thus, in the so called Letter 38 Gregory wrote, “it is impossible in 
any way to think of a severance or a division, so that the Son is considered apart from the Father, 
or the Spirit is separated from the Son; but there is found in them a certain inexpressible and 
incomprehensible union and distinction, since neither the difference of the persons breaks the 
continuity of the nature, nor the common attribute of substance dissolves the individual character 
of their distinctive marks. But, do not wonder if we say that the same thing is both joined and 
                                                 
15  J. Zachhuber referred to Enneads V, 9, 6, 8-11 and IV, 2, 1, 62-66 as an example. 
16 Ad Abl. 40, 24 - 41, 7 (Jaeger), see above. 
17 Ad Abl. 53, 6 - 54, 4 (Jaeger), see above. 
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separated and if, as in a riddle, we contrive something both strange and incredible, a conjoined 
separation and a separated union”.18 This premise also appeared in Ad Ablabium, where Gregory 
explained, “The idea of the hypostases admits of that separation which is made by the peculiar 
attributes considered in each severally, and when they are combined is presented to us by means 
of number”19. Here we can see the expression of an important argument of Isagoge where the 
movement along the genera/species hierarchy towards the more particular was associated with 
the concept of division, while the movement towards the more common was associated with the 
concept of unity. As Porphyry explained, individual was associated with divisibility, while 
general was associated with unity. Porphyry spoke about it in the same passage of Isagoge where 
he addressed another important issue for the kind of philosophy Gregory was elaborating in Ad 
Ablabium and Letter 38 – the subject of “general man” as applied to the human race. The same 
passage of Porphyry also contained the Aristotelian concept of participation of individuals in 
their natural species, which, as we have seen, Gregory as well used in Ad Ablabium.20 Thus, all 
these topics may be found in Porphyry in a passage from the second chapter of Isagoge, which I 
have discussed above in the chapter 1, “The paradigms of participation in the context of the topic 
of universals in Ancient philosophical tradition”, of this dissertation: 
 
So, when we are descending to the most special items, it is necessary to 
divide and to proceed through a plurality (διὰ πλήθους), and when we are 
ascending to the most general items, it is necessary to bring the plurality together 
into One (συναιρεῖν εἰς ἕν). For species—and still more, genera—are that which 
gather (συναγωγὸν) the many items into a single nature (εἰς μίαν φύσιν); whereas 
the particulars or singulars, in contrary fashion, always divide (διαιρεῖ) the one 
into a plurality. For by participaing in the species (τοῦ εἴδους μετουσίᾳ) the many 
men are one man, and by the particulars the one and common (ὁ εἷς καὶ κοινὸς) 
man is several — for the singular is always divisive whereas the common is 
collective and unificatory.21 
 
                                                 
18 Ep. 38, 4, 81-91, the translation by Syster Agnes Clare Way, C.D.P., in: SAINT BASIL, Letters, Vol. 1 (1–
185), The Catholic University of America Press 1951, p. 90 (Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐπινοῆσαι τομὴν ἢ διαίρεσιν κατ' οὐδένα 
τρόπον, ὡς ἢ Υἱὸν χωρὶς Πατρὸς νοηθῆναι ἢ τὸ Πνεῦμα τοῦ Υἱοῦ διαζευχθῆναι, ἀλλά τις ἄρρητος καὶ ἀκατανόητος 
ἐν τούτοις καταλαμβάνεται καὶ ἡ κοινωνία καὶ ἡ διάκρισις. οὔτε τῆς τῶν ὑποστάσεων διαφορᾶς τὸ τῆς φύσεως 
συνεχὲς διασπώσης οὔτε τῆς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν κοινότητος τὸ ἰδιάζον τῶν γνωρισμάτων ἀναχεούσης. Μὴ θαυμάσῃς 
δὲ εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ συνημμένον καὶ διακεκριμένον εἶναί φαμεν καί τινα ἐπινοοῦμεν, ὥσπερ ἐν αἰνίγματι, καινὴν καὶ 
παράδοξον διάκρισίν τε συνημμένην καὶ διακεκριμένην συνάφειαν). 
19  Ad Abl. 40, 24 – 41, 2. 
20 Ad Abl. 40, 24 - 41, 7 (Jaeger), see above. 
21 PORPH. Isag.: 6, 16–23 (Busse).  
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Keeping in mind the fact that Gregory used these three points from a single passage of 
Isagoge while developing his theory of the general and the particular, it can be argued that 
Isagoge and specifically that passage significantly influenced Gregory’s elaboration of principles 
appearing in his Ad Ablabium, Letter 38, and other texts of Gregory on the subject. 
It seems that Gregory’s use of the concept of the monad (μονάς), which was absent from 
Porphyry’s Isagoge can be related to Porphyry’s concept of the “whole man.” Writing about the 
monad, Gregory must have reformulated the notion of “wholeness” from Porphyry, enriching it 
by the additional connotations associated with an emphasis on unity and integrity of nature / 
species. 
However, Richard Cross suggested that in this passage of Isagoge Porphyry elaborated the 
collective understanding of universals which implied that species were divided by the 
individuals. R. Cross believed that Gregory of Nyssa argued precisely with that notion when he 
proposed that the monad (that is, nature or species for the thing) was indivisible by the 
individuals participating in it. 22 I believe R. Cross’ understanding of Porphyry is fundamentally 
wrong. R. Cross did not take into account the fact that the positions expressed by Porphyry in his 
Isagoge, did not claim the ontological status, but were rather logical exercises as Porphyry 
clearly said in the beginning of his treatise.  23 Therefore, in attributing the collective 
understanding of universals to Porphyry, R. Cross unjustifiably “ontologized” a purely logical 
discourse. When in his logical framework Porphyry said that the individual divided the unity into 
multiplicity, this in no way implied that the real unity (species) consisted of multiplicity 
(individuals). It meant that if we build up a generic hierarchy in our mind, the higher we assend 
along the hierarchy of commonness with our mind, the greater degree of unification we will find 
in the order of the hierarchy, whereas the lower we descend with our mind, the greater degree of 
division we will find there. This is the exact meaning of Porphyry’s words that the individual is 
associated with divisibility, while the totality is associated with unification. When Gregory 
borrowed this concept from Porphyry, he followed Porphyry in his statement that the species 
were characterized by unity, while the individuals were characterized by division and 
multiplicity, and this is why the individual/species discourse implied “conjoined separation and a 
separated union”.24 Yet, neither in the case of Porphyry nor in the case of Gregory did it mean 
that in reality the species were divided into parts by the individuals, or the collective 
understanding of a universal (= species). 
 Incidentally, R. Cross also noted the words about united division and divided unity in 
Gregory’s Letter 38, describing them as paradoxical. However, R. Cross did not realize that 
                                                 
22  R. CROSS, Gregory of Nyssa on Universals, p. 376ff.  
23 PORPH. Isag. I: 1, 8-12 (Busse). 
24 Ep. 38, 4, 91. 
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these words meant the same as what Porphyry discussed in Isagoge 2: 6, 16–23 (Busse) (see 
above), and incorrectly understood them in the sense of the collective meaning of universals.  
Thus, when Gregory used this Porphyry’s subject, his theological language manifested the 
elements of the logical discourse. In general, in Ad Ablabium and Letter 38, Gregory combined 
epistemological, ontological, and logical discourses.  
The ontological sense clearly appears in the words of Gregory concerning indivisibility of 
the monad / nature. R. Cross concluded that exactly on the basis of that statement Gregory 
argued with Neoplatonists and Porphyry that universal/nature/species should not be understood 
in a collective sense. Indeed, Porphyry did not mention indivisibility of species by the 
individuals in his Isagoge. Yet, since the arguments presented in Isagoge did not claim the 
ontological status, they did not require such an explanation. 
A somewhat similar subject occurs in Dexippus, another commentator on the Categories of 
Aristotle. Discussing the topic of homonyms, Dexippus argued that the common name was not 
divided by those participating in it, that is, those to whom that name was applied: 
 
τοῦ ἀδιαιρέτου τὸ μὲν παρὰ μέρος εἰς χρῆσιν λαμβανόμενον λέγουσιν 
ὥσπερ τὸν ἵππον καὶ τὴν λύραν, τὸ δὲ ἀθρόως καὶ ἀμερίστως πλείοσιν 
ὑπάρχειν δυνάμενον ἀδιαίρετον παραλείπουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τρόπος τῆς ἐπὶ 
τοῦ ὀνόματος κοινωνίας· αὐτῷ γὰρ τῷ μὴ διαιρεῖσθαι τούτῳ καὶ πάρεστι 
πᾶσι τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτοῦ. 
 
of the indivisible, one type is said to be taken for individual use consecutively, 
e.g. the horse and the lyre, while that which can be availed of simultaneously 
and undividedly by many is left as indivisible proper, and it is this latter that is 
the mode of the commonness of the name; for it is precisely by virtue of its not 
being divided that it is present to all entities that partake in it25. 
 
I am not claiming that Gregory was influenced by Dexippus when he spoke about 
indivisibility of the participated monad. Rather, bearing in mind that statement Dexippus it can 
be argued that the concept stating that the general was not divided by the particular which 
participated in it, was a part of the tradition of commentaries on the Categories of Aristotle in 
Antiquity, and Gregory might as well have been aware of that tradition. 
Thus, I believe that in analyzing historical and philosophical background of the premises 
appearing in Ad Ablabium and Letter 38 of Gregory of Nyssa in regard to his discussion of the 
                                                 
25 DEXIPPUS. In cat. 1, 12: 19, 11-16 (Busse).  
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general and particular, there is no need to look for the sources of Gregory’s inspiration either in 
Alexander of Aphrodisias or in Neoplatonic authors as it was done by J. Zachhuber. Instead it 
can be argued that in his general treatment of these subjects Gregory relied on the Peripatetic 
philosophical context, manifested, for example, in his use of the principle of “greater–lesser” and 
the concept of participation of individuals in their natural species. The main a source of the 
Peripatetic ideas for Gregory was Porphyry’s Isagoge, which is especially evident in the 
concepts of “whole man” as well as the association of the individual with “divisibility” and the 
general with “unity”, although Gregory might also have been aware of other writings belonging 
to the tradition of commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories.  
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Chapter 7, “Synthesis of Biblical and Logical-Philosophical Descriptions of the Order of 
Natural Beings in De opificio hominis 8 by Gregory of Nyssa” 
 
 
In the eighth chapter of his treatise De opificio hominis Gregory of Nyssa addresses the 
topic of the progressive ascent of nature from the lowest levels (vegetative life) to the most 
advanced (human beings) in accordance with the hierarchy of natural beings. In this regard, 
some modern authors, in particular, those who are willing to present Christian creationism and 
modern biological evolutionism as sympathetic, have suggested the presence of an evolutionary 
trend in Gregory of Nyssa.1 
This chapter of the thesis analyzes and clarifies the context and background for Gregory of 
Nyssa’s ordering of natural beings and his dynamic understanding of nature. 
 
 
7.1. Hierarchies of Beings in Gregory of Nyssa 
 
First, some words should be said about the hierarchy of beings in Gregory of Nyssa in 
general. Gregory develops a doctrine suggesting the fundamental division (διαίρεσις) of all 
beings into classes. In his earlier works, De opificio hominis and Dialogus de anima et 
resurrectione,2 Gregory develops a doctrine according to which beings can be positioned along 
an ascending ladder of vitality and posited the division of existing beings (τὰ ὄντα) into 
intellectual beings (τό νοητόν) and corporeal beings (τό σωματικόν). In these early works 
Gregory leaves questions concerning the division of intellectual beings for later consideration3 
and instead speaks here only about the division of corporeal beings.  
Later, in his treatise Against Eunomius, Gregory makes a distinction also within the 
intelligent realm and speaks of the division of beings into three natures: first, intellectual 
                                                 
1 Cf. A. WEISWURM, The Nature of Human Knowledge according to Gregory of Nyssa, Diss., 
Washington, The Catholic University of America Press 1952, p. 10; W. AGAR, Catholicism and the Progress of 
Science, New York 1940, p. 64; E. MESSENGER, Evolution and Theology, London 1931, pp. 23-26, 121-144; 
Idem., Theology and Evolution, London-Glasgow 1949, pp. 87-101; G. LADNER, The Philosophical 
Anthropology of Saint Gregory of Nyssa, “Dumbarton Oaks Papers”, 12 (1958), p. 75, n. 66.  John Behr speaks 
about the “evolutionary” dynamics of creation” in Gregory of Nyssa (J. BEHR, Rational Animal: A Re-reading of 
Gregory of Nyssa's De hominis opificio, “Journal of Early Christian Studies” 7 (1999), fasc. 2, p. 232). See also 
the discussion in W. MCGARRY, St. Gregory of Nyssa and Adam’s Body, “Thought” 10 (1935–1936), pp. 81-94, 
and E. SUTCLIFFE, St. Gregory of Nyssa and Paradise, “The Ecclesiastical Review”, 84 (1931), pp. 337-350.  
2 GREG. NYSS. Opif. hom. 8; An. et res., PG 46, 60AB. 
3 According to his own words in Opif. hom. 8, PG 44, 145.10–11. 
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uncreated nature (God), second, intellectual created nature (angels and human souls) which 
participate in the first nature in accordance with the goodness of will shown by individuals 
belonging to that nature, and, thirdly, sensible (τό αἰσθητόν) created nature.4 In another passage 
Gregory speaks about the division of beings into uncreated and created, and about the division of 
created beings into supramundane and sensible.5 
According to David Balas, “being” (=“that which exists”) is the highest level for the 
hierarchy of divisions in Gregory of Nyssa.6 However, I think that we should distinguish 
between two strategies for building such a hierarchy which are used by Gregory. According to 
the first, in which each level divides into more specific classifications after the manner of genera 
and species, “that which exists” is, indeed, the highest level of the hierarchy of divisions. “That 
which exists” embraces the (intellectual) uncreated and the created. According to the alternative 
strategy, which Gregory of Nyssa develops in his Contra Eunomium and which he applies 
alongside the first,7 the uncreated intellectual being, the higher nature (ἡ ὑψηλή φύσις8), 
common to the hypostases of the Trinity,9 serves as the highest level of the hierarchy, giving 
existence to created beings.10 The intellectual created beings long for this being as it is the source 
of goodness and they participate in it according to the goodness of their will.11  
It seems that, according to the first strategy, inasmuch as existing beings are divided into 
intellectual and corporeal, and intellectual beings are divided into uncreated and created, we 
should speak only about the epistemological (and not ontological) nature of Gregory’s hierarchy 
(that is, earlier levels of hierarchy are in no way, except in terms of our knowledge, higher than 
subsequent ones). It is assumed that “that which exists” — a category which, with its position at 
the root of the hierarchy, unites and transcends both the uncreated and the created — does not 
precede the realm of the uncreated in reality, but is the highest level of the hierarchy only in the 
context of human thought as a result of the analytical capacity of the human mind. This follows 
from the basic principles of Christian theology; it is also evidenced by Gregory’s references to 
                                                 
4 Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 1, 1, 270-277; 1, 1, 295 (Jaeger). We should note that in terms of the 
relationship between the created intellectual and sensible natures, Gregory of Nyssa, on the one hand, develops a 
theory of material bodies as a convergence of the intellectual logoi (Hex. PG 44, 69BC; An. et res., PG 46, 
124BD), yet, on the other hand, claims that created intellectual and sensible natures have fundamental 
differences and possess opposing properties (Or. cat. 6). 
5 GREG. NYSS. Eun. 4, 100-101 (Jaeger). 
6 D. BALAS, ΜΕΤΟΥΣΙΑ ΘΕΟΥ, p. 34.  
7 Gregory of Nyssa employed both strategies simultaneously in his Eun. 1, 1, 270-277. The strategy of the 
division of beings was also formulated in Opif. hom. 8, PG 44, 145, 10-11; and in the Or. cat. 6, 9-14 (Srawley).  
8 GREG. NYSS. Eun. 1, 1, 274, 3-4 (Jaeger). 
9 Cf. GREG. NYSS. Eun. 1, 1, 274, 1 - 275, 1 and 1, 1, 277, 8-13 (Jaeger). 
10 GREG. NYSS. Eun. 1, 1, 271, 7 - 1, 272, 1 (Jaeger); cf. An. et res., PG 46, 72D–73A.  
11 GREG. NYSS. Eun. 1, 1, 274, 2 - 275, 1 (Jaeger).  
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the process of human thinking, in which he mentions the division of beings into intellectual and 
sensible, and the division of intellectual into created and uncreated.12 
Gregory’s development of this strategy of genera-species divisions in relation to corporeal 
beings (which is, in fact, the natural order of beings in his system) implies the ontological, and 
not just the epistemological nature of the hierarchy of corporeal beings, as will be seen below. 
The second strategy involves a hierarchy that does not correspond to the pattern of genera 
and species (that is, lower hierarchical levels do not correspond to higher levels as species to 
their genus or as an individuals to their species), but is, instead, a hierarchy in the true 
ontological sense. Thus the principal source of being stands at the highest level of the hierarchy 
(the uncreated nature) and gives existence to other kinds of beings, which are ranked in 
descending order according to their degree of closeness to the source and of their capacity to 
participate in it (created intellectual and created sensible natures).  
 
 
7.2. The context of the topic of the order of natural beings in De opificio hominis 8 of 
Gregory of Nyssa 
 
We should now turn to the order of natural beings in the 8th chapter of Gregory’s Opif. 
hom. Gregory addresses this topic in relation to the first strategy, in which beings are organized 
according to the pattern of genera-species divisions with “that which exists” as the first-level 
category.  
Starting the discussion with the questions of why human beings have an upright posture 
and the purpose of hands, Gregory makes a digression and begins to discuss the ordering of 
creation in relation to “the philosophy of the soul.”13 In this discussion Gregory begins by tracing 
the order of creation as it is described in Genesis,14 and the correspondence of the order of 
natural beings to this pattern. Gregory wants to establish the logic of this pattern, followed by the 
order in which beings endowed with life were created (Gen 1,11–27) and notes that the Biblical 
ordering, according to which grass is created first, followed by animals (living beings), and then 
human beings, is evidently connected to the idea that earlier beings form the basis or support for 
those which follow: grass serves as food for animals, and animals function as support (as well as 
food) for humans. Gregory connects this order with the ordering of the vital powers of the soul 
distinguishing, firstly, vegetative and nutritional or natural vital powers belonging to plants, 
                                                 
12 Cf. “... In the division of beings we come to know (ἔγνωμεν) such differences...” (GREG. NYSS. Eun. 1, 
1, 295, 1-2); “... But the reason (ὁ λόγος) divides notion [of intellectual beings] into two – the uncreated, and, 
following it, the created are discerned” (Ibid., 1, 1, 271, 4-5). 
13 GREG. NYSS. EUN. 8, PG 44, 144, 40 - 145, 9. 
14 Cf. GREG. NYSS.  Hex. PG 44, 72 ff. 
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secondly, perceptive vital powers belonging to the animal world, and, thirdly, rational vital 
powers, belonging to humans. Moreover, each of these powers includes those preceding it, so 
that animals possess both vegetative and perceptive vital powers, while humans possess 
vegetative, perceptive, and rational powers.15 
After this Gregory goes on to discuss the division of beings in connection with the order of 
creation: 
 
Γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν τοιαύτη τις ἡ τοῦ λόγου διαίρεσις· Τῶν ὄντων τὸ μέν 
τι νοητὸν, τὸ δὲ σωματικὸν πάντως ἐστίν. Ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν νοητοῦ παρείσθω 
νῦν ἡ πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα τομή· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ὁ λόγος. Τοῦ δὲ σωματικοῦ τὸ μὲν 
ἄμοιρον καθόλου ζωῆς, τὸ δὲ μετέχει ζωτικῆς ἐνεργείας. Πάλιν τοῦ ζωτικοῦ 
σώματος τὸ μὲν αἰσθήσει συζῇ, τὸ δὲ ἀμοιρεῖ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. Εἶτα τὸ 
αἰσθητικὸν τέμνεται πάλιν εἰς λογικόν τε καὶ ἄλογον. Διὰ τοῦτο πρῶτον μετὰ 
τὴν ἄψυχον ὕλην οἷον ὑποβάθραν τινὰ τῆς τῶν ἐμψύχων ἰδέας τὴν φυσικὴν 
ταύτην ζωὴν συστῆναι λέγει ὁ νομοθέτης, ἐν τῇ τῶν φυτῶν βλάστῃ 
προϋποστᾶσαν· εἶθ' οὕτως ἐπάγει τῶν κατ' αἴσθησιν διοικουμένων τὴν 
γένεσιν. Καὶ ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῶν διὰ σαρκὸς τὴν ζωὴν 
εἰληχότων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητικὰ, καὶ δίχα τῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν εἶναι 
δύναται, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν οὐκ ἂν ἑτέρως γένοιτο ἐν σώματι, εἰ μὴ τῷ αἰσθητῷ 
συγκραθείη· διὰ τοῦτο τελευταῖος μετὰ τὰ βλαστήματα καὶ τὰ βοτὰ 
κατεσκευάσθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὁδῷ τινι πρὸς τὸ τέλειον ἀκολούθως προϊούσης 
τῆς φύσεως 
 
We might make a division of our subject in some such way as this. Of 
things existing, part are intellectual, part corporeal. Let us leave alone for the 
present the division of the intellectual according to its properties, for our 
argument is not concerned with these. Of the corporeal, part is entirely devoid 
of life, and part participates in vital energy. Of a living body, again, part has 
sense conjoined with life, and part is without sense: lastly, that which has 
sense is again divided into rational and irrational. For this reason the 
lawgiver16 says that after inanimate matter (as a sort of foundation for the 
                                                 
15 G. Ladner sees here the influence of Aristotelian anthropology (G. LADNER, The Philosophical 
Anthropology, p. 70), referring to De anima 2, 3, 414а. H. Drobner speaks about the Stoic background of the 
anthropological views propagated here by Gregory, yet without reference to philosophical sources (H. DROBNER, 
Gregory Nyssa as Philosopher: De anima et resurrectione and De hominis opificio, “Dionysius” 18 (2000), p. 
94). 
16 That is, Moses. 
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form of animate things), this vegetative life was made, and had earlier 
existence in the growth of plants17: then he proceeds to introduce the genesis 
of those creatures which are regulated by sense18: and since, following the 
same order, of those things which have obtained life in the flesh, those which 
have sense can exist by themselves even apart from the intellectual nature, 
while the rational principle could not be embodied save as blended with the 
sensitive,—for this reason man was made after the vegetating and the 
pasturing, as nature advanced in an orderly course to perfection.19 
 
Speaking about the division of beings, Gregory intends to describe the natural order in 
relation to corporeal beings. He states that corporeal beings are divided into those living and 
those devoid of life; living beings are divided into those which possess sensation and those 
devoid of sensation; beings with sensation are divided into rational and irrational beings. 
According to Gregory, such a division of natural beings is not arbitrary, but corresponds to the 
order of creation described in Genesis. At this point Gregory somewhat changes his language 
and starts to speak in terms of “nature;” he describes the logic of the order of creation as a 
consistent movement of nature towards perfection. 
Having elaborated on the structure of the hierarchy of created beings, Gregory again turns 
to anthropological issues and links the Biblical passages relating to the components of human 
beings to the order of creation. In this regard, he cites the Scriptural passages: 1 Thess 5: 28, Lk 
10: 27, 1 Cor 3: 3, 1 Cor 2: 14-15 and finishes his thoughts with the following words: 
 
Εἰ οὖν τελευταῖον μετὰ πᾶν ἔμψυχον ἡ Γραφὴ γεγενῆσθαι λέγει τὸν 
ἄνθρωπον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ φιλοσοφεῖ τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς ἡμῖν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἐπ' 
ἀναγκαίᾳ τινὶ τῇ τάξεως ἀκολουθίᾳ τὸ τέλειον ἐν τελευταίοις βλέπων. Ἐν μὲν 
γὰρ τῷ λογικῷ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ περιείληπται· ἐν δὲ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ καὶ τὸ φυσικὸν 
εἶδος πάντως ἐστίν. Ἐκεῖνο δὲ περὶ τὸ ὑλικὸν θεωρεῖται μόνον. Οὐκοῦν 
εἰκότως, καθάπερ διὰ βαθμῶν ἡ φύσις, τῶν τῆς ζωῆς λέγω ἰδιωμάτων, ἀπὸ τῶν 
μικροτέρων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλειον ποιεῖται τὴν ἄνοδον 
 
If, therefore, Scripture tells us that man was made last, after every 
animate thing, the lawgiver is doing nothing else than declaring to us the 
                                                 
17 Gen. 1, 11-12. 
18 Gen. 1, 20-22. 
19 GREG. NYSS. Opif. hom. 8, PG 44, 145, 9 - 145, 31, trans. W. Moore and H. A. Wilson in GREGORY OF 
NYSSA, On the Making of Man, Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 2d series, vol. 5, Grand Rapids, 
Mich., Eerdmans 1954, slightly revised by me. 
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doctrine of the soul, considering that what is perfect comes last, according to a 
certain necessary sequence in the order of things: for in the rational are 
included the others also, while in the sensitive there also surely exists the 
vegetative form, and that again is conceived only in connection with what is 
material: thus we may suppose that nature makes an ascent as it were by steps 
— I mean the various properties of life — from the lower to the perfect form.20 
 
Thus, the topic of nature reappears in this passage. After this, in the same chapter, Gregory 
returns to the issue raised at the beginning of the chapter, and thus writes on the purpose of 
human hands, “<...> first of all, nature has given them to the body especially for the sake of the 
word.”21 It can be said that Gregory understood nature as a natural dynamic order of beings or as 
some kind of dynamic principle, thanks to which the created beings as a whole obtain 
progressive movement in the direction of increasing vitality.22 
Before moving on to a more detailed analysis of the hierarchy of natural beings in Opif. 
hom.  8, it is worth looking at the development of the topic of nature in the 12th chapter of the 
treatise in order to detect the logic of Gregory’s thought on the hierarchy of beings. Here 
Gregory emphasizes the connections between different levels of the hierarchy, which are 
demonstrated by the ways in which the Beautiful (that is, the divine) fills beings at each level in 
accordance with the capacity of that level to participate in the Beautiful through a higher level; 
thus the nature which follows mind, is adorned by the beauty of the mind, which it possesses 
according to the participation of the mind in the divine. Thus, according to Gregory, participation 
in the true beauty runs proportionally through all created beings, so each level of beings 
participates in the Beautiful through the preceding level23 or, in the words of John Behr, 
“creation becomes theophanic.”24 If this natural participation becomes disrupted, the vector of 
participation functions in an opposite manner: matter, deprived of participation in the Beautiful 
through the natural order of beings becomes deformed and ugly, deviating from nature, and that 
ugliness is transmitted by the same chain to mind.25 Thus, the concept of nature maintains the 
connotations of the natural dynamic order of beings, expounded by Gregory in De opificio 
                                                 
20 GREG. NYSS. Opif. hom. 8, PG 44, 148, 17-27, trans. W. Moore and H. A. Wilson, in GREGORY OF 
NYSSA, On the Making of Man. Cf. Ibid., 145, 30-31.  
21 Ibid., 148, 43-44. Gregory explains the statement that the presence of hands in human beings is 
connected with the ability of speech, and says that if a person were deprived of hands, he would have to procure 
food by mouth like animals, and accordingly the human mouth in its structure would not have been adapted for 
articulate speech.  
22 Gregory investigated a similar topic of the ascent of natural species in the measure of participation in 
the vital power in his On the soul and the resurrection 46, yet, without the topic of progressive movement of 
nature and without the emphasis on the genera-species division as he did in Opif. hom. 8. 
23 GREG. NYSS. Opif. hom. 12, PG 44, 161, 29-47. 
24 J. BEHR, Rational Animal, p. 231. 
25 GREG. NYSS. Opif. hom. 12, PG 44, 161, 47 - 164, 28. 
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hominis 8, but receives a new, more theologically saturated, meaning associated with a vision of 
this order’s dynamics as a result of theophany. 
 
 
7.3. The Historical and philosophical context of the order of natural beings in De opificio 
hominis 8: Posidonius or Porphyry? 
 
Next, we should discuss Gregory’s order of natural beings in Opif. hom. 8 in relation to its 
historical and philosophical background. 
John Behr has identified two strategies followed by Gregory in Opif. hom. 8: “to explain 
the unfolding of creation as it is described in the opening verses of Genesis, and to connect this 
to the various trichotomic concepts used in Scripture.”26 However, we may discern at least one 
further strategy. D. Balas in his book on participation in God in Gregory of Nyssa mentions the 
similarity of the hierarchy of beings from Opif. hom. 8 to the so-called “Tree of Porphyry” as it 
is described in Isag.27 H. Drobner, likewise, without reference to Balas, notes, in his discussion 
of Gregory’s division of beings, the use of “the Tree of Porphyry,” that is, the hierarchy of 
genera and species mentioned by Porphyry in Isag.: “substance” (οὐσία) – “body” (σῶμα) – 
“animate body” (ἔμψυχον σῶμα) –“living being” (ζῷον) –“rational living being” (ζῷον λογικὸν) 
–“human being” (ἄνθρωπος) – “individual human being.”28 
Within this structure the upper levels function at the greatest level of generality and the 
hierarchy becomes more specific as one descends further down.29 At the same time, according to 
Drobner, it is possible that the influence of Porphyry on Gregory of Nyssa was mediated by 
Posidonius.30 Thus, keeping in mind Drobner’s comparison with the Tree of Porphyry, we may 
identify at least three strategies used by Gregory in Opif. hom. 8 in his discussion of the order of 
natural beings, the first associated with cosmogony, the second with anthropology, and the third 
with logic. 
                                                 
26 J. BEHR, Rational Animal, p. 227. 
27 D. BALAS, ΜΕΤΟΥΣΙΑ ΘΕΟΥ, p. 36, n. 93. 
28 H. DROBNER, Gregory Nyssa as Philosopher, pp. 92-96.  
29 “In each type of predication there are some most general items and again other most special (εἶδος) 
items; and there are other items between the most general and the most special. Most general is that above which 
there will be no other superordinate genus; most special, that after which there will be no other subordinate 
species; and between the most general and the most special are other items which are at the same time both 
genera and species (but taken in relation now to one thing and now to another). What I mean should become 
clear in the case of a single type of predication. Substance is itself a genus. Under it is body, and under body 
animate body (ἔμψυχον σῶμα), under which is animal; under animal is rational animal (λογικὸν ζῷον), under 
which is man; and under man are Socrates and Plato and particular men” (PORPH. Isag. 4, 15-27; 10, 3-18 
(Busse), trans. J. Barnes, in J. BARNES, Porphyry. Introduction, pp. 5-6). 
30 H. DROBNER, Gregory Nyssa as Philosopher, p. 95. 
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It should be noted that the relationship of the division of beings from Opif. hom. 8 with the 
Tree of Porphyry has not been thoroughly studied; scholars have been more interested in the 
connection of the ascending movement of nature in Gregory of Nyssa with the teaching of 
Posidonius. Thus, G. Ladner in his seminal article on the anthropology of Gregory of Nyssa 
discusses the nature of the graded ascent of nature from the lesser to the perfect in De opificio 
hominis 8 and connects it with the teaching of Posidonius, indicating that it referrs to Posidonius’ 
version of Stoic Monism and Pantheism.31 Ladner believed that Posidonius’ teaching on man as 
a binding link and mediator between the animal (living) realm and the divine realm influenced 
the teaching of Gregory of Nyssa on the order of natural beings. According to Ladner, in his 
attempts to elaborate on this doctrine, Gregory, as a philosopher, “achieved <…> a real synthesis 
between the Posidonian-Neoplatonic view of cosmical order and the Christian doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo”.32 Relying on E. Skard’s suggestion that Galen functioned as a mediator 
between Posidonius and Nemesius,33 and bearing in mind the frequent use of Galen’s texts by 
Gregory, Ladner suggests that Galen was the mediator between the teaching of Posidonius and 
the “bathmos-doctrine” of Gregory (that is, the doctrine of Gregory on the hierarchical levels of 
nature).34 In his claim that the doctrine of Gregory on the graded ascent of nature is related to the 
philosophical system of Posidonius, Ladner probably follows the well-known expert on the 
teaching of Posidonius K. Reinhardt, whom Ladner cites, among other scholars. Reinhardt 
discussed the problem of Posidonius’ influence on subsequent authors and analyzes the different 
stages represented by organic beings in relation to the idea of the human being as a mediator 
between the animal realm and the heavenly realm. Among other passages, Reinhardt points to 
Opif. hom. 8 of Gregory of Nyssa, “καθάπερ διὰ βαθμῶν ἡ φύσις... ἀπὸ τῶν μικροτέρων ἐπὶ τὸ 
τέλειον ποιεῖται τὴν ἄνοδον,”35 noting that this passage demonstrates the presence of these topics 
in Gregory, although without relation to each other.36 
Following Ladner and Reinhardt, D. Balas also suggests that the doctrine of Posidonius 
was the ultimate source for the doctrine of the ascending order of nature in Gregory as well as of 
the terminology which he uses for expressing the doctrine (Balas referrs to the expression, 
                                                 
31 G. LADNER, The Philosophical Anthropology, p. 71. Ladner does not cite specific passages of 
Posidonius, but refers the reader to the studies on Posidonius’ doctrine on the stages of nature, including W. 
JAEGER, Nemesios von Emesa. Quellenuntersuchungen zum Neuplatonismus und seinen Anfängen bei 
Poseidonios, Berlin 1914; K. REINHARDT, Poseidonios, Muenchen 1921, pp. 247ff., 343ff.; IDEM., Kosmos und 
Sympathie, Munich 1926), pp. 320ff.; IDEM., Poseidonios, in Pauly-Wissowa, Realencyclopädie der classischen 
Altertumswissenschaft 43, Stuttgart 1953, cols. 701f., 773ff. 
32 G. LADNER, The Philosophical Anthropology, p. 72. 
33 E. SKARD, Nemesiosstudien 11, “Symbolae Osloenses”, 17 (1937), p. 9ff. 
34 G. LADNER, The Philosophical Anthropology, p. 71, n. 45. 
35 PG 44, 148, 25–27; see above. 
36 K. REINHARDT, Poseidonios, in Pauly-Wissowa, col. 774. 
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“δύναμις ζωτική”);37 at the same time Balas does not exclude the influence of Panaetius.38 
Referring to Ladner, John Behr also accepts the influence of Posidonius on Gregory in this 
respect39 (the views of H. Drobner on the subject will be discussed a little later). 
Even if we agree that Gregory’s usage of δύναμις ζωτική depends on Posidonius, the 
relationship between Gregory and Posidonius in relation to the ascending movement of nature 
and, even more, to the hierarchy of beings does not seem to be sufficiently justified. Indeed, 
when K. Reinhardt speaks about Posidonius’ doctrine of the levels of organic beings, with 
human beings as mediators between the animal and the divine realms, he has in mind the idea of 
the progressive increase in perfection towards the divine from the animal world to the humans. 
This, furthermore, implies the idea that animals have three natural abilities – to feel, to move, 
and to choose good for themselves, while humans, possessing those abilities, also possess the 
unique ability of reason, due to which the human being can control the above mentioned abilities 
inherent in the soul.40 Outlining this doctrine of Posidonius, K. Reinhardt does not give a clear 
reference to the source, however we can see, from W. Jaeger’s study of the sources of Nemesius 
of Emesa,41 to which Reinhardt refers his readers, that the original source was the following 
passage from Cicero’s treatise De natura deorum:  
 
If we seek to move forward from the first undeveloped levels of being to 
the furthest and most perfect, we inevitably arrive at the nature of the gods. At 
the lowest level we observe that nature sustains plants sprung from the earth, 
and she bestows on them nothing more than her protective nurture and growth. 
On beasts she has conferred feeling and movement, and a kind of inclination 
which prompts them to seek what is good for them, and avoid what is baneful. 
On humans she bestowed something more noble than this, with the additional 
gift of reason, to enable them to control their mental inclinations, giving them 
free rein at one time and holding them in check at another...42 
 
Just like Gregory of Nyssa, the passage speaks about a progressive natural hierarchy. 
However, in my opinion, there is not enough similarity between Cicero’s and Gregory’s 
                                                 
37 See GREG. NYSS. Opif. hom. 8, PG 44, 144, 54–55, 59; cf. 176.10. Concerning Posidonius, Balas refers 
to K. REINHARDT, Poseidonios von Apameia, in Pauly-Wissowa 43 (1953), cols. 648, 30–649, 66; C. DE VOGEL, 
Greek Philosophy, Vol. III, Leiden 1959) no. 1176, 251–52; see also F. SANDBACH, The Stoics, 2nd ed. London, 
Indianapolis 1989, p. 130ff. 
38 D. BALAS, ΜΕΤΟΥΣΙΑ ΘΕΟΥ, pp. 36–37. 
39 J. BEHR, Rational Animal, p. 227, n. 17. 
40 K. REINHARDT, Poseidonios, in Pauly-Wissowa, col. 701-702. 
41 W. JAEGER, Nemesios von Emesa, Ss. 114-115. 
42 CICERO. Nat. deor. 2, 12, 33-34, trans. P. G. Walsh, in CICERO. The Nature of the Gods, Oxford 1997, 
p. 59). 
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doctrines to confidently speak about the influence of Posidonius’ doctrine on Gregory. Firstly, 
there is no similarity between the stages in the hierarchy of natural beings in the two authors. 
Secondly, the description of natural progress by Cicero, as Ladner correctly observes whilst 
speaking about Posidonius, requires an understanding of the human being as a binding link and 
mediator between the animal and the divine realms with the gods sitting at the top of the 
hierarchy. Yet, the motif of the human being as mediator between animal and divine realms is 
absent in Opif. hom. 8’s treatment of the hierarchy of natural beings, and the highest level of the 
hierarchy in Opif. hom. 8 is represented, on the one hand, by “that which exists” (from the 
logical viewpoint of the hierarchy), and, on the other hand, by human beings (from the viewpoint 
of the order of natural beings). Thirdly, Posidonius does not write about the dynamic aspect of 
the natural hierarchy, so clearly exposed by Gregory in his description of natural progress. And 
fourthly, the concept of βαθμός (step, grade) — to which Reinhardt refers when he speaks about 
the teaching of Posidonius, and on the basis of which he and other scholars infer the influence of 
Posidonius on Gregory — does not seem to be reliably attested in Posidonius, but only 
represents Reinhardt’s reconstruction of the Greek terminology used by Posidonius on the basis 
of Cicero’s text. 
Thus, in my opinion, we should speak about the direct influence not of Posidonius’ thought 
on Opif. hom. 8 but of Porphyry’s and, more precisely, of Porphyry’s Isagoge which contains a 
similar hierarchy of beings to that of Gregory, a fact which was pointed out by D. Balas and H. 
Drobner.  
In this regard, it should be noted that Drobner’s idea that Porphyry’s influence on Gregory 
might have been mediated by Posidonius43 is redundant (unfortunately, Drobner does not support 
his suggestion with additional arguments), since the logical framework of Porphyry can be quite 
clearly seen in Gregory and there is no reason to see Posidonius’ doctrine as a mediating link 
between the Tree of Porphyry44 and the hierarchy of beings in Gregory. It is possible that, 
Drobner’s claim rests on references to the teaching of Posidonius as a source of Gregory’s 
passage under discussion in the literature. The statement of D. Balas that the topic of the 
hierarchy of beings in Gregory of Nyssa looks similar to the Tree of Porphyry and then 
independently indicated a possible influence of Posidonius and Panaetius on Gregory’s doctrine 
of the ascending order of nature,45 seems to be more correct in this regard. 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 H. DROBNER, Gregory Nyssa as Philosopher, p. 95. 
44 D. BALAS, ΜΕΤΟΥΣΙΑ ΘΕΟΥ, p, 36, n. 93. 
45 IBID., p. 37. 
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7.4. The Order of Natural Beings in Gregory of Nyssa and the Tree of Porphyry 
 
While both point out the similarity between the hierarchy of beings in Gregory of Nyssa 
and the Tree of Porphyry, neither Balas, nor Drobner analyzes how exactly Porphyry’s logical 
framework manifests itself in Opif. hom. 8. However, before investigating this in more detail, we 
should note that the principle of the tree of genera and species may be found in other 
philosophical texts, the most important of which will be mentioned in the following section. 
 
 
 
7.4a. Genera-Species Division in Authors Prior to Gregory of Nyssa 
 
Alcinous assigns such a division from top to bottom along with the mandatory 
accompanying procedure of definition to the realm of dialectic,46 giving, as an example, the 
definition of human substance through the division of substance into animate and inanimate 
beings, and the animate beings into rational and irrational as well as mortal and immortal.47 Philo 
speaks about the division of beings according to the Stoics, who divided beings into corporeal 
and incorporeal; corporeal beings into animate and those bereft of soul; animate beings into 
those which possessed reason and those which did not; rational beings into mortal (humans) and 
divine; and mortal beings into male and female, while the incorporeal beings represent kinds of 
proposition.48 Seneca also discusses the genera-species division of beings, and his position is 
quite close to that of Porphyry. Explaining Lucilius on “being,” “species,” and “genus,” Seneca 
speaks about the division of beings into corporeal and incorporeal, the division of corporeal 
beings into animate and inanimate, the division of animate beings into animals (living beings) 
and plants, the division of animals into humans, horses and dogs, and the division of humans first 
into nations and races, and then into individuals.49 Clement of Alexandria speaks about the 
division of animate beings into mortal and immortal, the division of mortal beings into terrestrial 
and aquatic, the division of terrestrial beings into flying and walking, and the division of the 
                                                 
46 ALBINUS, Epit. 5, 1. 
47 IBID., 5, 3. 
48 “Some of the beings are corporeal and some are incorporeal (ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι σώματα, τὰ δ' 
ἀσώματα); some [of the corporeal beings] do not have soul and some are animate; some [of the animate beings] 
are rational and some are irrational, and some [of the rational beings] are mortal, while some are divine. And out 
of mortal beings, the mankind is divided into male and female. In turn, the incorporeal beings are divided into 
the completed and incompleted. The completed includes general and specific questions, requests, vows and all 
that sorts of things, <...> as well as that which the Stoics call the statements <...> In turn, the incompleted 
incorporeal is divided in the closest manner into the so-called predicates, accidents, and everything else that is of 
less importance” (PHILO. Agr. 139 = SVF II 182). 
49 SEN. Ep. 58, 8-15. 
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walking beings into those who posses reason and those who do not. In this way Clement arrives 
at a definition of human beings as animate, mortal, terrestrial, walking and rational.50 Finally, a 
contemporary and friend of Gregory, Basil of Caesarea, in his treatise On the Holy Spirit, also 
describes a genera-species division of “substance”–“animate being”–“human being”–“male”–“an 
individual.”51 Basil wrote this treatise before Gregory wrote De opificio hominis and the passage 
discussing the hierarchy stands largely as a polemic against those who claimed that the Holy 
Spirit was not “numbered together” with the Father and the Son, but was “numbered under.”  
Out of all divisions that we have mentioned, Gregory’s is closest to that of Porphyry, that 
is, the division into “substance”–“body”–“animate body”–“living being”–“rational living 
being”–“human being”–“an individual.”52  
Speaking about the genera-species divisions in Late Antiquity, we can, following J. 
Mansfeld, briefly mention some historical and philosophical trends. We can discern a Platonic 
characteristic in the structure of the genera-species divisions where there is a level which divides 
into two branches, one of which possesses a privative character with respect to the other (for 
example, “animate beings”–“inanimate beings,” “mortal beings”–“immortal beings,” etc.). This, 
generally speaking, involves a hierarchy structured in a tree-like fashion.53 A Stoic influence is 
displayed when the lowest level of division is represented by individuals and not by species, 
since the standard Aristotelian procedure of the genera-species division does not involve 
individual beings.54 A Stoic-Platonic trend is displayed when the top of the hierarchy is 
represented by “that which exists,” or “beings” (τὰ ὄντα, τὸ ὄν), and not by substance (ἡ 
οὐσία).55 An Aristotelian trend is demonstrated when the highest level of genera-species 
division, which implies the construction of the definition, is represented by substance.56 
Despite the fact that there are reasons to believe that Gregory’s scheme was directly 
influenced by that of Porphyry, each of the above trends, that is, the Platonic, the Aristotelian, 
and the Stoic, can also be seen in Gregory.  
 
 
                                                 
50 CLEM. Strom. 8, VI. 
51 BAS. CAES. Spir. san. 17, 41, 1-22 (Pruche). 
52 We may note that compared to the Seneca’s taxonomy, which is the closest, after that of Porphyry, to 
Gregory of Nyssa, Porphyry’s system has the level of “rational,” which is crucial for Gregory. 
53 J. MANSFELD, Substance, Being and Division in Middle Platonist and Later Aristotelian Contexts 
(Excurs), in Idem., Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus' Elenchos as a Source for Greek Philosophy, Leiden: 
Brill 1992, pp. 79, 85-86. Mansfeld notes that this procedure of division is criticized by Aristotle in his De part. 
an. А 2-3. 
54 DIOG. LAERT. 7, 61 (J. MANSFELD, Substance, Being and Division, pp, 95-96, cf. p. 80). 
55 According to J. Mansfeld, this has some parallels with Plato’s Soph 246а and possibly Tim. 27d (J. 
MANSFELD, “Substance, Being and Division,” 85, n. 23; 90, n. 34). In the division of beings into the bodily and 
the bodiless, in addition to the Stoic background (SVF II, 182) J. Mansfeld sees a Platonic background (Ibid., 87) 
referring the reader to the same passage of Soph 246а (cf. CLEM. Strom. 8, VI, 20, 2). 
56 J. MANSFELD, Substance, Being and Division, p. 79. 
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7.4b. Genera-Species Division in Gregory of Nyssa and Porphyry: Similarities 
 
After this brief overview of the genera-species divisions in philosophical thought, we now 
return to the influence of the Tree of Porphyry on the genera-species division of beings in Opif. 
hom. 8. The following points should be made:  
Firstly, the very similarity of the levels within the hierarchies of beings in Gregory and 
Porphyry evidences a degree of influence. 
Secondly, in his discussion of the hierarchy of beings, Gregory uses a genera-species 
discourse, that is, a discourse, according to which the lower levels of a hierarchy are related to 
the higher as a species is to a genus (or, equivalently, the higher level to the lower level as a 
genus to a species);57 the same is the case in the Tree of Porphyry.  
Thirdly, Gregory speaks about the levels of hierarchy also as species (εἶδος),58 a usage 
which corresponds to Porphyry’s logical terminology in Isag.,59 despite the fact that the Bible, 
which is discussed by Gregory, uses the word γένος when it describes how God created different 
kinds of plants and animals (the Septuagint).60 Thus, in this respect Gregory follows not the 
Biblical language, but rather logical terminology. Fourthly, the logical language appears in 
Gregory when he speaks about the genera-species “division” (διαίρεσις; τομή);61 the same 
terminology typically appears in Porphyry’s Isagoge.  
 
 
7.4c. Genera-Species Division in Gregory of Nyssa and Porphyry: Differences 
 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the position of Drobner, who notes the connection 
between the genera-species divisions of Gregory and Porphyry, does not seem to be entirely 
correct. Citing a quote from Opif. hom. 8 where Gregory speaks about the division of beings, 
Drobner writes, «Gregory presents an exact copy of Porphyry’s doctrine of the hierarchy of 
beings as the latter explains in the chapter 2 of his Isagoge to Aristotle’s Categories. This 
doctrine is more comprehensive that the threefold scheme Gregory first deduced from the 
biblical text, because it comprises the non-animate substances as well and thus takes every kind 
                                                 
57 It can be noted that Gregory of Nyssa also uses the genera-species framework in his treatise Ad Graec. 
3, 1, 16-31, PG 45, 184C. 
58 GREG. NYSS. Opif. hom. 8, PG 44, 145, 2; 145, 34; 148, 23. 
59 J. Mansfeld points to the Stoic origin of the terminology (J. MANSFELD, Substance, Being and Division, 
p. 103). 
60 See Gen. 1:11-27. 
61 GREG. NYSS. Opif. hom. 8, PG 44, 145, 10; 12; 17. 
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of being in the universe into account. There cannot be any doubt as to the fact that Gregory took 
this philosophical explanation from Porphyry, possibly mediated by Poseidonius <…>»62. As 
well as the statement on the possible mediating function of Posidonius, which was discussed 
above, the claim of Drobner that Gregory uses an exact copy of the hierarchy which appears in 
Isag. 263 is not entirely correct, since the division of beings which appears in Gregory is similar 
to that Porphyry but is in no way an exact copy of Porphyry’s scheme, particularly in the form 
which appears in Isag. 2. 
Firstly, the formal, but not the substantial, difference is that the genera-species hierarchy 
which Porphyry develops in Isag. 2 is somewhat different in its structure to the genera-species 
hierarchy of beings in Gregory. Porphyry’s hierarchy is presented as a listing of successive 
levels. The structure of the division in Gregory of Nyssa involves two links at each stage of 
division; as a rule, one of these corresponds to the possession of a certain specific difference, 
while the other lacks such a difference (for example, the corporeal beings are divided into those 
participating in life and those devoid of life, etc.). Thus, Porphyry’s hierarchy, presented in Isag. 
2, in structural terms, corresponds to the chain, as it is called by Ammonius of Alexandria,64 or 
the line, as it is called by Ibn al-Tayyib,65 while the structure of the generic divisions presented 
in Gregory corresponds to a tree, since it has a structure which contains branches. The structure 
in Porphyry receives the form of a tree only when we correlate what Porphyry says about the 
sequence of the genera-species division in Isag. 2 with what he says in Isag. 3 where he 
discusses the differences. In chapter 3 Porphyry does speak about the structure, implying a 
pattern of branches, and utilises a Platonic privative framework66 also used by Gregory. 
Secondly, in Porphyry the category of substance (ἡ οὐσία) is at the top of the hierarchy,67 
while Gregory places  “that which exists” or “being” in this position (Gregory writes about “τῶν 
ὄντων”).68 Although these terms are close, their meanings are not identical. In the context of the 
Tree of Porphyry, “substance” is viewed as an Aristotelian category, thereby inheriting the 
connotations typical for the concept of categories in an Aristotelian context, while Gregory 
speaks of “that which exists” without those connotations. When Gregory speaks of τῶν ὄντων as 
being at the top of the hierarchy, his position is the closest to the Stoic framework, for Gregory 
simply speaks of “that which exists” in the most general sense. Although both Gregory and the 
Stoics position this category at the top of their hierarchy of divisions, it does not claim any 
                                                 
62 H. DROBNER, Gregory Nyssa as Philosopher, p. 95. 
63 Balas notes the similarity between the hierarchy of beings in Gregory and the Tree of Porphyry, but 
without detailed elaboration on the subject (D. BALAS, ΜΕΤΟΥΣΙΑ ΘΕΟΥ, p. 36, n. 93). 
64 AMMON. In Isag. 70.13. 
65 IBN AL-TAYYIB. In Isag.171; J. BARNES, Porphyry. Introduction, p. 109. 
66 See above, the text at n. 54. 
67 PORPH. Isag. 4, 21; 10, 14-15 (Busse). 
68 GREG. NYSS. Opif. hom. 8, PG 44, 145, 10.  
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ontological primacy (as was noted above, for Gregory it would be impossible to put “that which 
exists” ontologically higher than the Godhead, even though in the genera-species hierarchy 
which he is building, the levels of “that which exists” and the “rational” are above the level of 
“Godhead”) but, reflecting our intention to comprehend all that exists, it instead refers the reader 
exclusively to an epistemological context. The link between the concept of “that which exists” in 
Gregory and the Stoic context is confirmed by the usage of the term: in both cases τῶν ὄντων69 is 
understood in the sense of “...out of everything that exists,” and in both cases this category is 
divided into corporeal and incorporeal beings (ἀσώματα among the Stoics, and νοητόν in 
Gregory), although Gregory certainly understands the nature of the incorporeal in a completely 
different manner than the Stoic philosophers. The nature of further divisions along the genera-
species hierarchy is understood by Gregory in such a way that they have concrete ontological 
status, representing the stages of cosmogenesis. 
It is worth pointing out another important difference in the schemes of Gregory and 
Porphyry – the difference in their understanding of the status of the genera-species hierarchy 
itself. The hierarchy that exists in Porphyry does not claim any ontological status70 and serves 
only didactic purposes. Gregory’s hierarchy of beings, even though it is dependent on 
Porphyry’s, as was stated, is endowed with ontological status in relation to the levels below the 
level of the corporeal, that is, in relation to the hierarchy of natural beings. 
Thirdly, if Porphyry’s division extends down to individuals, the division of beings in 
Gregory of Nyssa does not (what goes back to Aristotelian line in the genera-species divisions), 
but its final level is the “rational,” which corresponds to human beings. This can be related to the 
fact that for Gregory, unlike Porphyry, the importance lies not in the logical aspect of genera-
species divisions, but in the aspect related to the creation of the world. Therefore Gregory does 
not bring his genera-species divisions to their logical conclusion. 
Fourthly, there is also no exact correspondence between the lowest levels of the hierarchy 
in Gregory and Porphyry. We should recall that Gregory spoke about the division of beings into 
the intellectual and the corporeal, of corporeal beings into those participating in life and those 
devoid of life, of beings participating in life (animal, or living beings) into those having senses 
and those devoid of senses, and of beings which have senses into rational and irrational. This 
corresponds to the following succession: existing (ὄντα) – corporeal (σωματικόν) – living 
(ζωτικόν) – sensible (αἰσθητικόν) – rational (λογικόν). 
                                                 
69 In this respect it is important that Gregory consistently speaks of τῶν ὄντων or of πάντων τῶν ὄντων 
(and not of τὸ ὄν or τὰ ὄντα), as the highest level of the divisions (cf. the quote from the Stoics in n. 49). In 
addition to Opif. hom. 8, PG 44, 145, 10, see Eun. 1, 1, 270, 1; 1, 1, 295, 1 (Jaeger), Or. cat. 6, 10 (Srawley). 
70 See PORPH. Isag. 1, 8-12 (Busse). 
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Yet, the division which Porphyry describes in Isag. 2 and which is mentioned by Drobner 
in relation to that of Gregory, involves a hierarchy of “substance” (οὐσία) – “body” (σῶμα) – 
“animate body” (ἔμψυχον σῶμα) – “living being” (ζῷον) – “rational living being” (ζῷον 
λογικὸν) – “human being” (ἄνθρωπος) – “individual human being.” It would seem that 
Gregory’s structure of division as compared to the Tree of Porphyry presented in Isagoge 2 
omits the level of “animate beings” of the Tree, however Gregory does mention this level 
immediately after the description of his division of beings, “…after inanimate matter (as a sort of 
foundation for the form of animate things (τῆς τῶν ἐμψύχων ἰδέας)), this vegetative life was 
made <…> , then he proceeds to introduce the genesis of those creatures which are regulated by 
sense,”71 and a little later in the same Opif. hom. 8, “man was made last, after every animate 
thing…”.72 It follows from these passages that according to Gregory, in his hierarchy of genera-
species division “animate beings” were placed after “living beings” and before “rational beings,” 
and were the same as “beings with senses” (“percipient”). 
At the same time, while Porphyry does not mention “percipient” in the context of the 
division in Isag. 2 (something which is incorrectly referred to by Drobner in relation to 
Gregory’s scheme), he discusses this later, in the third chapter, where the structure of the genera-
species division is presented as a tree with branches. It follows from Isag. 3 that “percipient” 
constitutes a specific difference for the genus of “living,” (“animal”)73 which means that 
“percipient” distinguishes the species of “living” from the genus of “animate.” Porphyry 
discusses this in the context of his argument about the specificity of species-related differences 
which, depending on one’s point of view on a species within a genera-species hierarchy – “from 
bottom up” or “from top to bottom”—might either act as species-defining or to divide a genus 
into species. Porphyry lists differences of the “living,” including animate, percipient (when the 
hierarchy is viewed downwards from the “living”), rational and non-rational, mortal and 
immortal (branches which are formed when the hierarchy is viewed upwards from the “living”). 
Further Porphyry speaks about the division according to distinctive differences in relation to 
“substance” (as the top of the hierarchy) and lists those differences, mentioning animation and its 
absence as well as capacity and incapacity in relation to the percipient, which form the “living” 
as a result of the division of substance.74  
                                                 
71 GREG. NYSS. Opif. hom. 8, PG 44, 145, 18-23, trans. W. Moore and H. A. Wilson, in GREGORY OF 
NYSSA, On the Making of Man. 
72 Ibid., 148, 17–18, trans. W. Moore and H. A. Wilson, in , in GREGORY OF NYSSA, On the Making of 
Man. 
73 It seems that Porphyry followed Aristotle in this regard. Cf., for example, ARISTOT. Exerc. de gen. an. 
2, 1, 732a. 
74 PORPH. Isag. 10, 3-9; 14-18 (Busse). 
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Gregory’s level of “sensible beings” is also present in the Tree of Porphyry as a species-
related distinction, distinguishing the species of “living” within the genus of “animate.” Thus, 
according to the Tree of Porphyry, being sensible (“percipient”) is the substantial quality for the 
level of “living” located beneath the level of “animate beings” and corresponding to the level of 
“living” in the hierarchy. This is not consistent with Gregory’s understanding as he, as we have 
seen, places “sensible beings” not on the same level as “living beings”, as it is in Porphyry, but 
alongside “animate beings.”  
In addition, two levels – “living beings” and “animate beings – are arranged in opposite 
orders by Gregory and Porphyry: in Gregory “living beings” precede “animate beings” (=“beings 
having senses”), while in Porphyry “animate” precede “living.” 
The reason why Gregory changed the order of the genera-species hierarchy, present in the 
Tree of Porphyry, must have been related to his desire to reconcile the logical and philosophical 
structure of division, conventional at the time, with the Biblical account, that is, with how the 
Bible describes the order of the creation of natural beings, and with the logic of this order. 
Indeed, the Biblical text says that the world of plants was created prior to the world of animals 
(living beings).75 This determines the structure of division of beings in Gregory, according to 
which living beings precede animate beings. For this reason Gregory diverges from the order of 
the hierarchy of beings that appears in the Tree of Porphyry. 
 
 
7.5. Conclusion 
 
It can be concluded that in Opif. hom. 8 Gregory of Nyssa intended to achieve a synthesis 
between Biblical and the school Platonic descriptions of the order of natural beings. These 
descriptions, taken by themselves, are similar in structure, but diverge in several aspects which 
were therefore in need of harmonization. 
As far as Gregory of Nyssa’s understanding of nature is concerned, the very fact that 
Gregory speaks of “nature” as a dynamic principle due to which created beings acquire 
progressive motion,76 an idea that stands in contrast to his philosophical predecessors, may, in 
                                                 
75 Cf. Gen. 1:11 and 1:20. 
76 According to the logic of Opif. hom. 8, the source of this dynamic is God who, in this way, created 
natural beings. This means that creation and progressive (evolutionary) natural development, in this paradigm, 
coincide. In general, we can note that Gregory of Nyssa has a two-fold doctrine of the order of creation. On the 
one hand, it implies the instantaneous bringing into being of created beings in their entirety when all things 
started to exist in their potentiality (Hex., PG 44, 72), on the other hand, it means their actualized progressive 
development in time, which represents an important aspect of the act of creation. We may say that creation is 
instantaneous, keeping in mind the boundaries separating created beings from non-being on the one hand, and 
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my opinion, justify discussion of the evolutionary aspect of Gregory’s doctrine. This aspect is 
also reflected in Gregory’s idea that each subsequent level of this dynamic natural order 
incorporates the preceding levels. Moreover, the concept of nature as a dynamic principle, which 
Gregory uses, can be traced back to an Aristotelian understanding of nature. Although Ladner, 
referring to Aristotle’s Hist. an. 8, 1, 588b, argues that the influence of the Aristotelian doctrine 
of natural progress on Gregory was indirect,77 it can be assumed that Gregory had a direct 
knowledge of this doctrine, as is demonstrated in Opif. hom. 8. It is demonstrated by two facts: 
firstly that both authors understand nature as passing from the lesser to the more perfect natural 
species,78 and secondly that other Aristotelian motifs can be found in Opif. hom., including 
Gregory’s treatment of the anthropological problems, which indicates that Gregory’s interest in 
Aristotle must have been quite consistent.  
Nevertheless, the Aristotelian understanding of the structure of the transition between the 
natural species, is obviously opposite to that of Gregory: according to Aristotle, the boundaries 
between the stages of the movement of nature are blurred and invisible,79 while Gregory, 
following the Biblical text and the logical discourse of genera-species divisions, focuses on their 
qualitative difference from each other. 
Thus, the concept of the progressive graded movement of nature in Gregory of Nyssa 
represents a synthesis of anthropological, cosmogonic, logical, and natural philosophic 
discourses. This concept is partly based on the Biblical account and partly on the ideas borrowed 
from the Greek logical and philosophical tradition. Gregory changes the logical structure of the 
hierarchical tree of beings, typical for his time, exactly because of his desire to synthesize the 
Scriptural teaching about the order of natural beings and the doctrine of the order of beings 
which was widespread in the ancient philosophical tradition. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
from uncreated beings, on the other. Creation possesses development and order when created beings are regarded 
within their own limits.     
77 G. LADNER, The Philosophical Anthropology, p. 71, n. 47. 
78 Cf. ARIST. Hist. an. 8.1, 588b and Gen. an. B 1, 732b-733a. 
79 “Nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal life in such a way that it is impossible to 
determine the exact line of demarcation, nor on which side thereof an intermediate form should lie. Thus, next 
after lifeless things comes the plant, and of plants one will differ from another as to its amount of apparent 
vitality; and, in a word, the whole genus of plants, whilst it is devoid of life as compared with an animal, is 
endowed with life as compared with other corporeal entities. Indeed, as we just remarked, there is observed in 
plants a continuous scale of ascent towards the animal. So, in the sea, there are certain objects concerning which 
one would be at a loss to determine whether they be animal or vegetable” (ARIST. Hist. an. 8, 1, 4-5, 588b, trans. 
d’A. W. Thompson).  
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Chapter 8 “Reconstruction of Eunomius’ doctrine of universals and of its theological and 
philosophical context” 
 
 
The fact that the Neo-Niceans (the Cappadocian Fathers) introduced the notion of the 
universal – the concept of the common substance understood in the sense of the common species 
– into the Trinitarian doctrine in the course of the Arian controversy, is well known, and a large 
number of studies is dedicated to this issue. However, it seems that the position about the 
universal, which the Neo-Arians – the direct opponents of the Neo-Nicean authors – adhered to 
so far has not been discussed in the literature. It is in the polemics with this position that the 
New-Niceans developed their doctrine. In the following I will try to analyze the understanding of 
the universals by the leader of the Neo-Arian party Eunomius and to point to possible sources of 
his position in the philosophical doctrines of Late Antiquity. Keeping in mind the specific 
Eunomian understanding of the universals, I will present the theological debate between the 
Neo-Niceans and the Neo-Arians as the debate concerning the universals. In my opinion, the 
positions of the Neo-Nicean and the Neo-Arian parties were opposite to each other not only in 
terms of the doctrine concerning the status of God the Son, but also in terms of the related views 
concerning the theory of the universals. 
Indeed, in the Neo-Nicean philosophical and theological system, the horizontal structure of 
commonness extended beyond the Trinitarian doctrine to all beings. Thus, Gregory of Nyssa, the 
brother of Basil of Caesarea, developed the doctrine on the fundamental division (διαίρεσις) of 
the beings into classes. In his earlier works, On the Making of Man and On the Soul and 
Resurrection,1 Gregory of Nyssa developed the doctrine on the order of the created beings 
according to the ascending ladder of vitality and spoke about the division, according to which the 
beings (τῶν ὄντων) were divided into intellectual beings (τό νοητικόν) and corporeal beings (τό 
σωματικόν). Gregory left the question concerning the division of intellectual beings for another 
occasion2 and in these treatises spoke only about the division of the corporeal beings. According 
to him, all corporeal beings were divided into those partaking in life and those devoid of life; the 
beings partaking in life were divided into beings which possessed sensation and beings which 
lacked sensation; the beings which had sensation were divided into rational beings and irrational 
                                                 
1 GREG. NYSS. Opif. hom. 8; De an. e res. 46. 
2 According to his own words in Opif. hom. 8, PG 44, 145, 10-11. 
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beings. As a result, says Gregory, the nature makes the path of ascent from insignificant to the 
perfect as if up the steps consisting of properties.3 
Later in his fundamental treatise devoted to refuting Eunomius, Gregory of Nyssa also 
made the distinction within the intelligent realm and spoke about the division of beings into three 
natures: first, intellectual and uncreated nature (God), second, intellectual created nature (angels 
and human souls) which participated in the first nature in accordance with the goodness of will 
exposed by the individuals belonging to that nature, and, thirdly, sensible (τό αἰσθητόν) created 
nature.4 In another passage Gregory of Nyssa spoke about the division of beings into the 
uncreated and created, and about the division of the created beings into the supramundane beings 
and sensible beings.5 
According to David Balas, “being” is the summit of the hierarchy of divisions in Gregory 
of Nyssa.6 However, I think that we should distinguish between the two strategies of speaking 
about “horizontal” commonness used by Gregory of Nyssa. According to the first strategy which 
was built in accordance with the principle of division into genera and species, indeed, “being” 
was the summit in the hierarchy of divisions. “Being” embraced the (intellectual) uncreated and 
the created. According to the alternative strategy which Gregory of Nyssa developed in his 
Contra Eunomium and which he applied along with the first strategy,7 the uncreated intellectual 
being, the higher nature (ἡ ὑψηλή φύσις8), common for the hypostases of the Trinity,9 was the 
summit of the hierarchy, giving existence to the created beings.10 The intellectual created beings 
long for it as for a source of goodness and participate in it according to the goodness of their 
will.11 It seems that the first strategy placed a greater emphasis on the epistemological nature of 
the dividing process. It is assumed that “being,” that unites and transcends both the uncreated 
and the created at the summit of the hierarchy structuring the divisions of the types of 
commonness, does not precede the realm of the uncreated in reality, but is the summit of the 
hierarchy only in the context of the human thought as a result of the analytical capacity of the 
human mind. This follows from the basic principles of Christian theology; it is also evidenced by 
Gregory of Nyssa’s references to the process of human thinking, when he mentions the division 
                                                 
3 David Balas points to the doctrines of Posidonius and Panaetius a possible source for this doctrine of 
Gregory of Nyssa (D. BALAS, ΜΕΤΟΥΣΙΑ ΘΕΟΥ, рр. 36–37).  
4 GREG. NYSS. Eun. 1, 1, 270 - 277, 1, 1, 295 (Jaeger).  
5 GREG. NYSS. Eun. 4.100-101 (Jaeger). 
6 D. BALAS, ΜΕΤΟΥΣΙΑ ΘΕΟΥ, р. 34.  
7 Gregory of Nyssa employed both strategies simultaneously in his Eun. 1, 270-277.  
8 GREG. NYSS. Eun. 1, 1, 274.3-4 (Jaeger). 
9 Cf. GREG. NYSS. Eun., 1, 1, 274, 1 - 275, 1 and 1, 1, 277, 8-13 (Jaeger). 
10 GREG. NYSS. Eun., 1, 1, 271, 7 - 1, 272, 1 (Jaeger); cf. De an. e res., PG 46, 72D-73A.  
11 GREG. NYSS. Eun., 1, 1, 274, 2 - 275, 1 (Jaeger).  
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of beings into intellectual and sensible, and the division of intellectual into created and 
uncreated.12  
The second strategy involved a hierarchy that did not correspond to the divisions on the 
basis of genera and species (that is, the lower hierarchical level did not corresponds to the higher 
level as species to genus or as an individual to species), but was a hierarchy in the ontological 
sense with the principal source of being as its hierarchical summit (the uncreated nature) giving 
existence to other kinds of beings, located in the descending order with respect to the degree of 
closeness to it and of the capacity to participate in it (created intellectual and created sensible 
natures). I will discuss later the historical and philosophical background of horizontal structure 
of commonness and its division into classes in Gregory of Nyssa. 
The opponent of Gregory of Nyssa and the leader of the Neo-Arian party Eunomius13 used 
the doctrine of universals which in a sense was opposite to that of Gregory’s. And it was in 
opposition to the teaching of Eunomius, directly related to his understanding of universals, that 
Gregory of Nyssa developed the concept of the horizontal structure of commonness in his 
treatise Contra Eunomium. Specifically, Gregory did that to refute the doctrine, ascribed to 
Eunomius, that substances (of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit) form a hierarchy in such 
a way that the substance of the Father is “greater” than the substance of the Son, and the 
substances of the Father and the Son are “greater” than the substance of the Holy Spirit.14 It is 
not clear whether Eunomius really taught about the concept of “greater–lesser” as applied to the 
substances of the Supreme Triad, but, indeed, the Trinitarian doctrine of Eunomius implied the 
hierarchy of three simple substances, in which the higher substance had a precedence over the 
lower substance, and each substance was not at the same level with the others, that is, each 
substance was only one of its kind and none of them shared commonness with anything else.15 
However, the position of Eunomius concerning the problem of universals was not limited 
to the doctrine of impossibility of any commonness within the Supreme Triad. It appears that 
Eunomius had quite a developed and comprehensive theory of universals. This conclusion can be 
drawn on the basis of the Eunomian arguments from the Apology of Apology against the Nicean 
doctrine of consubstantiality of God the Father and the Son, which was paraphrased by Gregory 
of Nyssa: 
 
                                                 
12 Cf. “... In the division of beings we come to know (ἔγνωμεν) such differences...” (GREG. NYSS. Eun., 1, 
1, 295, 1-2 (Jaeger)); “... But the reason (ὁ λόγος) and understanding [of intellectual beings] divides into two – 
the uncreated, and, following it, the created are discerned” (Ibid., 1, 1, 271, 4-5). 
13 Eunomius expounded his teaching in his Apology, written in 359.  
14 See GREG. NYSS. Eun., 1, 282; 317; 321 (Jaeger). 
15 Cf. the citation from Eunomius in GREG. NYSS. Eun. 1, 152 (Jaeger). 
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His supposition that whatever things are united in the idea of their essence 
must needs exist corporeally and be joined to corruption (for this he says in this 
part of his work), I shall willingly pass by like some cadaverous odour, since I 
think every reasonable man will perceive how dead and corrupt such an 
argument is. For who knows not that the multitude of human souls is countless, 
yet one essence underlies them all, and the consubstantial substratum in them is 
alien from bodily corruption? so that even children can plainly see the 
argument that bodies are corrupted and dissolved, not because they have the 
same essence one with another, but because of their possessing a compound 
nature. The idea of the compound (τοῦ συνθέτου) nature is one, that of the 
common (τοῦ κοινοῦ) nature of their essence is another, so that it is true to say, 
“corruptible bodies are of one essence,” but the converse statement is not true 
at all, if it be anything like, “this consubstantial nature is also surely 
corruptible,” as is shown in the case of the souls which have one essence, while 
yet corruption does not attach to them in virtue of the community of essence. 
And the account given of the souls might properly be applied to every 
intellectual existence (περὶ πάσης νοερᾶς ὑποστάσεως) which we contemplate 
in creation. For the words brought together by Paul do not signify, as 
Eunomius will have them do, some mutually divergent natures of the supra-
mundane powers (τῶν ὑπερκοσμίων δυνάμεων)16; on the contrary, the sense of 
the names clearly indicates that he is mentioning in his argument, not 
diversities of natures (φύσεις), but the varied peculiarities of the operations of 
the heavenly host.17 
  
According to Eunomius, consubstantiality and possession of common substance could only 
happen in the corporeal and therefore corruptible realm. Eunomius identified commonness 
according to substance, that is, consubstantiality, with complexity: all that is consubstantial with 
something else is complex. In addition, as shown in the above passage, Eunomius developed an 
original doctrine on the angelic powers, relating to the problem of commonness. This doctrine 
assumed that the names of the intellectual powers pointed to individual natures which did not 
share (generic) commonness; in other words, Eunomius claimed that the angelic world was made 
of individual species, not united by any common genus. 
                                                 
16 Namely, thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers (Col. 1:16, Eph. 1:21). 
17 GREG. NYSS. Eun. III, 5, 61-64 (Jaeger), trans. by B. Moore and H. Wilson, in: The Nicene and Post-
Nicene Fathers, Series II, vol. 5. 
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Thus, the position of Eunomius concerning the universals can be reconstructed as follows: 
the higher we go up the hierarchy of beings, the lesser we encounter the opportunity for the 
horizontal (understood similarly to genus or species) commonness of nature for individual 
beings: commonness is possible for the corporeal beings in the proper sense; commonness is 
possible to a much lesser extent for the incorporeal beings – intellectual or angelic powers: there 
is a single species of nature for each angelic name, but there is no general nature regarding the 
angelic powers as such (this view had its philosophical basis which will be discussed below); 
commonness is not possible at all for the Supreme Triad, and at this level there are only 
substances, unique in terms of their species. 
Next I will try to clarify the historical and philosophical background of these different 
positions from the viewpoint of the theory of universals. First, I will focus on the historical 
situation. 
As I have mentioned, at the first phase of the Arian controversy in the time preceding the 
Neo-Nicean movement, the concept of “consubstantiality” (ὁμοούσιος) in respect to the Persons 
of the Trinity was used in the derivative sense, but not in a “horizontal” sense of common 
species and individuals. Accordingly, the Arian criticism and refutation of the usage of 
ὁμοούσιος as applied to the divine was built on the concept of derivation. In the first period of 
the Arian controversy, the Arians criticized the usage of the concept of “consubstantiality” as 
applied to the Persons of the Trinity on the grounds that consubstantiality of the Persons would 
involve a separation of a part in the generation of the Son of from the Father: 
 
We  acknowledge One  God… who begat an Only-begotten Son before 
eternal times… nor as Valentinus pronounced that the offspring of the Father 
was an issue nor as Manichæus (Μανιχαῖος) taught that the offspring was a 
consubstantial portion (μέρος ὁμοούσιον) of the Father. …  But if the terms 
‘from Him,’ (Rom. 11:36) and ‘from the womb,’ (Ps. 110:3) and ‘I came forth 
from the Father, and I am come’ (John 16:28), be understood by some to mean 
as if a part of consubstantial Him (μέρος αὐτοῦ ὁμοουσίου) or as an issue, then 
the Father is according to them compounded and divisible and alterable and 
material, and, as far as their belief goes, has the circumstances of a body, Who 
is the Incorporeal God18. 
 
                                                 
18 ATHAN. De Syn. 16, trans. by J. Newman, revised by Rev. A. Robertson and by me.  
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In the beginning of the second stage of the Arian controversy, Eunomius argued with the 
concept of “consubstantiality” in his first work Apology (359) along the same lines.19 Shortly 
after Eunomius had written his Apology, Basil of Caesarea introduced the concept of horizontal 
structure of commonness into the Trinitarian doctrine, insisting that consubstantiality should be 
understood in this sense. For the first time this concept was articulated by Basil in his treatise 
Contra Eunomium20 written to refute the Eunomius’ Apology. Eunomius replied to this treatise 
of Basil with his new treatise Apology of Apology (whose text survived only in small fragments 
and in the paraphrase in Gregory of Nyssa’s Contra Eunomium), where Eunomius showed the 
understanding of universals which we mentioned above. Thus, for refuting a the new concept of 
consubstantiality proposed by Basil, Eunomius needed a different set of philosophical arguments 
than his Arian predecessors and he himself had while writing the first Apology, when it was 
possible to rely on the traditional Arian criticism of consubstantiality understood in the sense of 
derivation. Now it was necessary to develop the argument which Eunomius could use for 
refuting the horizontal structure of commonness for consubstantial beings. In my opinion, it is 
for this reason that Eunomius in his Apology for Apology changed the nature of his criticism for 
the horizontal concept of consubstantiality of the Persons of the Trinity, proposed by Basil of 
Caesarea, and, therefore, articulated his specific understanding of universals. For this reason we 
may see a parallel development in the position of Eunomius and in the opposing position of 
Gregory of Nyssa who developed the ideas of Basil both in terms of the Trinitarian doctrine and 
the doctrine of universals.  
In his treatise Contra Eunomium, Basil of Caesarea said that the right way to conceive the 
commonness between God the Father and the Son was to think of a combination of the general 
(understood as a species, that is, in a horizontal sense) and of the individual properties of the 
Persons. Giving an analogy, according to which the common divinity of the Holy Trinity was 
likened to the commonness of light, and being generated and ungenerated (the hypostatic 
properties of God the Son and the Father) – to the properties in which this commonness subsisted 
and through which it is contemplated, Basil wrote: 
 
If anyone wants to accept that which is true, namely, that begotten and 
unbegotten are distinctive features (τινας ἰδιότητας) that enable 
identification and are observed (ἐπιθεωρουμένας) in the substance, which 
lead to the clear and unconfused notion (ἔννοιαν) of the Father and the Son, 
then he will escape the danger of impiety and preserve logical coherence in 
                                                 
19 EUNOM. Apol. XXVI, 23 (Vaggione). 
20 BAS. CAES. Eun., PG 29b 556; 637. 
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his reasoning. … The divinity is common, whereas fatherhood and sonship 
are distinguishing marks: from the combination (συμπλοκῆς) of both, that is, 
of the common and the unique (τοῦ τε κοινοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου), we arrive at 
comprehension of the truth (ἡ κατάληψις ἡμῖν τῆς ἀληθείας ἐγγίνεται). 
Consequently, upon hearing 'unbegotten light' we think of the Father, 
whereas upon hearing 'begotten light'21 we receive the notion of the Son22.  
 
In his Apology of Apology Eunomius objected the argument of Basil in the following way: 
 
Οur God also is composite, in that while we suppose the Light to be 
common, we yet separate the one Light from the other by certain special 
attributes and various differences. For that is none the less composite 
(σύνθετον) which, while united by one generality (τὸ κοινότητι μιᾷ), is yet 
separated by certain differences and conjunctions of peculiarities23.  
 
The position on the universals articulated here is the same as in the above paraphrase of 
Eunomian position concerning the universals by Gregory of Nyssa (in the Contra Eunomium, 
3.5.61-64). The general assumption for understanding the universals in both sources on the 
Eunomian doctrine is that the concept of division into genera and species (and its subtype, the 
division into species and individuals) was only possible for the complex and composite beings; 
such a division was not possible for the immaterial realm, that is, for the realm of the intellectual 
beings and the divinity. On this assumption Eunomius drove the conclusion that the doctrine of 
consubstantiality of the Persons of the Trinity in the horizontal sense, that is, in the sense that 
entailed the concept of species and individuals, implied complexity and corporeity of the Persons 
which was absurd. 
It seems that this assumption was based on a specific Neo-Platonic understanding of 
Aristotle’s doctrine of categories, common in the philosophy of Late Antiquity, namely, on the 
understanding of the categories which was developed by Porphyry, and later by Iamblichus, both 
of whom relied on the Plotinian interpretation of Aristotle’s categories and on the Plotinian 
doctrine concerning a specific undivided manner of the existence of forms in the intellectual 
world. 
                                                 
21 Comparing the common divinity of the Father and the Son with light, Basil follows the paradigm which 
he outlined in his Ep. 361, 27–35 (Courtonne) to Apollinaris of Laodicea. 
22 BAS. CAES. Eun., PG 29b, 637, transl. by M. DelCogliano and A. Radde-Gallwitz in: ST. BASIL OF 
CAESAREA, Against Eunomius. 
23 GREG. NYSS. Eun. 3, 10, 46, 1-7 (Jaeger), trans. by B. Moore and H. Wilson, in: The Nicene and Post-
Nicene Fathers, Series II, vol. 5, slightly revised by me.  
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In addition to the specific interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine of composite 
substance, this interpretation was based on the doctrine of the two kinds of incorporeal beings, 
existing apart from the bodies or together with the bodies24 as well as on the doctrine of the 
existence of universals in three different ways: prior to things, in the things, and posterior to the 
things. According to the understanding of Porphyry, categorical statements (in the Aristotelian 
sense), and, in particular, statements concerning genera and species, comprised by the 
Aristotelian categories, referred only to the realm of forms immanent to the things or the 
universals in the things (depending, in their being, on the universals prior to the things), and 
therefore such statements might apply only to the corporeal realm.25 The intelligible realm was 
beyond the grasp of categorical statements and was outside the realm which could be indicated 
by the language,26 since the human language applied only to the sensible realm.27 Thus, the 
universals prior to the things, being the causes of the universals in the things were unformalized 
in the human language and could not be predicated to material things. The categorial predicates 
in relation to things were the universals in the things. 
In developing his “intellectual interpretation” of categories, Iamblichus attempted to 
develop and transform the Porphyrian understanding.28 According to Iamblichus, things are 
formed not by the immanent forms-universals, but by the forms-universals prior to things. 
Iamblichus solved the problem of how the universals prior to things, being the ontological 
reasons of things, could be predicated to things as categories in such a way that the intellectual 
forms, of course, could not be the predicates of sensible things in the proper sense. Therefore, in 
this case we have a synonymous predication in the improper sense.29 For example, the statement 
“Socrates is a man” is an improper expression meaning that material Socrates participates in 
some transcendental idea of man. 
In his treatise On the Mysteries of the Egyptians, Iamblichus developed the theory that the 
higher creation, combining divine and non-divine worlds in itself, was not the subject to the 
hierarchy of genera-species and species-individuals, which implied individuation through genus 
and individual property, but every genus of the “greater beings” was a simple and distinct state, 
distinguished from all others by their genus. In doing so, Iamblichus might have had in mind the 
corollary of the Pophyrian understanding of the categories, according to which the framework of 
                                                 
24 PORPH. Sent. 19; 42. 
25 PORPH. In Cat. 56, 29-32; 58, 5-29; 91, 5-12 (Busse). 
26 Cf. PORPH. Sent. 19. 
27 PORPH. In Cat. 91, 7-12; 91, 19-27 (Busse). 
28 SIMPL. In Cat. 79, 29-30 (Kalbfleisch). 
29 Ibid. 53, 9-18 (Kalbfleisch) = fr. 16 (Larsen); in more detail see J. DILLON, Iamblichus’ Noera Theoria 
of Aristotle’s Categories, “Syllecta Classica” 8 (1997), pp. 65–77; R. CHIARADONNA, Porphyry and Iamblichus 
on Universals and Synonymous Predication, “Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medieval” 18 (2007), 
pp. 123-140. 
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division into genera and species as well as into species and individuals could only be applied to 
material beings, but not to the intellectual realm. 
 
As for the properties which you enquire about as pertaining to each of the 
superior classes (τῶν κρειττόνων γενῶν), which distinguish them from each 
other, if you understand the properties as specific differences (εἰδοποιοὺς 
διαφορὰς) distinguished from one another by dichotomy within the same 
genus, as for example "rational" and "irrational" within the genus "Animal," we 
will never accept the existence of properties in this sense in the case of beings 
who have no community of essence (κοινωνίαν οὐσίας μίαν), nor division into 
sub-species of the same rank, and which do not exhibit the synthesis (σύνθεσιν) 
of an indefinite (ἀορίστου) element that is common, and a determinative 
(ὁρίζοντος) element that defines. But if you understand "property," (τὴν 
ἰδιότητα) on the assumption that you are dealing with primary and secondary 
entities that differ from each other in their whole nature and by entire genus, as 
a simple (ἁπλᾶ) state delimited in itself, then this concept of property makes 
some sense; for these will certainly each be separate and simple, as totally 
transcendent properties of beings which exist eternally30.  
 
In this case Iamblichus followed the Aristotelian idea of unmoved movers, giving the 
motion to the planets.31 Each of the movers was original, had its own species, and was not 
subject to the common genus with the others.32 Iamblichus denied any possibility of species 
formation in the “greater genera” on the premise that each of these genera did not have a 
common substance with other beings but was defined by its own simple genus. Otherwise, 
according to Iamblichus, these genera would have been not simple but complex being the 
combinations of the general and the particular. His argument is likely to be based on the 
conclusion that in the opposite case we would not have been able to speak about the divine 
genera, but about the genera of the material world. Indeed, in his “intellectual interpretation” of 
the Aristotelian categories, Iamblichus spoke of species formation as the principle of 
distinguishing between the beings only with respect to the material reality33 – but denied it, as 
we have seen, with respect to the divine genera. 
                                                 
30 IAMBL. De myst. I, 4, 10-11, trans. by E.C. Clark, J.M. Dillon, J.P. Hershbell, in: Iamblichus on the 
Mysterius, Leiden: Brill 2004, slightly revised by me. On Iamblichus’ preference of the particular over the 
general see PROCLUS. In Tim. I, 426, 3. 
31 Cf. ARIST. Met. XII, 8. 
32 See G. SHAW, Theurgy and the Soul. The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus, Pennsylvania 1995, p. 76.  
33 SIMPL. In Cat. 218, 8-9. 
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Thus, Eunomius followed the same line of argumentation as that of Iamblichus: the 
reasoning in terms of general and particular implied the complexity of what existed through the 
combination of the two, and therefore could not be applied to the incorporeal realm. The fact that 
Iamblichus rejected the principle of defining the indefinite general with the determinative 
properties as leading to complexity – the key principle of the horizontal structure of commonness 
for the Persons of the Trinity for the Cappadocian Fathers34 – also indicates that it was suitable 
for Eunomius to choose the Iamblichian conceptual structure as a philosophical basis for refuting 
the use of this principle in the Trinitarian sense. We can assume that in his teaching on the 
singular natures of the types of the angelic powers which did not have any commonness with 
each other, Eunomius directly relied on Iamblichus.35 However, in general, in his doctrine of the 
universals, which allowed for the application of the concept of consubstantiality, understood in a 
horizontal sense, and in general of the applicability of the division into genera-species and 
species-individuals only to the material realm, Eunomius followed the Neoplatonic paradigm of 
understanding the Aristotelian categories, according to which the categories, including the 
Aristotelian category of the second substance (species and genera), were applicable only to the 
material and physical reality. 
Eunomius might have been introduced to the Neoplatonic tradition by his teacher Aetius 
who lived and studied,36 or even was born37 in Syrian Antioch. In the beginning of the fourth 
century Daphne, the suburb of Antioch, was a center of Syrian Neoplatonism which had emerged 
around the School of Iamblichus. Moreover, Aetius was a friend of the Emperor Julian,38 the 
                                                 
34 Cf., for example, the famous Ep. 38: «…My statement, then, is this. That which is spoken of in a 
special and peculiar manner is indicated by the name of the hypostasis.  Suppose we say “a man.”  The indefinite 
meaning (τῷ ἀορίστῳ τῆς σημασίας) of the word strikes a certain vague sense upon the ears.  The nature (τὴν 
φύσιν) is indicated, but what subsists and is specially and peculiarly indicated by the name is not made plain. … 
This then is the hypostasis, or “understanding;” not the indefinite conception of the essence or substance (ἡ 
ἀόριστος τῆς οὐσίας ἔννοια), which, because what is signified is general, finds no “standing,” but the conception 
which by means of  the expressed peculiarities gives standing and circumscription to the general and 
uncircumscribed (τὸ κοινόν καὶ ἀπερίγραπτον). …  Transfer, then, to the divine dogmas the same standard of 
difference which you recognise in the case both of essence and of hypostasis in human affairs, and you will not 
go wrong» (3:1-12, 30-33 (Courtonne), trans. by Rev. B. Jackson, in: The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 
Series II, vol. 8).  
35 We should note that the language used by Gregory of Nyssa in his paraphrase of the Eunomian doctrine 
that the types of angelic powers cannot be the subjects of the common genus, is somewhat similar to the 
language used by Origen in the Peri Archon (if we consider those few passages that are extant in the original 
Greek); cf. the paraphrase of Gregory of Nyssa: οὐ γάρ, καθὼς Εὐνόμιος βούλεται, αἱ παρὰ τοῦ Παύλου 
κατειλεγμέναι φωναὶ τῶν ὑπερκοσμίων δυνάμεων φύσεις τινὰς ἀλλήλων παρηλλαγμένας σημαίνουσιν (GREG. 
NYSS. Eun. 3, 5, 63, 4-6 (Jaeger)) and Origen’s chapter title Περὶ λογικῶν φύσεων (De Princ. 1, 5) as well as in 
the extant Latin translation of the Greek text of the De Princ.: Igitur tot et tantis ordinum officiorumque 
nominibus cognominatis, quibus certum est subesse substantias (De Princ. 1, 5, 3, 74-75 (Crouzel, Simonetti). 
However, further in the De Princ. 1, 8, 2, Origen rejected the idea that the angelic powers (as well as human 
souls) had different spiritual natures. 
36 PHILOSTORGIUS 3, 15. 
37 SOCRATES SCHOLASTICUS. Hist. 2, 35. 
38 PHILOSTORGIUS 3.27; 6.7; JULIANUS. Ep. 25 (see J. BIDEZ, La Vie de l’Empereur Julien, Paris 1930, pp. 
90–93). 
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follower of Iamblichus, and the disciple of the Pergamum School of Neoplatonism. Orthodox 
contemporaries of Eunomius traditionally viewed him in the context of the Aristotelian 
doctrine,39 and most scholars of the twentieth century followed them in this respect. However, 
there were some attempts to establish a connection between Eunomius and Platonic tradition. 
Thus, in the middle of the twentieth century, some scholars pointed to the presence of the 
Neoplatonic subordinationism in the Eunomian teaching on the Supreme Triad.40 Jean Daniélou 
tried to connect the teaching of Eunomius with the contemporaneous Neoplatonic thought, 
demonstrating the influence of the Cratylus exegesis of the Iamblichian School on the theory of 
names of Eunomius.41 Pointing to the hierarchical nature of the Eunomian Supreme Triad and 
the triads of Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus, P. Mar Gregorius insisted on the Eunomius 
adherence to theurgic practices,42 and even called him a man deeply immersed in theurgy, 
unfortunately, not providing any evidence to his claim.43 Not attempting at such radical claims of 
Eunomius’ Neoplatonism, in this article I am trying to point out the Neoplatonic background of 
Eunomius in the sense that Eunomius might have depended on the interpretation of the 
Aristotelian categories, common in the Neoplatonic philosophical tradition. 
Obviously, the Cappadocian Fathers did not accept this interpretation of the Aristotelian 
categories and do not limit the framework of division into genera-species and species-individuals 
to any realm of reality. We may say that one of the mitigating reasons for the Cappadocian 
understanding of the scope of how the Aristotelian categories could be applied, which diverged 
from the Neoplatonic understanding, prevailing in their time in the philosophical circles and 
followed by Eunomius, was the epistemological terminology used by the Cappadocians. This 
terminology combined the language of the general and the particular as applied to the Trinitarian 
doctrine. Indeed, the Cappadocians tended to describe in epistemological terms those notions 
which Iamblichus and Eunomius endowed with ontological status, referring to the indefinite 
general and defining particular as really existing principles and rejecting their applicability to the 
divine realm. The Cappadocians relegated the description of the general and the particular in the 
                                                 
39 BAS. CAES. Eun., PG 29b, 516; GREG. NYSS. Eun. I, 1, 55; 2, 620 (Jaeger); EPIPH. Panar. 76, 2, 2; 
SOCR. Hist. 4, 7. See also D. RUNIA, Festugiere Revisited: Aristotle in the Greek Patres, “Vigiliae Christianae”, 
43 (1989), pp. 9-12, 23-26. 
40 E. VANDENBUSSCHE, La part de la dialectique dans la théologie d’Eunomius le technologue, “Revue 
d’histoire ecclésiastique", 40 (1944-1945), p. 70; E. VON IVÁNKA, Hellenisches und Christiches im 
frühbyzantinischen Geistesleben, Wien 1948, pp. 21-22. See also D. BALAS, ΜΕΤΟΥΣΙΑ ΘΕΟΥ, pp. 25–27; P. 
PAPAGEORGIOU, “Plotinus and Eunomius: A Parallel Theology of the Three Hypostasis,” The Greek Orthodox 
Theological Review 37, 3-4 (1992), pp. 215-231. 
41 J. DANIELOU, “Eunome l’arien et l'exégèse néoplatonicienne du Cratyle,” Revues des études grecques 
69 (1956), pp. 412-432. The arguments that the philosophical background of the Eunomian theory of language 
implied the Stoic, and not the Neoplatonic framework are presented in D. BIRIUKOV, The Strategies of Naming. 
42 P. MAR GREGORIOS, Theurgic Neo-Platonism and the Eunomius-Gregory Debate: An Examination of 
the Background, in L. Mateo-Seco, and J. Bastero (eds.), Eun. I” en la produccion literaria de Gregorio de Nisa, 
Pamplona 1988, pp. 217-235.  
43 Ibid., p. 230. 
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Trinitarian framework mainly to the activity of the human thinking – from the general notion of 
the object that was stored in memory, to its particular features which the mind identified though 
the deeper contemplation of the object.44 However, the Neo-Niceans did not single out any 
particular concept for their Trinitarian system. In their works we may see the whole variety of 
approaches, including the analogy of the general species and individuals, the principle of 
perichoresis of the Persons, the language of the development of the Monad, etc. – but none of 
these concepts, apparently, was regarded as exclusive.  
Thus, the specific nature of the Eunomian ontology is its “atomicity” which manifested 
itself in the idea that at the higher ontological levels there were only singular substances, while 
we might encounter the greater possible commonness at the lower steps of the hierarchy of 
beings. This view is specifically manifested in the teaching of Eunomius that each type of 
angelic powers possessed only a single type of nature, but not the common nature for the angelic 
powers as a whole. This understanding probably went back to a similar concept in the 
philosophical system of Iamblichus. It is possible that this particular doctrine of Eunomius 
concerning the universals provoked the natural philosophical reaction which was manifested in 
the development of the opposite doctrine on the hierarchy of commonness in the treatise of 
Gregory of Nyssa Contra Eunomium, namely, the doctrine which combined two strategies of the 
hierarchy of commonness. According to the first strategy which was built upon the principle of 
division into genera and species, “being” was at the summit of the hierarchy of divisions. In this 
strategy, the most common was located at the summit of the hierarchy, and the degree of 
commonness decreased in the process of descending. Such structure of hierarchy of commonness 
was opposite to that of Eunomius. The second strategy implied the hierarchy of commonness 
which did not correspond to the divisions into genera and species. This strategy attempted to 
reveal the ontological hierarchy of beings and had uncreated intellectual being at its summit. 
This strategy was also contrary to the Eunomian structure since it involved the commonness of 
the uncreated and the created intellectual realms. 
Thus, various concepts related to the universals which emerged in the philosophy of Late 
Antiquity, are reflected in different positions on the universals in the Trinitarian controversy at 
the early stage of the Byzantine philosophical thought. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Cf., for example, the passage from Basil of Caesarea, cited above (Eun., PG 29b, 637) and Ep. 38, 3:1-
12, 41-47 (Courtonne).  
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Chapter 9 “Hierarchies of Beings in the Patristic Thought. Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius 
the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, John of Damascus, and the Palamites” 
  
 
 
1. Now we should turn to the question of how the hierarchy of beings was understood by 
Dionysius the Areopagite in comparison with Gregory of Nyssa. 
This paradigm of participation by Dionysius is radically different than that of Gregory of 
Nyssa. The hierarchy, built up by Gregory does not imply transcendental principles 
corresponded to the links of hierarchy and participated in by them, while Dionysius on the basis 
of the philosophy of Proclus developed his doctrine of hierarchy involving such principles. 
This difference can be correlated with the rethinking of the concept of participation 
according to substance, and, in particular, participation in divine substance in the Patristic 
thought due to the change in the underlying philosophical understanding of the very notion of 
participation. Below, a short excursion into this subject will be provided. 
I will use the expression, “Platonic paradigm of participation” for such a view when the 
participating entity is understood as being different from the participated entity according to 
nature, and the expression by participation implies the terms of the opposition to being by 
existence or by nature (by possession of nature). For example, a being, which is not the One, 
participates in It, and therefore is not It as such.1 In the most general sense, participation in this 
paradigm points to the fact that a certain being possesses a certain property to a lesser extent than 
does the embodiment of this property. The “Aristotelian paradigm of participation,” opposite to 
the Platonic, is Aristotle’s understanding of participation expressing a logical relationship 
between the genera-species predicables of varying degrees of generality: less general participates 
in more general, while the latter does not participate in the former (an individual participates in 
species and genus; species participates in genus, but not vice versa).2 Thus by participation in 
the Aristotelian paradigm meant the same as by existence or by nature since in this paradigm an 
individual by nature is which species and genus it belonged to or participated in. Moreover, 
unlike Platonic language which, when it comes to participation, speaks about a greater or lesser 
degree of participation, Aristotelian language cannot speak about varying degrees of 
participation. 
                                                 
1 Cf. PLATO. Parm. 158a. 
2 ARIST. Top. 121a10-15, 122b20-22. 
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The Early Christian authors were inspired to actively use the Platonic paradigm of 
participation by the well-known passage from the Second Epistle of Peter, which stated that 
Christians would become the partakers of the divine nature (θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως) (2 Pet. 1, 3–
4). Accordingly, the topic of participation in divine substance (nature), as implicitly or explicitly 
opposite of possession of it3, with more or less obvious philosophical connotations and usually 
with the allusion to 2 Pet. 1, 3-4 was used in the early Byzantine literature by Athanasius of 
Alexandria 4, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, Macarius the Great5 and other authors. In 
the Middle Byzantine literature this topic was dealt with by John of Damascus, who summarized 
all possible paradigms of participation for his time – Platonic, Aristotelian, and Neoplatonic,6 
and by Symeon the New Theologian.7 This trend of Patristic literature argued that holy people 
participate in the divine nature (they partake in the divine substance, but do not possess it as 
hypostases of the Trinity do), while the created world as a whole, according to Gregory of 
Nyssa,8 cannot be considered as participating in it.  
This paradigm of participation fell into background in the Byzantine Patristic literature in 
connection with the new philosophical language which appeared in the Corpus Areopagiticum. 
Those notions which earlier Patristic exegesis expressed through the opposition of by existence 
(by nature) – by participation, started to be expressed in Dionysian philosophical and theological 
framework by the conceptual triad of non-participated – participated – participating9 (the 
Neoplatonic paradigm of participation) developed by Proclus and adopted by the author of the 
Corpus Areopagiticum. This paradigm of participation included some aspects of both Platonic 
and Aristotelian paradigms: the Aristotelian paradigm functioned as a background, in opposition 
to which the notion of non-participated was elaborated, while the Platonic paradigm manifested 
itself in relation to the participated and the participating. 
In the process of transferring this triad into Christian theological thought, Areopagite 
distinguished in the divinity the participated (μετεχόμενον) which he associated with the divine 
processions and powers, and non-participated (ἀμέθεκτος) – the supra-substantial divinity of 
God.10 The author of the scholia to the Corpus Areopagiticum interpreted this in such a way that 
                                                 
3 About the opposition by participation and by nature see above. 
4 For example, Ep. 1 ad Serap., PG 26, 585B-C. 
5 The last two authors very often devoted their attention to this subject; each of them has dozens of 
pertinent passages.  
6 For example, see the Platonic paradigm in the De imag. 3.33 (on partaking in the divine substance by 
the saints); see the Aristotelian paradigm in the De duab. 7; see the Neoplatonic paradigm in Ibid., 11: 9-10 
(Kotter) (where John of Damascus, contradicting the De imag.  3.33, speaks about impossibility of partaking in 
the divine substance) and in the De fidei 7 (51).  
7 Eth. 3, 82-86; Hymn 7, 30-36; 50, 153-154, 200-202 etc. 
8 Eun. 3, 3, 7, 1 - 8, 6 (Jaeger). 
9 This triad might have been introduced into the philosophical language by Iamblichus; see the testimony 
of Proclus in his Commentary on the Timaeus II, 105, 16–28; 313, 19–24. 
10 De div. nom. (hereafter DN) 2, 5; 11, 6.  
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while divinity could be participated according to its processions and energies, God could not be 
participated according to His nature.11 Moreover, this paradigm assumes that He is completely 
unparticipated for all created beings including saintly people. The topic of ultimate impossibility 
of participating in God according to substance (nature) and the opportunity to participate in God 
according to energies is exhaustingly developed in the writings of Maximus the Confessor 
(possibly the author of the scholia to the Corpus Areopagiticum mentioned above).12 In this way 
the Aristotelian paradigm became partially borrowed in the understanding that to participate in 
substance meant to possess the substance or to be something according to substance. Thereby, 
the discourse of the participation of saints (as well as of any created beings) in the divine 
substance, which was used in the preceding Patristic literature including Gregory of Nyssa, 
became forbidden (since in this paradigm the participation of saints in the divine essence would 
imply becoming God according to substance for their). 
After Maximus, Neoplatonic participation paradigm which implied complete impossibility 
of participating in God according to substance, for a time fell out of use, but reemerged among 
the Orthodox theologians after the rediscovery of the theological heritage of Maximus the 
Confessor at the end of life of Nicetas Stethatos, that is, in the last quarter of the eleventh 
century. Further this paradigm was taken over by Gregory Palamas; eventually in the course of 
the Palamite Controversy the idea of possibility of participation of created beings in the divine 
substance was rejected in the Tomos of the Council of the Church of Constantinople in 135113 
and anathematized in a special supplement to the Synodikon of Orthodoxy.14 
Gregory of Nyssa used both Platonic and Aristotelian paradigms of participation in his 
writings. The Aristotelian participation paradigm was used by Gregory when he argued that all 
people equally partook in the human nature15. Gregory used the Platonic participation paradigm 
in the framework of hierarchy where it took place participation of intellectual created beings in 
the uncreated intellectual being – divine substance – according to the goodness of will as 
participation in the highest level of hierarchy. However, in Dionysius the Areopagite, who 
borrowed the Neoplatonic triad of participation, as well as subsequently in Maximus the 
Confessor and Gregory Palamas, such a Platonic paradigm of participation became impossible in 
its application to the divine substance. According to the philosophical paradigm of participation 
shared by these authors, participation in the divine substance would imply its assimilation, which 
was overall prohibited in the Patristic theological thought. In fact, the idea of assimilating divine 
                                                 
11 PG 4, 221C, 404A–B, 404D. 
12 MAX. Quaest. et dub. 173, 1-7 (Declerck); Cap. Theol. et oec., PG 90, 1180C-1181A. 
13 396-397 (Καρμίρη). 
14 Synodicon of Orthodoxy 85, 628-633 (Gouillard). 
15 Eun. 1, 1, 173, 2 - 1, 1, 175, 1 (Jaeger). 
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substance by created beings was “blocked” in this case through the introduction of the concept of 
non-participation into theological discourse. 
Therefore, the authors who adopted the Neoplatonic triad of participation in their 
theological language and whose theological system implied the utter non-participation in God 
(non-participation in the divine substance) naturally developed the doctrine of hierarchy entailing 
participation of created beings not in the divine substance, but rather in the higher transcendental 
principles – processions of God, His qualities, or energies, as it can be found respectively in 
Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, and Gregory Palamas. 
The doctrine of the hierarchy of beings which exists in the Corpus Areopagiticum is 
generally associated with the theme of participation in the divine. Dionysius speaks about dual 
participation in God. On the one hand, all beings participate in God naturally – by virtue of 
possessing existence and in accordance with the nature of each being (which will be discussed in 
more detail below). Such a participation is static, and within this paradigm there is no being 
deprived of participation in the First Cause. On the other hand, Dionysius speaks about 
individual way of participation in God (for rational beings), and the ability to participate in the 
Divine Goodness for an individual being, which can either be fulfilled or not. In the latter case, 
Dionysius characterizes a being as not participating in Goodness (DN IV, 4: 147, 15-148, 2  
(Suchla)). Thus, one of participation paradigms used by the Areopagite corresponded to natural 
participation and implied participation of created beings in God as a given reality. In this 
paradigm we cannot speak about non-participation of beings in Godhead in any respect. Another 
paradigm corresponded to individual way of participation and implied participation as a 
condition which may (or may not) become a reality. The latter paradigm presupposed both 
participation and non-participation of a (rational) individual being in God, if the being chooses to 
close itself for divine gifts. According to the Areopagite, in both cases beings participate in the 
divinity in its entirety: God on His part gives himself entirely, whereas created beings participate 
in the divinity proportionately to their capacity, both in the ability to receive as defined by their 
nature, and in terms of individual openness to participating in the divine gifts (for rational 
beings) (DN II, 5: 129, 4-6 (Suchla)). Later, a similar dual paradigm of participation of the 
created beings in the divine would be used by Maximus the Confessor and Gregory Palamas. 
Thus, Dionysius the Areopagite developed his theory of processions and principles which 
are participated in by the created beings in the context of the natural participation of created 
beings in the divinity. In the On the Divine Names V, 1 Dionysius speaks about such names of 
God as Goodness, Being, Life, and Wisdom as about the order of the divine processions, 
  
139
outspreading on the corresponding realities in the created world and surpassed them.16 Goodness 
extends on being and non-being; Being extends on beings; Life on living beings, while Wisdom 
extends on intellectual beings (angelic powers), rational beings, and sensible beings. These good 
processions do not constitute multiple principles, but all belong to One God. At the same time 
according to Dionysius those beings which are the subjects of the processions and which 
participate in them, form a hierarchy: living beings (τὰ ζῶντα) are above beings (τὰ ὄντα); 
sensible beings (τὰ αἰσθητικὰ) are above living beings; rational beings (τὰ λογικὰ) are above 
sensible beings, and intellects (τὰ νοερὰ) are above rational beings17. Dionysius noted that 
intellectual beings were the closest to God as having the largest number of natural perfections.18 
This very principle underlying the hierarchy of participation in Dionysius is associated with the 
concept of conformity or proportionality in outpouring of the divine gifts on the participating 
beings (see DN I, 2–3; IV, 1, 33) both in their natural and individual aspects. 
Dionysius speaks of Goodness, Being, Life, and Wisdom using not only the terminology of 
“processions.” In relation to these names he also mentions two types of specific realities – self-
supra-substantial and self-participated principles. As a rule, scholars have focused their attention 
on the Dionysian doctrine of Goodness, Being, Life, and Wisdom as the processions of the divine 
without going into great detail into the doctrine of these principles in the Corpus Dionysiacum. 
We should try to understand what Dionysius writes about them. 
In DN V, 2 Dionysius speaks about self-supra-substantial Goodness, Being, Life, and 
Wisdom pertaining to self-supra-substantial divinity; they are above all goodness, being, life, and 
wisdom. The principles, as it seems, can be identified with supra-substantial Principle and supra-
divine Life which Dionysius mentions in DN XI, 6. Yet, in order to standardize our 
terminological usage, we will refer to this kind of principles as self-supra-substantial principles. 
                                                 
16 It should be noted that the theological language of Dionysius speaks of divine names in a way that, on 
the one hand, the names explain the divine processions, while, on the other hand, Dionysius identifies those 
names with the processions. Dionysius says in DN V, 1 that the names Goodness, Being, and Life do not simply 
apply to non-beings, beings, and living beings, but also exceed them (181, 1–6 (Suchla)). Evidently, the 
reference that the divine names related to the processions exceed the corresponding realities of the created 
beings, indicates that Dionysius here identified the divine name and the procession.  
17 «Yet someone might say, 'Wherefore is Being expands beyond Life and Life beyond Wisdom, when 
living things are above beings, and sensible things above living ones, and rational things above these, and the 
intellects are above the rational things and are more around God and closer to him? For, those which participate 
in God’s greater gifts are the higher and surpass the rest. If the intellects are understood that way that they were 
without being and without life, the saying would be sound. But since the divine intellects are above other beings, 
and live in a manner surpassing other living things, and think and know in a manner beyond sense and reason, 
and in a manner beyond all existent things participate in the Beautiful and Good, they are nearer to the Good, 
participating in it in an eminent way, and receiving from it more and greater gifts; likewise rational things excel 
sensitive ones, having more by the eminence of reason, and the latter [excel other living things] by sensation, and 
[living things excel mere beings] by life» (DN V, 3: 182, 1–14 (Suchla)). I have made use the translations of E. 
Perl (E. PERL, Theophany: the Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite, New York 2007, pp. 69-70) 
and C. E. Rolt (Dionysius the Areopagite: On the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology, transl. by C. E. Rolt, 
Grand Rapids, London: SPCK 1920, (Christian Classics Ethereal Library), pp. 133-134). Sf. DN II, 7: 131, 7-13; 
IV, 4: 148: 12-18 (Suchla). 
18 DN V, 3: 182.3-4 (Suchla). 
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These entities differ from other higher entities established by God. The latter principles, 
like all beings, constitute the gift and the outpouring of self-supra-substantial Goodness (DN V, 
6) and include the principles (ἀρχαί) with the prefix “self-” (αὐτο-): Self-Being, Self-Life, Self-
Wisdom, Self-Similarity of the Divinity, Self-Unity, Self-Order (V, 5, cf. XI, 6), Self-Goodness 
(II, 1; XI, 6), Self-Eternity (V, 9), Self-Equality (IX, 10; XI, 6), Self-Peace (XI, 2; XI, 6), Self-
Divinity (XI, 6), Self-Beauty (XI, 6), and Self-Holiness (XII, 1).19 Dionysius indicates that all 
existing things, including the principles with the prefix “self-” come from self-supra-substantial 
Goodness, and gives two examples: an example of the relation of number one to other numbers 
(all numbers are merged in number one, and the more the number is removed from the one, the 
more it is divided) and an example of a multitude of lines passing through the center of the circle 
(the farther from the center, the more their divergence is) (V, 6). 
Dionysius speaks about the principles with the prefix “self-” as about realities which, being 
the gift and the outpouring of the non-participated God are participated in by beings, making 
beings to be and to become called beings, living beings, deified beings, etc. (XI, 6). 
Self-Being is the highest principle among the principles with the prefix “self-”; it is 
participated in by other principles with the prefix “self-”, which are called “self-participating” 
(αὐτομετοχὰς) by Dionysius. These principles are simultaneously participating and participated: 
they participate in Self-Being and are participated in by beings in accordance with qualities 
corresponding to these names (while some beings may simultaneously participate in several 
principles (V, 5: 184.11-12 (Suchla)). The beings, participating in the self-participated principles 
through them also participate in Self-Being (V, 5). 
Although Dionysius the Areopagite called self-participating higher realities principles 
(ἀρχαί) (V, 5), he rejected the possibility of understanding them as creating substances or causes 
(αἰτίαι) of beings (XI, 6),20 since the Cause (αἰτία) of beings and their principle is only the supra-
substantial divinity in the moduses of self-supra-substantiality (self-supra-substantial Goodness, 
Substance, Life, and Wisdom) (V, 6; XI, 6). Despite the fact that Dionysius mentions a variety of 
such moduses, the divinity in these moduses is one and the same Cause of beings; it is not many 
causes, and it would be wrong to understand the self-supra-substantial Goodness, Substance, 
Life, and Wisdom as separate causes of beings (V, 2). We may say that according to Dionysius 
the realities of the self-supra-substantial represent a single Cause and Principle while there is a 
whole variety of principles with the prefix “self-” (Self-Being, Self-Life, Self-Wisdom, etc.) (cf. 
V, 5-6). 
                                                 
19 Speaking of these principles, Dionysius also mentions that Self-Life comes from divine Life (VI, 1), that 
God as Power dwells above Self-Power (VIII, 2) and is the basis of Self-Similarity (IX, 6), Self-Equality (IX, 10), 
and Self-Peace (XI, 2). 
20 Dionysius probably argues here against Proclus’ doctrine of hennads interpreted in the sense of 
hypostatized principles. 
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Dionysius says that God can be called both the basis, for example, of Self-Life or Self-
Power and Self-Life or Self-Power in the proper sense. In the first case, it is said about God as 
about supra-substantially exceeding all beings and “first beings” (τὰ πρώτως ὄντα) (evidently, 
under the “first beings” Dionysius here means the principles with the prefix “self-”); in the 
second case he is named according to the names of beings and first beings21 as their Cause (XI, 
6: 221.13-222.2 (Suchla)). 
The relationship between the divine processions on the one hand, and the self-supra-
substantial realities and principles with the prefix “self-” on the other, are not entirely clear, but 
it seems that self-supra-substantial realities and principles with the prefix “self-,” while differing 
from each other (the former are the cause and the source of existence for the latter) and not being 
identical to divine processions, represent different aspects of the processions.22 
Among all divine names as Dionysius describes them we can distinguish first four: 
Goodness, Being (τὸ ὄν) [= Existence (τὸ εἶναι) = Substance (ἡ οὐσία)], Life, and Wisdom. 
Dionysius writes about these names as related simultaneously to divine procession, to self-supra-
substantial realities, and to the principles of beings with the prefix “self-.” This sequence of 
names was borrowed by Dionysius from the Neoplatonic tradition, which elaborated the doctrine 
                                                 
21 It is this language of speaking about the supra-being on the basis of being, which in my opinion may 
explain the words of Dionysius in DN  XI, 6: 222, 13ff. (Suchla) that Self-Being, Self-Life, and Self-Divinity are 
spoken about the divine, supra-primary, and supra-substantial Principle and Cause, while earlier (XI, 6: 222, 6ff. 
(Suchla)) Dionysius rejected the notion that Self-Being was the divine Cause for all beings, and Self-Life was the 
Cause of all living beings, and said that it was the supra-divine Life that was cause of both Self-Life and all living 
beings.  
22 It may be noted here that Eric Perl, in fact, identified divine processions in Dionysius with the 
principles with the prefix “self-” without mentioning it and without posing a question concerning the complexity 
and originality of the Dionysian doctrine of divine names and their denotations. In my opinion, this position 
somewhat distorts the doctrine of Dionysius in the form it was presented by Perl. Thus Perl developed the 
argument about the tetrad of processions Goodness, Being, Life, and Wisdom from DN V, 1 and went on to DN 
XI, 6. On the basis of the latter passage he pointed out that according to Dionysius divine processions were not 
mediating creative substances and hypostases (E. Perl, Theophany, pp. 66-67). However, in XI, 6 Dionysius 
precisely speaks about the principles with the prefix “self-” and not about divine processions in general. 
Dionysius’ purpose, among other things, was to claim that those principles were not the creative causes of 
beings, whereas the supra-substantial principle and the supra-divine Life were the Cause and Principle of all 
being and life (XI, 6: 222, 3 – 223, 3 (Suchla). It seems that Dionysian distinction between the concept of 
“cause” (αἰτία), attributable only to self-supra-substantial (or divine) entities, but not to the entities with the 
prefix “self-,” and the notion of “principle” (ἀρχή), attributable to both of those, is relevant here; see above, the 
text around note 37). Thus, in my opinion, it is not correct to identify the Dionysian divine processions and the 
principles with the prefix “self-” without specifying details and context, as it was done by Perl, since not 
everything that Dionysius attributed to the principles with the prefix “self-,” he applied to divine processions in 
general. 
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of the triad Being, Life, and Mind.23 Using this Neoplatonic triad, Dionysius replaced Mind with 
Wisdom, wishing, as scholars pointed, to bring this language closer to the Biblical.24 
In the Platonic tradition, the triad of Being, Life, and Mind went back at least to Plotinus, 
who taught about the One as the source of Being (τὸ ὄν), Life, and Mind.25 Later Neoplatonists 
Proclus and Syrianus also placed Being, Life, and Mind underneath the One, linking the triad to 
the noetic realm. S. Klitenic Wear and J. Dillon believed that only Porphyry out of all 
Neoplatonists placed the triad at the level of the One, and in this respect we have a crossing point 
of Porphyry and Dionysius who also considered the triad to correspond to the highest reality.26 
However it is unlikely that Dionysius drove on Porphyry speaking about divine names of 
Goodness, Being, Life, and Mind; Proclus was the most likely source. As P. Sherwood noted,27 in 
this regard Dionysius relied on the 101st and 102nd theorems of the Elements of Theology by 
Proclus, which referred to the triad of Being, Life, and Mind. In the 8th theorem of this treatise 
and further on Proclus spoke of Goodness as the highest principle. The dependence of Dionysius 
on Proclus in this respect also follows from the philosophical background of the Dionysian 
doctrine concerning the tetrade of Goodness, Being, Life, and Wisdom in DN V, 1-2, analyzed, 
among other scholars, by E. Perl.28 
It follows from the above that we may confidently speak about the hierarchy of created 
beings or hierarchy of participation in Dionysius the Areopagite. This is the following hierarchy 
(from the lowest level in the ontological sense as well as in relation to the measure of 
complexity): being – living being – sensible being – rational being – intellectual being (V, 3, see 
the relevant quote in note 34). This hierarchy corresponds to the order in the degree of expanding 
of the processions of God in the triad of Being, Life, and Wisdom, borrowed from the 
Neoplatonists, where the three levels in the hierarchy of participation – intellectual, rational, and 
sensible – corresponded to Wisdom. The structure of the hierarchy of participation is such that 
the more complex species the being belongs to, the greater amount of transcendent entities the 
                                                 
23 However, P. Rorem indicated that there also was a Biblical background in relation to these divine 
names (P. ROREM, Pseudo-Dionysius. A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence, 
Oxford 1993, pp. 153-155, cf. P. ROREM, “The Biblical Allusions and Overlooked Quotations in the Pseudo-
Dionysian Corpus”, Studia  Patristica 23 (1989), p. 64). 
24 Cf. S. KLITENIC WEAR, J. DILLON, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist tradition: 
Despoiling the Hellenes (Ashgate Studies in Philosophy and Theology in Late Antiquity), Aldershot; Burlington 
(VT): Ashgate 2007, p. 24, n. 31; p. 26; E. PERL, Theophany, p. 129.  
25 PLOT. Enn. I, 8, 2; see CH. SCHÄFER, The Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite. An Introduction to 
the Structure and the Content of the Treatise On the Divine Names, Leiden, Boston: Brill 2006, pp. 86. S.  
Klitenic Wear and J. Dillon mistakenly indicate Enneads I, 6, 7 in that respect (S.  KLITENIC WEAR, J. DILLON, 
Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, p. 24). 
26 S  KLITENIC WEAR, J. DILLON, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, pp. 25-26. 
27 P. SHERWOOD, Introduction, in St. Maximus the Confessor: The Ascetic Life. The Four Centuries on 
Charity, trans. and annot. by P. Sherwood, O.S.B., S.T.D. Paulist Press 1955 (Ancient Christian Writers), pp. 40-
41. 
28 E. PERL, Theophany, pp. 68-69. 
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being participates in. This implied the inclusion of each preceding level by the subsequent level, 
and meant that possession of each subsequent perfection or natural capacity entailed the 
possession of all preceding capacities, as well as the corresponding participations (although it is 
still not entirely clear how this worked in the case of angelic powers, corresponding to the level 
of the intellectual – the highest level of the Dionysian hierarchy, since the nature of angels 
obviously did not include the preceding perfections in the hierarchy29). 
Although the order of the participated divine names-processions was borrowed by 
Dionysius from Proclus, the Dionysian hierarchy of participation is not close to the hierarchy of 
participation in Proclus, which had the following form: living beings – vegetative beings – 
soulless bodies – matter.30 Thus, relying on Proclus in respect to his doctrine of the participated 
divine names-processions Goodness–Being–Life–Wisdom, Dionysius did not follow Proclus as 
far as his doctrine on what exactly participates in those processions was concerned.  
It should be noted that Dionysius does not show a clear correspondence between the stages 
in the divine processions and the levels in participation hierarchy. As I have mentioned, the 
whole three levels of hierarchy participate in Wisdom: intellectual, rational, and sensible, 
unexpectedly appearing here. 
However, is there a correspondence between the participating and the participated in the 
hierarchical structure? Does the hierarchy of participated beings correspond to a parallel 
hierarchy of participated beings in terms of participated divine processions? In my opinion, the 
answer to this question should rather be negative. 
The processions-names Goodness, Being, Life, and Wisdom from DN V, 1–2, which are 
participated in by the hierarchically organized created beings do not form a hierarchy, but rather 
in the words of Eric Pearl, “are simply more and less universal modes of the same divine 
presence,”31 representing different limits, upon which the divinity expands itself (ἐκτείνω). That 
means, as it follows from the V, 3, that Wisdom includes Life, Being, and Goodness; Life 
includes Being and Goodness, etc.32 Ch. Schäfer called this principle the “Russian-doll-
                                                 
29 It should be noted that, unlike Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa placed the perfection, corresponding to the 
angelic powers (as well as to the highest ability of the human beings), intellectual created being, outside the 
hierarchy of natural beings. Thus, such a perplexity does not arise in respect to Gregory’s doctrine of hierarchies.  
30 Theol. Plat. 3, 6. The specific character of Proclus’ teaching of participation hierarchy is that the 
number of the entities participated in by the levels of hierarchy increases as we approach the middle of the 
hierarchy (and not, for example, its summit, as it is the case with Dionysius); in general, see the list in E. R. 
DODDS, Commentary, in PROCLUS, The Elements of Theology, A revised text with transl., introd. and comm. by 
E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1963, pp. 232-233.  
31 E. PERL, Theophany, p. 70. 
32 Cf. E. PERL, Theophany, pp. 69-70. It should be noted that Klitenic Wear and Dillon claim that in the 
Dionysian triad Being is above Wisdom and Life, and that Life and Wisdom participate in Being: “Regarding 
Being, Dionysius places this name above Life and Wisdom so that Life and Wisdom participate in Being” (S. 
KLITENIC WEAR, J. DILLON, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, p. 26. Unfortunately, the 
authors do not indicate the source for this claim in the text of Dionysius). However, this statement is valid only 
for the principles with the prefix “self-” (V, 5, see above), but not for all processions as such.  
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principle.”33 Obviously, the same principle holds true in regard to the entities participating in 
those processions: intellectual beings contain the perfections of rational, sensible, living, and 
existing beings; rational beings contain the perfections of sensible, living, and existing beings, 
etc. 
We may speak about the element referring to a hierarchy for the principles with the prefix 
“self-”, which Dionysius also speaks of as participated entities (see above). Dionysius mentions 
the deified being, the living being, the unified being, the similar being, and the ordered beings as 
entities participating in those principles (V, 5: 184, 8-16; XI, 6: 222, 17 – 223, 1 (Suchla)), but 
he assumes that beings with qualities corresponding to the names of the principles participate in 
each of them. This is why these principles (with the exception of Self-Being) are called “self-
participating,” which is understood in a sense that they both participate (in Self-Being and 
through it in the self-supra-substantial Goodness), and are participated in (by the relevant types 
of participating beings). The element of hierarchical structuring in respect to these principles 
consists in their participation in Self-Being as a “senior” principle” (V, 5: 184.8–16 (Suchla)). 
However, Dionysius does not seem to give reasons to think that self-participated principles in his 
system form some kind of hierarchy among themselves apart from the fact that each of them 
participates in Self-Being. 
Thus, if we take a closer look at the examples which Dionysius provides speaking about 
the origin of all beings, including the principles with the prefix “self-,” out of self-supra-
substantial Goodness, namely, the example of many lines passing through the center of circle 
and the example of the relationship of one to other numbers (V, 6, supra), we may see that the 
first example does not imply any hierarchy, while the second example may imply it. However, 
one example is not sufficient to conclude about the hierarchical structure among the principles 
with the prefix “self-” in Dionysius, moreover, the first example does not support the 
hierarchical structure at all. Furthermore, in addition to Self-Being, Self-Life, and Self-Wisdom, 
such principles include, for example, Self-Similarity, Self-Unity, Self-Order, etc., and possible 
structure of hierarchy between them, unlike the first ones, is unclear. 
One might add that even the “Russian-doll-principle,” entailing the inclusion of the lesser 
extended principles by the longer extended principles with certainty refers only to the divine 
processions (discussed in DN V, 1-2), but not to the principles with the prefix “self-,” and we 
cannot make any definitive conclusions concerning their subordination to this principle in 
Dionysius. 
Thus, we can identify four elements concerning the subject of participation in the system 
of Dionysius, defined by the Neoplatonic paradigm which involved such aspects of participation 
                                                 
33 CH. SCHÄFER, The Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite, p. 87. 
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as the non-participated, the participated, and the participating. The four elements include, 
firstly, the non-participated – the supra-substantial divinity of God; secondly, the participated – 
divine processions and self-supra-substantial principles; thirdly, the participated and 
participating – the principles with the prefix “self-,” and, fourthly, the participating – the created 
beings in their individual and natural aspects, and, in particular, the hierarchy of beings. 
Unlike Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius did not use either Aristotelian paradigm of 
participation according to substance, that is, when the language of participation is used for 
saying that some individual being belongs to some species, or species to genus, or the Platonic 
paradigm of participation according to substance, implying the opposition by participation 
(corresponding to the possession of a certain property) and by being (corresponding to what this 
property objectified). Instead of using those paradigms, Dionysius uses the combined 
Neoplatonic paradigm of participation, which implied a distinction between the non-participated 
and participated in the divinity. This fact defines the general concept of the hierarchy of beings 
in Dionysius in the sense that it is exactly the hierarchy of the participating. 
Thus, Gregory of Nyssa and Dionysius diverge in the very concept of understanding the 
hierarchy of beings, since in Gregory this hierarchy did not imply any transcendental principles 
with respect to the types of created beings in which these types participate, while in Dionysius 
the hierarchy entailed the existence of such principles or some universals-prior-to-beings. The 
triad of the divine processions Being, Life, and Wisdom claims this role in Dionysius. Even 
though this triad represented a unified Cause of beings, it constituted a sequence of links 
differing in the degree of the expansion of the divinity. In addition, the principles with the prefix 
“self-” – Self-Being, Self-Life, and Self-Wisdom, representing some aspects of the divine 
processions – also claim this role, for in the system of Dionysius they also are participated in. 
Moreover, as far as we may understand Dionysius, these principles are distinct realities, since 
Dionysius speaks of a multitude of such principles (V, 5). 
We may also point to the common features in the hierarchies of beings by Gregory and 
Dionysius. There is a certain similarity in the sequence of levels in the hierarchies. Keeping in 
mind this similarity, we may suggest the dependence of Dionysius on Gregory in some respect. 
Thus the Dionysian hierarchy of participating beings is the following: being (τὰ ὄντα) – 
living beings (τὰ ζῶντα) – sensible beings (τὰ αἰσθητικὰ) – rational beings (τὰ λογικὰ) – 
intellectual beings (τὰ νοερὰ). In Gregory, if we take his hierarchy with the basis / summit as 
being and present the genera-species divisions in a linear way, we will have the following 
sequence of links: existing (τὰ ὄντα) – corporeal (σωματικόν) – living (ζωτικόν) – 
sensible/animate (αἰσθητικόν/ἔμψυχον) – rational (λογικόν). Each of these hierarchies has the 
direction of movement from being (existing) to rational beings or intellectual beings.  
  
146
We can also point to a certain similarity between the hierarchies built up by Gregory of 
Nyssa and Dionysius the Areopagite. In Gregory, the hierarchy with being at its basis is the 
hierarchy of genera and species. In Dionysius, the hierarchy of the participating beings (as well 
as relationship between the divine processions) according to its structure is also similar to the 
genera-species hierarchy.34 This follows from the understanding of the hierarchy, in which each 
successive level contains all the preceding levels, that is, from the “Russian-doll-principle.” 
Further, the level of the corporeal is missing in the hierarchy of Dionysius compared with 
Gregory,35 while the level of intellectual is missing the hierarchy of Gregory compared to 
Dionysius. At the same time the hierarchies of Gregory and Dionysius show similarity with 
respect to the sequence of levels being – living beings – sensible beings – rational beings.  
Interestingly, the hierarchy of the participating beings according to nature of Dionysius 
contains the level of sensible beings. Its presence, as it was mentioned above, is quite 
unexpected, because it does not match Wisdom – the procession of the divinity in which it 
participates, and in general it falls out of the Dionysian order of divine processions (Being, Life, 
Wisdom) which are participated in by the levels of hierarchy. This level is missing in Proclus’ 
hierarchy of the participated entities. It should also be noted that in the Dionysian hierarchy the 
level of the sensible is located in the same place where it was in the hierarchy established by 
Gregory of Nyssa – between living beings and rational beings. Thus, taking into account the 
overall similarity in terms of the sequence of levels in the hierarchies of Gregory and Dionysius, 
we may assume that the appearance of such a level in the hierarchy of the naturally participating 
beings in Dionysius was caused by his reworking of the hierarchy of beings, provided by 
Gregory of Nyssa. If this is the case, Dionysius might have borrowed the level of the sensible 
from Gregory’s hierarchy, installing it in the appropriate place of his own hierarchical structure. 
As I have mentioned, the presence of the level of sensible beings in the place where it was 
located in the hierarchy of Gregory of Nyssa, that is, between living beings and rational beings is 
related to the fact that in the course of developing his hierarchy Gregory had in mind the Biblical 
and cosmogonic order of natural beings (as it is mentioned in Gen. 1:11 and 20), and on its basis 
changed the order of levels in the hierarchy compared to the Tree of Porphyry, which he 
generally followed. 
Thus the Biblical trend in terms of the order of natural beings through Gregory of Nyssa 
penetrated the Dionysian discourse and through it penetrated the corresponding doctrines of the 
subsequent authors, which I intend to discuss in the second part of this study. 
                                                 
34 The difference from the genera-species structure in this case is only that the hierarchical language in 
Dionysius does not imply the links representing privative elements, symmetrical to the main links of the 
hierarchy (non-intellectual, non-rational, non-sensible, etc.), as it is the case in Gregory’s hierarchical structure.   
35 As a matter of fact, this link is present in the hierarchy of participation of Proclus, who, as we have 
seen, in many ways influenced the doctrine of Dionysius. 
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2. Now I turn to Maximus the Confessor who used the tetrad of Goodness, Being, Life, and 
Wisdom (or the triad of Being, Life, and Wisdom if the tetrad was taken without its first term), 
borrowed by Dionysius from the Platonists, and who discussed the hierarchy of beings in 
connection with the tetrad.  
In the Ambiguum 24 which integrated the ascetic and the ontological trends in theology, 
Maximus discussed five tropoi of contemplation – a kind of theological categories: according to 
substance, movement, difference, mixing, and position.36 First three were intended for the 
knowledge of God and pointed to Him as, respectively, as the Creator, the Caretaker, and the 
Judge. Two last tropoi were of pedagogical nature: mixing referred to our ability of volition, and 
position corresponded to the stability of this volition’s directionality towards the good. The 
saints, having connected position with movement, and mixing with difference, that is, reducing 
the five tropoi of contemplation to three, arrived at contemplation of substance, difference, and 
movement and saw the Cause (God) in the effects, contemplating it as Being, Wise Being (σοφὸν 
εἶναι), and Living Being (ζῶν εἶναι), thus penetrating into the mystery of the tropoi of existence 
of the hyposteses in the Holy Trinity and learning a deifying doctrine of the Father, the Son and 
the Holy Spirit.37 We can speak about this triad as the triad of Being, Wisdom, and Life. Thus, in 
the Ambiguum 24 Maximus reproduced the Dionysian triad of Being, Life, and Wisdom in the 
form of a triad of Being, Wisdom, and Life, that is, rearranging the last two terms. Maximus 
correlated the members of the triad with persons of the Holy Trinity – the Father, the Son, and 
the Holy Spirit. 
As it was noted earlier by Polycarp Sherwood, Maximus combined two triads: on the one 
hand, the Origenist–Evagrian triad of the Creator, Caretaker, and Judge,38 and, on the other 
hand, the Dionysian triad of Being, Life, and Wisdom, going back to Proclus. As likely sources 
for this passage in Maximus, Sherwood indicated the passages from the De divinis nominibus 5.2 
and 5.3, where Dionysius discussed Goodness, Being, Life, and Wisdom. Dionysius, in turn, 
relied on the 101st and 102nd theorems from Proclus’ Elements of Theology, which mentioned 
the triad of Being, Life, and Mind. According to Sherwood, Dionysius reworked the system of 
Proclus, changing the level of Mind from the Proclean structure into Wisdom, and adding a 
fourth element of Goodness. In this way, according to Sherwood, Maximus returned to the 
triadic structure of the system which had been present in Proclus (this is not entirely correct, 
                                                 
36 The concept of five tropoi of contemplation, introduced by Maximus, echoes the Platonic tradition, 
more precisely,  Plato’s doctrine of five greatest classes of genera – being, identity, difference, rest, and motion 
(Soph. 254D–255C); see the development of this doctrine of Plato in Plotinus (Enn. VI, 2). See also J. DILLON, 
Philosophy and Theology in Proclus and Maximus the Confessor, “Quaestiones Disputatae. A Journal of 
Philosophical Inquiry and Discussion”, 2:1-2 (2011), pp. 37-55. 
37 Amb. 24, PG 1123A-1136C. 
38 See EVAG. In Ps. 138.16, PG 12, 1161CD. 
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since in the Elements of Theology, Proclus spoke also about Goodness as the supreme 
principle39), and, compared to the structure of Dionysius, he reordered Wisdom and Life based on 
the traditional Patristic sequence of Persons – the Father – the Son – the Holy Spirit, referring 
Wisdom to the Son, and Life to the Holy Spirit (as to the Giver of Life).40 
The Dionysian triad also found its place in Maximus the Confessor’s Capita de caritate 
3.24–25, where Maximus said that God, bringing intellectual and rational beings into existence, 
gave them four divine properties (τῶν θείων ἰδιωμάτων): being (τὸ ὄν), ever-being, goodness, 
and wisdom, in which the rational and intellectual substance (ἡ λογικὴ καὶ νοερὰ οὐσία) 
participates (μετέχει) by its very existence, by its capacity to exist in goodness, and by the grace 
of ever-being. First two divine properties were given to the substance, while last two properties 
were given to the gnomic ability, so created rational beings might become by participation that 
which God is by His nature. Here the topic of individual participation in the divine found its 
expression in Maximus.41 First two properties constituted the image of God in man, while the 
second two constituted the likeness of God in man. The terms “goodness,” “being,” and 
“wisdom” were used by Maximus for pointing both to the divine properties, and the properties 
bestowed by God upon the human beings. 
In the Ambiguum 7 Maximus discussed the hierarchy of participating beings: 
 
[We believe that]... the Word is shown and multiplied analogously 
(ἀναλογίαν) to each in all [originating] from Him, and He is the head of all in 
Himself. Both being and rest correspond to him, and those which came into 
being are from Him, since [they] came into being; and depending on why [they] 
came into being, resting and moving, they participate in God (μετέχει Θεοῦ). 
For all [created beings] because of their origin from God participate in God 
analogously (ἀναλόγως), either according to mind (νοῦν), or reason (λόγον), or 
sense (αἴσθησιν), or living movement (κίνησιν ζωτικήν), or substabtial 
                                                 
39 PROCLUS. Inst. theol. 8ff. Cf. E. PERL, Theophany: the Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the 
Areopagite, New York 2007, p. 66. 
40 P. SHERWOOD, Introduction, pp. 40-41. These observations of Sherwood were reproduced by the 
subsequent scholars; see L. THUNBERG, Microcosm and Mediator. The Theological Anthropology of Maximus 
the Confessor, Lund 1965, pp. 129–130. Thunberg claims (p. 130) that according to Sherwood, Maximus the 
Confessor combined the Dionysian levels of Wisdom and Goodness, whereas in fact, Sherwood discovered that 
Maximus changed the order of the Dionysian levels of Wisdom and Life; L. THUNBERG, Man and the Cosmos: 
The Vision of Maximus the Confessor, Crestwood, N.Y., Vladimir's Seminary Press 1984, p. 46; J. DILLON, 
Philosophy and Theology in Proclus and Maximus the Confessor, “Quaestiones Disputatae. A Journal of 
Philosophical Inquiry and Discussion”, 2:1–2 (2011), p. 51. 
41 On the subject, see also for instance Amb. 42, PG 91, 1329AB. 
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(οὐσιώδη) fitness holding [in existence], as the great revealer of God Dionysius 
the Areopagite thinks.42 
 
In the passage Maximus speaks about a hierarchy of natural abilities of created beings, 
through which every created being participates in God in accordance with its nature to a greater 
or lesser extent compared to other natural beings. Maximus mentions natural participation in 
God according to the abilities of substantial fitness (of being), life, sense, reason, and mind. Due 
to the principle of analogy, these natural abilities constitute a hierarchy from the level of being to 
the level of mind, increasing in the ontological sense. The listing and order of these natural 
abilities as formulated by Maximus, coincides with the hierarchically organized order of natural 
abilities of created beings, corresponding to the divine procession of Being, Life, and Wisdom, 
mentioned by Dionysius in the De divinis nominibus 5, 3 and 4, 4, where Dionysius wrote about 
beings – living beings – sensible beings – rational beings – intellectual beings. Clearly, 
Maximus must have adopted this system from Dionysius.43  
We may note that while Dionysius articulated the principle, according to which each 
successive level of participating hierarchy included the previous levels, what means that the 
possession of each subsequent natural ability required possession of the previous abilities as well 
as the corresponding participations (De divinis nominibus 5, 3), Maximus did not explicitly 
elaborate on that point here. 
Thus, the hierarchy of naturally participating beings in Maximus goes back through 
Dionysius, on the one hand, to the Neoplatonic triad of Being, Life, and Mind, and, on the other 
hand, in respect to the level ensuring natural participation according to sense – to the teaching of 
Gregory of Nyssa and through him to the Biblical cosmogonic order of natural beings. 
We may ask whether Maximus, just like Dionysius, shows the correspondence between the 
order of levels in the participating hierarchy and the order of the entities, participated in by the 
levels. In other words, the question is whether Maximus has an equivalent of the divine 
processions appearing in the system of Dionysius, which correspond to the Neoplatonic triad 
(tetrad) of (Goodness), Being, Life, and Mind, and which are participated in by the levels of the 
hierarchy of beings.  
                                                 
42 Amb. 7, PG 91, 1080AB. 
43 Moreover, in this passage from Amb. 7, Maximus combined several Dionysian concepts related to the 
hierarchy of participating beings, which surface in different passages of DN of Dionysius. These are the notions 
of commeasurement (ἀναλογία, see DN 1, 2: 110, 13; 4, 1: 144, 5; 4, 33: 178, 17 (Suchla); on this concept in 
Dionysius see A. GOLITIZIN, Et Introibo Ad Altare Dei: The Mystagogy of Dionysius Areopagita: with Special 
Reference to Its Predecessors in the Eastern Christian Tradition, Thessalonike 1994, pp. 86ff. and fitness 
(ἐπιτηδειότης; see DN 1, 5: 118.1; 4, 4: 147.17, 148.18; 9, 10: 214.4 (Suchla)) implying the concept of the 
measure of natural participation for various kinds of created beings.  
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In the passage quote above,44 Maximus the Confessor speaks about direct participation of 
created beings in God according to their natural abilities. The immediate context of the passage 
as well as of other texts of Maximus indicates that according to him, the logoi from before the 
ages, by which God brought creation into being, correspond to the kinds of created beings. In 
Ambiguum 7, Maximus mentioned the logoi of angels, powers and entities of the heavenly world, 
the logoi of humans, and the logoi of all that exists.45 
We may try to find out specific meaning of what those participating natural abilities 
participate in, bearing in mind the Neoplatonic triad (tetrad) of (Goodness), Being, Life, and 
Mind, which genetically, by mediation of Dionysius the Areopagite, influenced Maximus’ 
teaching on the hierarchy of participating natural abilities. In fact, as it is evident from the 
foregoing, Maximus sometimes used the notions of the participated Goodness, Being, Life, and 
Mind in his theological language. 
Well, Being, Life, and Mind cannot be viewed as principles participated in by the created 
beings, when Maximus used the terms for designating the Persons of the Holy Trinity, as he did 
in Ambiguum 24, since the Persons of the Holy Trinity cannot be participated in by the creation. 
However, in the Capita de caritate 3.24–25 in the context of the triad of Goodness, Being, and 
Wisdom borrowed from Dionysius, Maximus speaks about Being (and ever-being) as 
simultaneously a property of God and something which human beings possess by nature due to 
their natural participation in God. We may also recall a well-known passage from the Capita 
Theologia et Oeconomiae 1.48, where Maximus speaks about participated timeless works of God 
(τά ἔργα), which are Goodness, Life, Immortality, Simplicity, Immutability, and Limitlessness 
contemplated around God. Among these properties, Goodness and Life are also included in the 
Dionysian tetrad. 
Thus, we can say that Maximus did not elaborate the doctrine of the supreme principles 
participated in by the levels in the hierarchy of naturally participating beings, corresponding to 
the Neoplatonic triad (tetrad) of (Goodness), Being, Life, and Mind, in great detail. Nevertheless, 
we may speak of Being and Life as such principles – divine properties or divine works – 
participated in by the corresponding natural abilities of created beings. As opposed to Dionysius, 
the participated Wisdom which Maximus mentioned in the Capita de caritate 3.25, corresponds 
not to a ability of human beings but to an inclination of will. Therefore we cannot mention it 
among the principles included in the Neoplatonic triad and naturally participated in by the 
created beings.   
                                                 
44 Amb. 7, PG 91, 1080AB. 
45 Ibid., 1080AC. 
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3. Next we should discuss the Neoplatonic triad of Being, Life, and Mind in the natural 
hierarchy of participating beings in John of Damascus who addresses the topic of participation in 
his Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith in the following way: 
 
Because of the exceedingly great wealth of His goodness, the good, all-
good, and exceedingly good God, who is all goodness, did not rest content that 
the Good, or His nature, should just be and not be participated in (μετεχόμενον) 
by anything. For this reason, He first made the intellectual and heavenly 
powers (τὰς νοερὰς καὶ οὐρανίους δυνάμεις), and then the visible and sensible 
world, and then, finally, man of the intellectual and the sensible (ἐκ νοεροῦ καὶ 
αἰσθητοῦ). Hence, all things He has made participate in His goodness by the 
fact that they have being (κατὰ τὸ εἶναι). For He is being (τὸ εἶναι) to them all, 
since “in him are all things,”46 not only because He has brought them from 
nothing into being, but because it is by His operation that all things He made 
are kept in existence and held together. Living beings (τὰ ζῷα), however, 
participate more abundantly, because they participate (μετέχειν) in the good 
both by their being and by their living. But rational beings (τὰ λογικὰ), while 
they participate in the good in the aforementioned ways, do so still more by 
their very rationality (κατὰ τὸ λογικόν). For they are in a way more akin to 
Him (οἰκειότερα), even though He is, of course, immeasurably superior. 47 
 
John of Damascus followed what can be called the Platonic paradigm of participation48 – 
the paradigm according to which something participating in the nature of other being did not 
become of the same nature as the participated entity by virtue of participation. John of Damascus 
stated that all created beings in their existence participate in God as Goodness that is His 
nature.49 Developing this idea, John of Damascus described how living and rational beings 
                                                 
46 Rom. 11: 36. 
47 Exp. fidei 4 XIII (86), 2-14 (Kotter), transl. by F. H. Chase, in SAINT JOHN OF DAMASCUS, Writings, 
New York 1958 (The Fathers of Church. A new translation), p. 354, slightly revised by me.  
48 In general in his writings John of Damascus used all possible paradigms of participation of his time as 
applied to substance (nature) – the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Neoplatonic paradigm. In addition to the above 
citation, the Platonic paradigm is manifested, for example, in Or de imag. 3.33. The Aristotelian paradigm 
appears in the De duabus vol. 7; the Neoplatonic paradigm is used in De duabus vol. 11: 9-10 (Kotter), and in the 
Exp. fidei 7 (51). We may point to some inconsistencies in the way John of Damascus used all three paradigms 
of participation in substance. Thus, in the Apologetic Treatises 3.33 John of Damascus speaks about participation 
of saints in the divine substance, whereas in De duabus in Christo voluntatibus 11: 9-10 (Kotter) he mentions 
that the divine substance is non-participated. 
49 It seems that we do not have reasons to think that John of Damascus used the concept of nature in the 
technical sense as the common substance of the hypostases of the Holy Trinity, speaking here about Goodness, 
participated in by the natural species as about something constituting the nature of God. More likely, John of 
Damascus meant that Goodness was an essential property of Godhead.  
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participated in God through their natural abilities in such a way that each subsequent ability and 
participation incorporated the preceding abilities. Living beings participated in God through life 
and being; and rational beings participated in God through reason, life, and being. Here we may 
clearly discern the Neoplatonic triad of Being, Life, and Mind. 
Compared to the lists of participating natural abilities established by Dionysius the 
Areopagite and Maximus the Confessor, the levels of intellectual and sensible as individual 
entities are absent in John of Damascus. It seems that John’s train of thought in the passage 
suggests the identification of intellectual (νοερός) and rational (λογικός), since at first John of 
Damascus speaks about God’s creation of intellectual powers and human beings who possessed 
an intellectual principle among other faculties. Then John follows up describing rational beings 
(τὰ λογικὰ) as participating in God according to rationality and describes them as the most 
closely participating in God, obviously implying that rational beings are the bearers of the 
intellectual principle. The fact that John of Damascus did not mention the level of the sensible in 
his natural hierarchy of participating beings can be explained by his borrowing of the hierarchy 
from Dionysius the Areopagite. However, in building up his hierarchy and enumerating its 
levels, John of Damascus must here have relied not on the order of levels in the Dionysus 
hierarchy of  participating beings, which contained the level of the sensible,50 but on the 
Dionysian description of the participated processions of God: Goodness, Being, Life, and 
Wisdom.51 At the same time, in accordance with the standard name of the corresponding level in 
the hierarchy of the participating in Dionysius and Maximus, John changed wisdom into reason. 
The proximity of John of Damascus to Dionysius the Areopagite also finds its expression 
in John’s statement that the beings, richest in possession of natural abilities, allowing them to 
participate in God (that is, rational beings), are the most akin to God. Dionysius expressed the 
same idea when he said concerning the hierarchy of participating beings that the beings which 
had the largest number of natural perfections – intellectual beings – are the closest to God.52 
Finally it should be noted that John of Damascus does not seem to have a doctrine of 
principles participated in by the levels of natural hierarchy of beings; he speaks about 
participation of beings through their natural abilities directly in God or in natural divine 
Goodness, but not in some higher realities like some universals-before-things corresponding to 
the natural abilities of created beings, as it was in the case with Dionysius and Maximus. 
4. At this point we should discuss the hierarchy of participating beings in Gregory 
Palamas. I suggest that this subject started to be actively discussed in the Palamite controversy in 
connection with the doctrine of the anti-Palamite Gregory Akindynos. Unlike Barlaam of 
                                                 
50 DN 5, 3. 
51 Ibid., 5, 1-2. 
52 Ibid., 5, 3: 182.3-4 (Suchla). 
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Calabria, his predecessor in the polemics with the Palamite doctrine on the distinction between 
substance and uncreated energies in God53 and on the divinity of the Tabor light defended by 
Palamas, Akindynos taught about participation in the divine substance. The fact that Akindynos 
held this view even before the summer of 1341 is testified by a passage from the Short History of 
How the Evil Heresy of Barlaam and Akindynos Originated written by the monk David 
Disypatos, a friend of Gregory Palamas. That passage from the manuscript Oxon. Misc. gr. 120, 
was not used by the editor of the Short History Manuel Candal54; it was discovered by Richard 
Browning and was published in his edition of the Poem against Akindynos by David Disypatos. 
According to the passage, beings of the created order – inanimate, irrational, and rational – 
participate in divine substance: 
 
<...> Fearing to end up having the same fate as Barlaam, for he preached 
the same blasphemous doctrine, [Akindynos] resorted to a trick – he would not 
answer directly. <...> He admitted only substance to be incorruptible, and 
therefore he presented divine substance as participated and visible, <...> and 
participated in not only by rational creatures, but also by the irrational, and 
even inanimate <...>.55 
 
We can see from this passage that it describes the events of the time between the Councils 
of Constantinople in June and July 1341, when Barlaam had already been condemned56 (this, 
apparently, was “the fate of Barlaam” resulting from his preaching of “blasphemous doctrine,” 
mentioned in the passage) while Akindynos was not condemned yet.57 The testimony that 
Akindynos taught about participation of all creation in the divine substance seems to be 
trustworthy since it fits the theological doctrine of Akindynos attested in his other texts.58 On the 
                                                 
53 See the evidence that the doctrine of participation in the divine substance was inacceptable for Barlaam 
in the Short History of David Disypatos (M. CANDAL, Orígen ideológico del palamismo en un documento de 
David Disípato, “Orientalia Christiana Periodica”, 15 (1949), pp. 39-41); the same is mentioned in the acts of the 
Council of Constantinople in June 1341.  
54 M. CANDAL, Orígen ideológico del palamismo. 
55 R. BROWNING, David Dishypatos’ Poem on Akindynos, ”Byzantion”, 25–27 (1955–1957), p. 744.  
56 That is, condemned at the Council of Constantinople on June 10, 1341. 
57 Akindynos was condemned at the Council of Constantinople, summoned in July, 1341. 
58 Thus, in his treatise the Dial. 3, 91: 305-306 (Cañellas), Akindynos discussed how participation in 
substance could be understood. After mentioning an interpretation, inappropriate in the theological context, 
which implied that the nature of the participated being was assumed by the participating being, he mentioned the 
appropriate understanding of participation in substance in such a way as the body participated in the soul, while 
each of them did not assume the nature of the other; thus the soul was both by its nature participated and 
unparticipated in by the body. Likewise, according to substance God was both participated and unparticipated. 
Similar position concerning participation in the divine substance was expressed by Nicephorus Grigoras, the next 
major representative of the anti-Palamite movement after Akindynos (see Niceph. Grig., Antirrheticus I 2.1: 
231.17-20 (Beyer)).  
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other hand, the accusation that the divine substance according to Akindynos was visible, seems 
to merely represent a rhetorical device of the narrator. 
In the opposition to the belief of Akindynos that created beings in the measure of their 
natural abilities (which constituted a certain hierarchy) participated in the divine substance, 
Gregory Palamas developed the doctrine that created beings participated in God through 
participation in uncreated divine energies, while the divine substance could not be participated in 
by anything created. At the same time, while the participation paradigm offered by Akindynos 
did not employ a conceptual framework making it possible to distinguish between the modes of 
participation of the holy men and of the rest of the humans in God, Gregory Palamas emphasized 
the distinction between the natural mode of participation in God for all beings, and the 
supernatural participation of the deified people. 
For this reason, Palamas distinguished between two kinds of uncreated divine energies: on 
the one hand, there are the creating energies, and the other hand, the energy of deification. 
Various creating energies are participated in by all created beings depending on their place in the 
hierarchy of natural abilities;59 deifying energy is supernaturally participated in by the deified 
humans and the angelic powers which are capable of participation, in addition to natural 
participation in the creating energies. 
Gregory Palamas developed his doctrine of the hierarchy of participating beings in the 
treatises On the divine union and distinction (the summer of 1341), the Dialogue between an 
Orthodox and a Barlaamite (the autumn of 1341), On the divine and deifying participation (the 
winter of 1341/1342), and in the Antirrhetikoi against Akindynos (1342–1345).60 
Speaking about the hierarchy of natural abilities, Palamas distinguished – in the 
descending measure of generality – natural participation of the following types: existential, 
living, sensible, rational, intellectual (or wisdom-like61), as well as spiritual (for angelic 
                                                 
59 When Doru Costache discusses the kinds of participation of created beings in Palamas’ On the divine 
and deifying participation, 11, he seems to have misunderstood the text, “Ἅρα εἷναι φανερν ὅτι ταῠτα δὲν 
μετέχουν τοῠ Θεοῠ κατ ἁκρίβειαν, ἀλλά λἐγεται ὅτι μετέχουν ὡς ἀποτελέσματα τῆς δημιουργικῆς ἐκείνου 
ἐνεργείας καὶ δυνάμεως” (237: 10-13 (Χρήστου)) in such a way that according to him the kinds of created 
beings participated in the effect of the creating divine energies (and not in the creating divine energies 
themselves): “... whilst the saints experience the divine life as an immediate and deifying participation, all other 
beings are only capable of a providential or mediated participation in the ‘effect’ (ἀποτέλεσμα) of God’s 
‘demiurgic energy and power’ (τῆς δημιουργικῆς ἐνεργείας καὶ δυνάμεως)” (D. COSTACHE, Experiencing the 
Divine Life: Levels of Participation in St Gregory Palamas' On the Divine and Deifying Participation, 
“Phronesis”, 26:1 (2011), p. 16). Clearly, however, the notion of ἀποτέλεσμα is associated here not with divine 
energies, but with created beings; the passage means that created beings participate in God, being themselves the 
“products” (ἀποτέλεσμα) of His creating energy and power.  
60 Palamas also briefly mentions the kinds of natural participation of created beings in the divine creating 
energies in the Triads 3, 2, 11, and in the Capita 150, 87, 89, 91 (in connection with the doctrine of Dionysius). 
61 Gregory Palamas speaks of wisdom-giving energy which implies the ability of wisdom participating in 
it, instead of the notion of the intellectual, usual for him in this context, in the Fifth Antirrheticus against 
Akindynos, 27, 116: 23 (Χρήστου). Obviously Palamas depends here on the name of the corresponding divine 
procession in Dionysius the Areopagite (DN 2, 5: 129, 1 (Suchla)). 
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powers62). A specific creating divine energy – substance-creating, life-giving, wisdom-giving, 
etc. – corresponds to each of these abilities. A being which possesses the abilities, participates in 
the energies.63 Almost everywhere, where Palamas used the concept of the hierarchy of naturally 
participating beings, he also mentioned participation of people “who live in a divine way” in the 
deifying energy.64 
Palamas argued that according to its nature, the created being could possess different kinds 
of natural participation. In On the divine union and distinction, 16, Palamas said that all created 
beings participated in God in virtue of their existence. Another kind of created beings combined 
existential, living, and sensible natural abilities (probably Palamas had animals in mind), as well 
as the corresponding participations. Human beings combined existential, living, sensible, 
rational, and intellectual abilities, as well as the ways of participating in God. Thus, following 
the Dionysian paradigm, Palamas taught that possession of each subsequent natural ability 
(within the above order of abilities), corresponding to the participation in a certain divine energy, 
entailed the possession of the previous abilities and the corresponding participations.65 One can 
say that in this respect the kinds of created beings – the bearers of the corresponding kinds of 
natural participations – constituted the hierarchy. 
Following Dionysius the Areopagite,66 Palamas also argued that God was fully participated 
in by the creation, whereas intellectual created beings could participate in Him fully or partly67 
depending on the disposition of will. On the part of God, the completeness of natural 
participation in Him by the created beings did not depend on the type or number of the kinds of 
this participation, but natural participation in God at least in one respect implied participation in 
the entire divinity.68 
Gregory also followed the Areopagite while speaking about the order of levels in the 
hierarchy of naturally participating beings. Levels and their order, listed by Palamas, are the 
following: existential – living – sensible – rational – intellectual / wisdom-like – spiritual. In 
general they correspond to the hierarchy of Dionysius: beings – living beings – sensible beings – 
rational beings – intellectual beings, and therefore the hierarchy of natural beings in Gregory 
must have gone back through the Areopagite, on the one hand, to the Neoplatonic triad of Being, 
                                                 
62 Palamas clearly speaks of this kind of natural participation only in the Dial. 46-47. The fact, that he 
mentions angelic powers as a kind of created beings corresponding to the highest level in the hierarchy of the 
participating beings, shows the influence of Dionysius the Areopagite (DN 5, 3). According to the Dionysian 
hierarchy of participating beings, angelic powers occupy the same place.  
63 Antirr. C. Akind. V, 27, 116.  
64 Particip. 11: 147, 3 (Χρήστου). 
65 It is not entirely clear how this works in the case of angelic powers, corresponding to the highest level 
in the hierarchy of natural abilities (spiritual), since the nature of angels, obviously, does not include the 
preceding perfections of the hierarchy. 
66 DN 2, 5. 
67 Cf. Antirr. C. Akind. V, 27, 115; Dial. 45-47. 
68 Antirr. C. Akind. 27, 116: 20–21 (Χρήστου). 
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Life, and Mind, and, on the other hand (in respect to the level of the sensible, located between 
living beings and rational beings), to the hierarchy built by Gregory of Nyssa, and through it to 
the Biblical cosmogonic order of natural beings. 
However, there are certain differences between the hierarchies of naturally participating 
beings developed by Gregory Palamas and Dionysius the Areopagite. 
Thus, Palamas’ list of natural abilities through which created beings participate in God, 
included the level of spiritual (πνευματικός), corresponding to a natural participation, typical for 
the angelic powers, while in Dionysius angelic powers participated in God through intellectual  
ability. This means that Gregory Palamas partly shifted natural abilities in relation to the kinds of 
created beings which possessed them, compared to Dionysius: in the Dionysian hierarchy of 
naturally participating beings, intellectual ability was typical for the angelic (intellectual) 
powers, while rational ability was typical for the humans.69 In Palamas, intellectual ability was 
typical for the humans, while spiritual natural ability was typical for the angelic powers.  
Another difference between Dionysius the Areopagite and Gregory Palamas is that the 
hierarchy of naturally participating beings in Gregory is strictly connected with the idea of 
supernatural participation. We may say that the very subject of the hierarchy of naturally 
participating beings appears in Palamas to clarify the difference of deification as supernatural 
participation in God and natural participation of all beings in God. Therefore, the discussion 
about the hierarchy of naturally participating beings in Gregory Palamas is almost always related 
to and emphasized by the doctrine of the supernatural participation of the deified people in God. 
This means that the highest element in Palamas’ hierarchy of participation for the created beings 
– not only natural participation, but also supernatural – is the deifying participation 
corresponding to the deifying divine energy.70    
At the same time, although Dionysius speaks about the principle of Self-Divinity or Self-
Deification, as well as about deified beings, corresponding to it,71 he mentions this principle 
among other principles with the prefix “Self-,” without emphasizing it or incorporating it into the 
hierarchy of participating beings. The hierarchies of participation, found in Maximus the 
Confessor and John of Damascus as well do not employ the element responsible for deification.  
Besides this, while both Dionysius and Maximus developed the discourse of individual 
participation in God, fundamental for Palamas’ doctrine of supernatural participation, these 
authors did not associate it with the hierarchy of participating beings. 
In the authors, preceding Gregory Palamas, which we briefly viewed, the topic of 
deification was treated in the context of the hierarchy of beings only by Gregory of Nyssa, but 
                                                 
69 DN 5, 3; E. PERL, Theophany, pp. 70–71. 
70 In particular, see Antirr. C. Akind. V, 27, 116. 
71 DN 11, 6. 
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from an entirely different viewpoint in regards to the mechanism and the structure of the 
hierarchy than that of Palamas. We should point to the contrasting conceptual frameworks used 
by Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory Palamas for indicating the concept of deifying participation in 
God in the context of the hierarchy of participating beings. Gregory of Nyssa used the concept of 
participation in the divine nature,72 while this concept was forbidden for Palamas,73 and deifying 
participation in Palamas’ theological system was understood as participation not in the divine 
nature, but in the uncreated energy of God. This difference is associated with the opposite 
paradigms of participation used by Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory Palamas. Gregory of Nyssa 
used the Platonic paradigm of participation when he spoke about participation of holy men in the 
divine nature. The Platonic paradigm implies that something, participating in the nature of 
something else, does not become of the same nature by virtue of participation. In his theological 
language, Gregory Palamas used the Neoplatonic paradigm of participation introduced in the 
Patristic thought by the Areopagite, which implied a distinction of the unparticipated and the 
participated in God. Following Maximus the Confessor, Gregory Palamas related the 
unparticipation to the divine substance. Thereby the system of Gregory Palamas entailed 
deifying participation in God as participation in the uncreated divine energy, and not in the 
divine nature, as was the case in Gregory of Nyssa. 
Thus, a substantial point in the teaching of Gregory Palamas on the hierarchy of 
participating beings is his position on what the hierarchically organized kinds of created beings 
participate in. Palamas’ fundamental position was that they participated in the uncreated divine 
energies, that is, that they naturally participated in the creating energies and supernaturally in the 
deifying energy. According to Palamas, those energies are God; they are different from the 
divine substance and differ between each other. We may say that according to the Palamite 
paradigm, the levels in the hierarchy of naturally participating beings participate in certain 
                                                 
72 See Eun. 1, 1, 270-277 (Jaeger); specifically on the participation of intellectual created beings in 
uncreated divine nature depending on the goodness of will, see Eun.1, 1, 274, 1-4 (Jaeger).  
73 The doctrine that divine substance cannot at all be participated in by the created beings is a throughline 
in the texts of Palamas, and he discussed this issue very often. However, there are isolated instances when 
Gregory softens this attitude: in the in the 13th chapter of the dialogue Theophanes he says in the person of one 
of the interlocutors (Theophanes), that although the substance of God cannot be participated in, it is nevertheless 
somehow participated (238, 7-10 (Χρήστου)), and in the 17th chapter, Palamas says that the divine nature is 
participated in, although not in itself, but through its energies (243, 20-24 (Χρήστου); see also DAVID 
DISYPATOS, C. Akindynos: 447-448 (Browning)). Interestingly, in the 16th chapter of the dialogue Theophanes, 
Palamas denies the concept which was, in fact, used by Gregory of Nyssa, namely, that only holy people 
participate in the divine substance, while it cannot be participated in by other beings (see above, the text at the 
note 4). Palamas attributed this concept to the Messalians and rejected it (THEOPHANES 16: 240.16-23 
(Χρήστου)). This change of the theological language in Gregory Palamas compared to the language of the pre-
Areopagite theology (represented, in particular, by Gregory of Nyssa) is obviously related to the fact that the 
former theological language in the situation of changed philosophical paradigms entailed unacceptable 
theological connotations. Thus, for example, at the time of Gregory Palamas the concept of participation in 
substance referred to the adoption of substance by the participating being or the division of substance (cf. GREG. 
PAL. Capita 150, 110: 208.1-8 (Sinkewicz)), while at the time of Gregory of Nyssa this concept did not have 
such connotations. 
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universal principles in the Godhead. Yet we have no grounds to think that in the Palamite 
doctrine these participated principles form a hierarchy between themselves similar to the 
hierarchy of beings which participated in them.  
Among the authors whom we have considered, Dionysius the Areopagite shows a 
relatively well-developed doctrine of the transcendentals, participated in by the levels of the 
hierarchy of created beings. The doctrine of the Areopagite implied participation of naturally 
participating beings, on the one hand, in divine processions, and, on the other hand, in the 
principles with the prefix “self-.”74 The creating uncreated divine energies in Palamas rather 
correspond exactly to the processions in the conceptual framework of Dionysius, since the status 
of the principles with the prefix “self-“ in Dionysius is not entirely clear. It may be noted that 
Dionysius speaks about three of the processions (Being, Life, and Wisdom) with the 
corresponding five levels in the hierarchy of naturally participating beings (beings – living 
beings – sensible beings – rational beings – intellectual beings), while creative energy in 
Palamas is correlated with each corresponding level of naturally participating beings. 
In this way various aspects of the Patristic understanding of the hierarchy of beings were 
used and transformed in the teaching of Gregory Palamas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 DN 5, 1-3; 5, 5; 11, 6 (Suchla). 
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Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has demonstrated how the topic of the universal was manifested mainly in 
the Arian controversy of the fourth century and the works of the Cappadocian Fathers, as well as 
in the Ancient philosophy and the late Eastern Christian philosophical and theological tradition.   
In Chapter 1 of the dissertation, three paradigms of participation were identified. Each of 
the paradigms presupposed a certain status of the universal principle involved. The dissertation 
has shown that three paradigms of participation can be distinguished in Ancient philosophy in 
relation to the concept of universals, which are relevant for the subsequent Eastern Christian 
tradition. The Platonic paradigm of participation in its positive sense indicated that some beings 
– the participating entities – had a certain property to a lesser extent than that which was the 
embodiment of that property (the participated entity). The participated entity acted as a 
transcendent cause (corresponding to universals-before-things) for the participating entity. This 
implied the opposition of “according to being” (that which referred to the participated entity) and 
“according to participation” (that which referred to the participating entity). The Aristotelian 
paradigm of participation “according to being” in fact was the same as “according to 
participation,” since that paradigm pointed to the relation of an individual to the species/genera, 
constituting the nature which the individual carried, as well as the relationship of the species to 
the higher genera. This paradigm involved a logical relationship between the genera/species 
predicables of the varying degrees of commonness: that which was less general participated in 
that which was more general, while the latter did not participate in the former. The Aristotelian 
paradigm involved the correspondence of the participated entity to the universal-in-things. The 
analysis of the topic of participation in Porphyry’s Isagoge has shown that with minor 
reservations Porphyry followed the Aristotelian discourse. This dissertation further analyzed the 
relationship between the concept of participation as applied to individual hierarchy and the 
hierarchy of genera/species, and the position that the individual represented the principle of 
division while the general represented the principle of unification, which Porphyry elaborated in 
his Isagoge. In this context Porphyry introduced the concept of the “general man,” which went 
back to Alexander of Aphrodisias and was understood in the sense of the human species. The 
Neoplatonic paradigm of participation, which was probably originated by Iamblichus, included 
the concept of a non-participated entity. In the Platonic general paradigm of participation, this 
entity indicated a cause which was transcendent in respect to that which was caused and 
unaffected by the generation of that which it generated. 
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Chapter 2 diverged from the topic of participation and addressed the problems of the 
universal in Clement of Alexandria – the first Christian author who exposed a fundamental 
knowledge of the classical philosophical tradition. The doctrine of Clement on acquiring 
knowledge about the general, which contained Middle Platonist and Aristotelian elements, was 
analyzed. Clement’s doctrine on categories was further considered and the conclusion was made 
that this doctrine was consistent with the Middle Platonist philosophical tradition in a sense that 
categories were understood as statements which could only refer to the sensible world, but not to 
the intelligible world. Thus, according to Clement, God was not subject to the genera/species 
division. As it was shown in Chapter 8, such an interpretation of the applicability of the 
Aristotelian categories would become relevant for Eunomius, the leader of the Neo-Arian party, 
who would use it in his polemics with the Nicaeans. 
Chapter 3 continued to study the concepts of universal and participation, turning to the 
works of Origen – the author who made a significant impact on the subsequent Christian 
philosophical and theological thinking. Four types of natural participation were identified in 
Origen; each of the types became relevant for the subsequent Eastern Christian tradition. The 
first type implied the order in which different kinds of created beings participate in the Persons 
of the Holy Trinity. According to the second type, all created beings naturally participate in the 
logoi contained in the Logos-Wisdom. In this respect Origen elaborated on the concept outlined 
by Clement of Alexandria. This type suggests that according to Origen the Logos-Wisdom in 
some way contains universals-before-things. The third type of natural participation implied that 
all rational beings have a natural ability to unify with God. It is assumed that the divine nature, 
common for the Persons of the Holy Trinity, serves as a universal participated principle for the 
natural ability of rational beings to unify with God. According to the fourth type, all people 
naturally participate in the main capacity which constitutes human nature – capacity of 
reasoning. This type is characterized by the use of the Aristotelian paradigm of participation.  
In Chapter 4, the problems of participation and universals in the doctrine of Arius were 
analyzed, and the trends in the use of the language of participation in Arius and the Arians were 
identified. According to the first trend, it was said about the Son that He participates in the 
divinity of the Father, which is understood in a way that the Son does not have divinity 
according to His own nature. The second trend is associated with the concept of non-
participation: it is said about the Son that He does not participate in the Father and His nature. 
The third trend is related to the concept of participated realities in the Godhead – Wisdom, 
Word, and Power, in which the Son participates. A reconstruction of the doctrine of Arius was 
proposed, where those realities were universal principles, participated in by the beings of the 
created realm. A suggestion was made as to how Origen might have influenced Arius as far as 
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the topic of participation is concerned, while significant differences between Origen and Arius 
were outlined. One such difference was the concept of non-participation, absent from the 
conceptual framework of Origen, but appearing in Arius. Keeping in mind that this concept 
emerged in the Neoplatonic philosophy and was used in a similar way by Iamblichus, the older 
contemporary of Arius, as well as the presence of the doctrine of henads in Iamblichus, which 
were understood as universal participating entities, the assumption that Iamblichus’ doctrine 
might have influenced the philosophical and theological language of the Arian doctrine was 
made. 
In Chapter 5, the place of universals in the Eunomian controversy was analyzed. 
As far as the contribution of the Cappadocian Father, Basil of Caesarea, is concerned with 
relation to the problems discussed in the dissertation, the philosophical and theological context 
of the principle of individuation was elaborated by Basil in his polemics with Eunomius with the 
help of the concept of the convergence of properties. After analyzing the Stoic and Platonic 
concepts of the convergence of properties, it was concluded that Basil’s theological system 
revealed more of a Stoic background. Two paradigms of Basil’s understanding of the material 
substrate common for all humans – the Platonic and Stoic paradigms – were identified. This 
research demonstrated a direct Stoic influence on Basil and specified what it consisted of and 
why exactly Basil used the Stoic paradigm. This context of the Stoic natural philosophy makes a 
case against the opinion of P. Kalligas concerning the nominalist tendencies in Basil. 
The problem of universals was examined from the viewpoint of the principle of “greater-
lesser,” which was discussed by Basil’s brother Gregory of Nyssa in his criticism of the Arian 
doctrine of Eunomius. In this criticism, Gregory appealed to the position of the Aristotelian 
Categories, according to which the first substance (an individual) could not relate to a greater or 
lesser degree to the second substance (its species) than another first substance (another 
individual) or than it did at some other time. It can be argued that despite Gregory of Nyssa’s 
claim that Eunomius applied that principle to the category of substance (and this was taken for 
granted by modern scholars), a careful analysis of quotations from Eunomius cited by Gregory, 
allows us to doubt that the doctrine of Eunomius indeed entailed the application of the principle 
of “greater-lesser” to the category of substance. After discussing the application of the principle 
of “greater-lesser” to the category of substance, it can be concluded that Gregory of Nyssa 
elaborated on both the Aristotelian paradigm of participation in respect to the human species, 
entailing the existence of universal-in-things, and the Platonic paradigm of participation, arguing 
for participation of rational created beings in the divine nature depending on the goodness of 
their will. It is concluded that in the latter case Gregory combined the allusion to 2 Pet. 1: 3-4 
and the Platonic paradigm of participation. This feature went back to Origen, and the divine 
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substance was understood in the sense of a substance common for the Persons of the Holy 
Trinity. 
In Chapter 6, Gregory of Nyssa’s concept, actively discussed in the current academic 
literature, was reviewed. According to this concept, all people in a certain sense constituted a 
single person, and the word “man,” which pointed to humanity in general and not to a human 
individual, could be properly used only in the singular but not in the plural form. Arguing with 
the reconstruction of the historical and philosophical background of this concept in Gregory of 
Nyssa, proposed by J. Zachhuber and R. Cross, it was suggested that in the essential points of 
this concept Gregory followed Porphyry’s Isagoge.  
Chapter 7 discussed the topic of the hierarchy of beings in Gregory of Nyssa. In general, 
the dissertation has demonstrated that the authors, who treated the topic of the hierarchy of 
natural capacities in the Eastern Christian tradition, combined the Platonic, Aristotelian, and 
Neoplatonic conceptual frameworks. The early treatment of this subject can be seen in Origen’s 
use of the Platonic paradigm which implied the modes of participation of the created beings in 
the Godhead (the Father and the Son) according to their existence and intellectual capacity. This 
subject also appeared in the doctrine of Arius. However, in its well-developed form, the 
hierarchy of natural capacities emerged only in Gregory of Nyssa. 
For building his hierarchy, Gregory followed two strategies: the strategy of dividing genera 
and species with the entire “being” at the summit of the hierarchy, and the strategy of taking the 
uncreated nature to be the summit of the hierarchy. The hierarchy of beings discussed in Gregory 
of Nyssa’s De opificio hominis, 8, was analyzed in terms of the first strategy. The evolutionary 
ascent of natural species towards increasing vitality from inanimate beings to human beings in 
accordance with the order of creation described in the Bible, and the related topic of the genera-
species hierarchy (of the division of beings) were examined along with the influence of the 
preceding authors on Gregory concerning his thought on the subject. It was argued in opposition 
to K. Reinhardt, G. Ladner, and a number of other scholars, that the influence of Posidonius on 
the emergence of the topic of hierarchy of beings in Gregory is not sufficiently well-founded. A 
brief overview of the genera-species divisions, elaborated by several philosophers of Antiquity 
was provided along with the general conclusion that the Tree of Porphyry had a direct impact on 
the division of beings in Gregory. In this respect Gregory seems to manifest the Aristotelian, the 
Platonic, and particularly the Stoic trends. The similarities and differences of Porphyry’s Tree of 
beings and the hierarchy of natural beings in Gregory were analyzed. As opposed to the previous 
studies which only pointed to the closeness of both systems, it was shown that there were some 
significant differences between the orders of levels in both authors. Gregory of Nyssa must have 
changed the order of the hierarchical levels compared to that of Porphyry in order to align the 
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logical and philosophical structure of the division of beings common for his time with the logic 
of the order of creation described in the Bible, thus trying to achieve a synthesis between the 
Scriptural description of the order of natural beings and the order taught in the Greek 
philosophical schools.  
Chapter 8 reconstructed the philosophical context of the polemics on the status of 
commonness in Eunomius and the Neo-Arian controversy. This chapter showed that the concepts 
of universals which had been developed in classical philosophy, played an important role in the 
Eastern Christian theology and philosophy of the fourth century. The Aristotelian principle of 
individual/species division were important in the process of problem setting in the Eastern 
Christian philosophy. In the second half of the fourth century, the representatives of the Nicean 
ecclesiastical party adopted the principle and developed the doctrine that the divine substance 
and the Persons of the Holy Trinity were correlated as individuals and species. The Nicaeans put 
forward this principle to justify their Trinitarian doctrine, according to which all Persons of the 
Holy Trinity, including the Son and the Holy Spirit, belonged to the divine order. This doctrine 
forced Eunomius, the leader of the Neo-Arian party which insisted on the created nature of the 
Son and the Spirit, to put forward the doctrine about the applicability of the 
individual/species/genera discourse only to material beings, but not to the realm of the 
intellectual and divine. 
It is suggested that the doctrine of consubstantiality, proposed by Basil of Caesarea in his 
Contra Eunomium in response to the Apology of Eunomius, triggered the debate over the 
universals at the second stage of the Arian controversy. This doctrine implied the understanding 
of consubstantiality in the “horizontal” sense as commonness between the Persons of the Trinity 
in the same way as species were common to their constituent individuals. Using the fragments of 
Eunomius’ reply to Basil’s concept from Eunomius’ Apology for Apology, preserved by Gregory 
of Nyssa, it was concluded that in his attempt to refute the applicability of the notion of 
consubstantiality with relation to God the Father and the Son, Eunomius elaborated his own 
doctrine of commonness, according to which the higher we go up the hierarchy of beings, the 
lesser the horizontal commonness in the nature of individual beings we may find. It was 
suggested that this concept might have been closely related to the Middle Platonic (Clement of 
Alexandria) and Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle’s Categories, which implied that 
categories and especially the category of the second substance (corresponding to species and 
genera) could be applied only to the corporeal realm. This gives reason to believe that there 
might have been a connection between the arguments of Eunomius and the philosophical 
teaching of Iamblichus, while, conversely, the status of universals was treated completely 
differently by Eunomius and Gregory of Nyssa.  
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In Chapter 9, the hierarchy of beings in Gregory of Nyssa and Dionysius the Areopagite 
was compared. It was shown how the topic of the hierarchy of the participating beings, 
elaborated by Dionysius on the basis of the Neoplatonic triad (tetrad) (Goodness) Being, Life, 
Mind, and of the doctrine of the hierarchy of natural beings by Gregory of Nyssa, was further 
developed in Maximus the Confessor, John of Damascus and Gregory Palamas. The fundamental 
difference in the structure of hierarchies in the doctrines of Dionysius and Gregory was revealed. 
This difference is associated with a shift in the meaning of the philosophical concept of 
“participation.” Gregory’s hierarchy must have influenced Dionysius’s hierarchy. Gregory’s 
doctrine of hierarchy was based on the Biblical and cosmogonical order of natural beings. The 
further elaboration of the hierarchy of participating beings, proposed by Dionysius the 
Areopagite on the basis of the Neoplatonic triad (tetrad) of (Goodness) Being, Life, and Mind, 
and of the doctrine of the hierarchy of natural beings in Gregory of Nyssa was analyzed in the 
writings of Maximus the Confessor, John of Damascus, and Gregory Palamas. 
This study resulted in discovering a terminological inconsistency of the Orthodox Eastern 
Christian tradition in respect to the issue of participation of created beings in the common nature 
of the Persons of the Holy Trinity. This inconsistency may be tentatively explained by the fact 
that Early Christian writers and authors of the later periods used different philosophical 
paradigms of participation. 
The analysis has shown that the whole variety of participation modes can be found in the 
Arians and the Cappadocian Fathers. A specific Neoplatonic influence was likely to have 
influenced the Arians, whereas the influence of Porphyry’s Isagoge was important for their 
opponent Gregory of Nyssa. 
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